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Abstract
The following dissertation is an in-depth examination of the cognition and behaviour
associated with ritualized action. Within the Cognitive Science of Religion (CSR)
framework considerable resources have been devoted to understanding how rituals
influence the way groups form, and how they influence the behaviour of individuals with
respect to in- and out-group members (though other dimensions of ritual-related topics
are discussed hereafter). However, as evinced by the publication record, very little effort
has been devoted to understanding how we cognitively and behaviourally respond when
rituals are directed towards objects and artefacts.
That this question has been overlooked is not a trivial academic matter. Rituals are
ubiquitous across cultures, and while the vast majority of rituals are performed for the
benefit of an individual or a group, a vast subset therein are performed toward objects,
and thereby influence the way in which we interact with them. Wedding bands,
birthday cakes, flags, holy water, and entire buildings (to name but a few) are all made
unique via ritual action. What is it about such actions that bestow upon objects their
status? Why and how does this come about? And can it be explained through wholly
ordinary cognitive mechanisms?
In my introduction I outline the most relevant theories, which both inform and
challenge our nascent understanding of object-directed rituals. I make suggestions as to
which theories have the most promise in examining these questions. Further, I attempt
to provide a theoretical and operational definition which is not merely a descriptive
constellation of general features, but a definition which proposes a causal pathway of
action. In so doing, I elevate the role of ‘causal opacity’ and ‘goal demotion’ to greater
prominence (above featural qualities like repetition, redundancy, formality, and
stereotypy). The following chapters sequentially present evidence for this definition, as
well as exploring other important cognitive aspects associated with ritual cognition.
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In chapter two I establish a robust protocol for examining the manner in which
ritualized actions influence our cognitions. I challenge the methods and conclusions of
prior work that has examined the role objects and artefacts play in ritual sequences. I
examine predications made by the ‘ritual stance’, a theoretical framework for explaining
ritual cognition, and find support for a nuanced picture of ritual cognition when
ritualized actions are directed toward objects.
In chapter three I extend the findings of chapter two, and more clearly demarcate the
unique role of goal demotion. I find support for the claim that causal opacity and goal
demotion are separable, and account for different kinds of responses among participants.
Further, I examine the ways our memory (and by extension, our perception) is
influenced by ritualized action.
In chapter four I examine all previous findings in more ecologically valid settings. I
examine the behaviour of children (in two distinct and orthogonal cultures) and adults.
Here I find a distinct lack of support for predictions associated with the ritual stance,
which represents a meaningful challenge to the validity of prior findings. However, I do
find additional support for the position (established in chapter three) that ritualized
actions are recalled/perceived differently from ordinary actions.
The results of these five experiments are discussed, and I attempt to reconcile these
findings in a manner that can help direct future questions associated with
object-directed rituals. While the results of these experiments were not strictly as
hypothesized, they do provide an important definitional, theoretical, and operation
foundation for future work on a topic that is otherwise under-researched.
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Introduction
Rituals, Religion, and Evolution
What comes to mind when considering ritual? Most often, the rituals we tend to
be familiar with are the religious rituals associated with our own cultures. As a citizen
of a first-world western nation in which the largest religious groups are Christian, I am
most familiar with rituals associated with the beginning of life, the joining of lives, and
the mourning of life lost (Baptisms, Marriages, and Funerals, respectively). While I do
not belong to such religious groups I am also familiar with other rituals, including the
taking of the sacrament, in which the devout remember their lord by way of consuming
his body and blood, as well as less popular but still orthodox rituals associated with
exorcisms and interventions (Herbermann, 1913). But to scratch the surface of ritual, to
examine the constituent parts of it, is to be able to identify ritual acts outside of
religion which are still unique to our own shared culture. One example is the birthday
party: how odd it is to annually surround our loved ones, chant at them in unison, set
fire to their dessert, then cheer with non-sense words like “hiphip” and “hooray” as they
unhygienically extinguish the purposeless fire. What are the differences between an
exorcism and a birthday? And perhaps more importantly what are the similarities?
A thorough and scientific examination of ritual requires one to ignore appeals to
supernatural power in the former case and simple appeals to tradition in the latter. For
if we take ritual acts at face value we must ask the questions but how do those specific
actions emancipate the possessed? and why does a birthday (and not a funeral or a
wedding) warrant a flaming dessert? These questions are, in a sense, absurd. There can
be no scientific explanation or justification for either act. A more useful line of inquiry
is to examine questions of proximal and ultimate causation (Scott-Phillips, Dickins, &
West, 2011; Tinbergen, 1963). A proximal explanation is an explanation of what
sustains a thing in the present, thus, to ask the following question of ritual has
substantive value: How do we recognize this act as something that is not ordinary? or
why do we continue to perform rituals? While an ultimate explanation relates to the
causes that allowed a thing to come into being historically and ancestrally, thus we can
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ask the question: why does anything like a ritual exist at all? To answer these questions
we must divorce all the rich associations we may have with given rituals and examine
the structure onto which such explanations are imposed. Thus we must forgo the
exegetical explanations associated with supernatural intervention, as well as
associations that a thing is merely transmitted culturally.
It is beyond the scope of this thesis to provide a full and complete theory of ritual
and ritual cognition that satisfactorily describes the proximal features as they relate to
casual mechanisms, the ontological and developmental considerations, as well as the
ultimate features relating to the adaptive and functional utility of the act and the
evolutionary and selective pressures that facilitated its emergence. While the pursuit of
such a comprehensive goal might easily consume an entire lifetime, herein I take humble
steps to address only a few of these features. In all empirical chapters hereafter, I begin
to describe a range of behaviours associated with ritual and ritual cognition. In
chapters one and two I attempt to demarcate some features of ritual cognition as causal
mechanisms in our responses to, and our perceptions of, ritual. And in chapter three I
propose and extend these findings into increasingly ecologically valid contexts, and
contribute to the discussion of the ontological features of the human species that
facilitate ritual-oriented behaviour.
How Should We Understand Rituals?
There are many possible scientific and academic frameworks that can illuminate
the phenomena of ritual. Anthropological and sociological theories of ritual abound.
Yet one of the more recent approaches to understanding ritual falls under the umbrella
of the ‘Cognitive Science of Religion’ (CSR) (Atran, 2002; Boyer, 2001). This approach,
broadly, suggests any explanation of religion and its features (including ritual) can be
quantitatively and empirically investigated and explained with reference to ordinary
cognitive faculties and heuristics. Further, such a framework is typically grounded by
evolutionary theory. Where peculiar features of ritual (or religion more broadly) are
identified a parsimonious approach is employed: the underlying ordinary cognitive
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mechanisms of the phenomenon are identified, then discussed or manipulated in such a
way as to elicit a response consistent with the initial religious observation (Boyer &
Liénard, 2006; Liénard & Boyer, 2006; Sørensen, 2007b). For example, it has been
shown that supernatural agents are present cross-culturally and tend to share a number
of overlapping features. The underlying structure at the individual level is semantic
memory, and it has been investigated and manipulated in such a way as to reveal that
supernatural agents have a memory advantage because they incorporate a particular
range and frequency of category violations (Banerjee, Haque, & Spelke, 2013; J. Barrett
& Nyhof, 2001; Norenzayan, Atran, Faulkner, & Schaller, 2006). Descriptions of agents
with a few deviations are better remembered than those with none, or those with too
many. For example, a man (a category of thing with ordinary biological, psychological,
and physical constraints) who is described as violating one of the native categorical
constraints, such never needing to eat (a biological violation), knowing all the
information in the world (a psychological violation), or being able to fly (a physical
violation) is better remembered than a man who is all of those things (i.e., a know-it-all
man, who flys from place to place, and who never hungers), or a man who is none of
those things (i.e., just a man).
By and large this is an incredibly fruitful strategy for determining how and why
something like ritual or religion can appear special, while being explained by wholly
ordinary processes. To this end, specific theories of ritual cognition will be described in
the following section (‘What is Ritual Cognition’). The logical consequence of the CSR
approach, when applied to ritual, is that we must first consider ritual as a basically
ordinary thing and that any cognitive or behavioural responses derived thereafter must
be explained in terms of ordinary processes. This approach leads to interesting
questions and insightful predictions. For example, we can consider a ritual - like any
action - to be merely a structured set of motor actions requiring an understanding of
causation and intention (Boyer & Liénard, 2006; Zacks, Kumar, Abrams, & Mehta,
2004; Zacks, Speer, Swallow, Braver, & Reynolds, 2007; Zacks & Tversky, 2001), which
is further informed by contextual social information both implicit and explicit (Baldwin,
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1992; Nielsen & Blank, 2011), and which is historically and cross-culturally present (i.e.,
not explained by local environmental or cultural factors; Nielsen, Mushin, Tomaselli,
and Whiten (2014); Nielsen and Tomaselli (2010); Shipton and Nielsen (2015)).
But regarding ritual in this manner - as being like any other kind of action - is not
particularly useful, and may even be counter-productive. Rituals do seem to elicit
different kinds of thoughts and behaviours, and we must very clearly operationalize
what features are present in rituals in order to determine why they are not ordinary.
First, however, an important distinction (drawn from the literature) needs to be made.
Thus far, I have been referring to the phenomenon under consideration as ‘ritual’ (and
will do so in Chapter one), but what I am referring to - and what I will ultimate make
conclusions with reference to - is ‘ritualized behaviour’ (a distinction not made clear
until Chapter 2). The difference between ritual and ritualized behaviour is rather
important. Rituals necessarily contain ritualized behaviour, but ritualized behaviour
rarely constitutes a ritual in its entirety. Ritualized behaviours constitute the atomic
elements of ritual - and can be recognized for the following features: repetition and
redundancy of some or all actions, frequently also featuring stereotypy, in which the
performance of such action is rigidly determined and highly specified, thus conveying a
sense of formality, and which facilitates a drive to prioritize accurate performance of the
action rather than accurate reproduction of outcomes. Such actions, when performed
by a group, may also be synchronized (Bulbulia & Sosis, 2011; Cohen, Mundry, &
Kirschner, 2013; Fischer, Callander, Reddish, & Bulbulia, 2013; Kapitány & Nielsen,
2015, 2016; Legare & Souza, 2012; Rappaport, 1999; Reddish, Bulbulia, & Fischer,
2014; Tunçgenç & Cohen, 2016; Wiltermuth & Heath, 2009). In contrast, a ritual is a
broader category of action: a ritual features ritualized actions, but also embodies
meaning and dogma, arouses a diverse range of emotions (which likely serve important
functional roles), and has various learned associations and interactions with memory,
and which also tend to clearly ‘belong’ to specific groups and communities (Durkheim &
Ward Swain, 2008; Geertz, 1973; Whitehouse, 2004, 2012; Whitehouse & Laidlaw,
2004). This distinction should further the argument made earlier - that it is necessary
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to separate religion from ritual (and, by extension, ritualized behaviour from ritual),
particularly if the goal is to find answers to the questions posed previously: How do we
recognize this act as something that is not ordinary?, and why does anything like a ritual
exist at all?
I will argue over progressive chapters that the definition of ritualized behaviour
(provided above) is actually insufficient. Consider the following thought experiment
which I will continue to draw upon throughout this introduction. Imagine the room
attendant of an upmarket hotel. The attendant’s job is to clean recently vacated rooms.
In so doing, the task is typically performed while the following conditions are met: the
attendant is wearing an immaculate and standardized uniform (formality), they
perform their obligatory actions (rigidity) during a specific window of opportunity. The
attendant most likely enters the first room, and follows a reproducable set of procdures
(first clean the bed, then the bathroom, then the floors, then the windows; accurate
performance of actions). This attendant, by virtue of the prestige of the hotel, likely
performs all these actions whether or not they actually need to be performed. If one of
the beds has not been used it will nonetheless be cleaned (redundancy). And, of course,
the very act of cleaning itself is highly repetitive. And this procedure will be repeated
many times a day, every day of the week. The point is that many kinds of ordinary
actions, with perfectly instrumental explanations, embody many of the features of
ritualized behaviours. And yet, by any understanding - either in the laysense, or a
scientific sense - to conclude that the attendant’s actions were a part of a ritual would
be absurd (or at the very least useless). However, if you were to observe a formally
dressed person who, at a specific time, entered the woods and appeared to - in specific
order - douse, rub, and anoint the bark, branches, and leaves of a tree, then to repeat
these actions on another tree, and another... you would be at a loss to describe that
person as doing anything other than performing a ritual! The argument I will put forth
in the following empirical chapters is that these features of ritual are only useful
inasmuch as they generate causal opacity and goal demotion.
The role of causal opacity in ritualized action has been discussed by a number of
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authors (Legare, Wen, Herrmann, & Whitehouse, 2015; Nielbo & Sørensen, 2016;
Watson-Jones, Legare, Whitehouse, & Clegg, 2014; Wen, Herrmann, & Legare, 2015; ?).
It has generally been described in two different ways, both of which have utility, and
both of which relate to how an observer of an action can infer causal action. And yet, I
will argue that both are insufficient and hereafter attempt to refine their definition and
operationalization.
The first definition of causal opacity relates to actions which, when performed, do
not produce physical outcomes. That is, the start-state of the object subjected to
actions is equivalent to the end-state (as the actions have not physically causally altered
the objects); this is referred to as ‘start-and-end-state equivalency’, and occurs when a
“...[causally opaque] action sequence prompts the interpretation that the observed actions
are unknowable from a physical-causal perspective...” (Legare, Whitehouse, Wen, &
Herrmann, 2015; Watson-Jones et al., 2014). When actions do produce an end-state
that perceptually varies from the start-state the actions are interpreted as having been
performed in order to bring about the change, and the “... the action sequence is
interpreted as having an instrumental goal and a potentially knowable causal structure”
(Watson-Jones et al., 2014). These authors argue that as a consequence of
state-end-state equivalency such actions are considered conventional by observers. This
can be a useful claim to make under some circumstances, and I characterize causal
opacity according to this definition as ‘actions that do not cause outcomes’. While some
rituals and actions conform to this definition, others do not. Consider the following
example in which this interpretation is incredibly useful: the act of clapping or giving
applause. The pre-clap state of the universe is not physically different from the
post-clap state of the universe, and as a result the actions are easily and justifiably
interpreted as conventional. However, some rituals that feature causally opaque
ritualized actions have a non-equivalent start- and end-state. Consider a birthday party.
The person for whom the party is held is aware that there are lit candles on a cake
(start-state), and who then has the obligation of extinguishing them (end-state). While
the causal mechanism of extinguishing candles is easily knowable, the physical-causal
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relationship between the extinguishing of the candles and the birthday itself is not,
despite the fact that the start-state and the end-state vary from the perspective of the
guest of honour. More extreme examples include ritualistic tattooing, circumcision, or
scarification (Sosis, Kress, & Boster, 2007), where the end-start is permanently and
physically different from start state. Thus, the notion that start-end-state equivalency
is sufficient for arousing causal opacity is clearly lacking. Indeed, this definition also
leaves open the possibility that, even if we accept it at face-value, it may be possible for
ritualized actions to lead to an inference of non-physical change. In chapters one, two,
and three I address additional problematic aspects of this definition of causal opacity.
The second definition of causal opacity relates to more concrete perceptual
cognitive processes, and can be described as “... the decoupling of an action sequence’s
causal dependency structure” (Schjødt & Sørensen, 2013). This definition describes how
the causal pathway of a ritualized action and the corresponding [alleged] outcome is
inaccessible to the observer. “... [causal opacity] belongs to the level of concrete
psycho-physics of an action, which is accessed through mechanisms of perceptual
causality and therefore quite early in the processing hierarchy of dynamic stimuli”
(Schjødt & Sørensen, 2013). Such a definition allows for non-equivalence between start-
and end-states, so long as the way in which the states change is perceptually unclear.
The utility of this definition is that it allows for a difference between start- and
end-states, real physical differences and does not preclude non-physical changes taking
place (as will be discussed in chapters one, two, and three). While I use the first
definition of causal opacity in Chapter one, as my understanding of the topic changed
over time, I shifted towards the second in chapter two and three.
But causal opacity is not the only quality associated with ritualized action. I
argue that goal demotion is equally important but relatively understudied. While goal
demotion is mentioned as a quality of ritual by a number of authors (Boyer & Liénard,
2006; Legare & Souza, 2012; Liénard & Boyer, 2006; Rossano, 2012; Schjødt &
Sørensen, 2013; Sørensen & Nielbo, 2013), very few have studied it empirically (but see:
Fux, Eilam, Mort, Keren, and Lawson (2013); Mitkidis, Lienard, Nielbo, and Sørensen
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(2014); Nielbo and Sørensen (2011). Many authors acknowledge the importance of goal
demotion and suggest that identifying goal demotion is a function of the fact that
ritualized actions “...are not justified by the purported goals of the performed sequences
of action” (Mitkidis et al., 2014; Rappaport, 1999), or as a “disturbance of the goal
structure ... and [or] removal of the goal” (Nielbo & Sørensen, 2011). Here I argue that
these definitions are not distinct enough from that of causal opacity. If there is
start-end-state equivalency then of course the actions are not justified by the goal, since
the goal is simply not apparent (beyond the fact that actions were purposeful).
Likewise, if an action sequence’s causal dependency structure is disrupted, then it is
also the case that the goal structure is disturbed. In chapter two I describe the
difference between causal opacity and goal demotion in the following way: “...causal
opacity describes whether or not an action sequence has an observable potential
mechanism, [while] goal demotion refers to an observer’s ability to infer and understand
an actor’s reason (e.g., goals or motivations) for a given action sequence”. I further
suggest that the difference is that “causal opacity begets the question “By what
mechanism is an effect being caused?” while goal demotion begets “Why does the actor
act?””. Rituals tend to be both opaque and goal demoted, and as a result are rarely
dissociated in the literature. In Chapter two and three I attempt to rectify this problem
empirically by explicitly manipulating whether participants have access to actor’s
intentions during the performance of ritualized actions.
So how should we formulate an empirical understanding of rituals? First, we
should limit our investigation to ritualized action rather than rituals. Rituals feature
ritualized action, but they also come with many other associations. By choosing
(potentially arbitrarily, for ritual has many other features, too) to focus on this one
building block, we can begin constructing from the ground up a more refined empirical
understanding of the constitutional nature of rituals. Second, the consensus definition
specifies that ritual and ritualized actions are recognized for their repetition and
redundancy of some or all parts, in which the sequence of may also feature stereotypy,
and in which the performance of such action is rigidly determined and highly specified,
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thus conveying a sense of formality, which facilitates a drive to prioritize (when
performing a ritual action) accurate performance of the action rather than accurate
reproduction of outcomes. But as I articulate with the hotel attendant problem, such
an operational definition is only useful inasmuch as those actions convey to observers a
sense of causal opacity and goal demotion. In chapters one, two, and three I attempt to
refine this theoretical approach with regard to understanding ritual cognition, and in so
doing attempt to place all the motor-features of ritual, and the consequent
normative-performative aspects of ritual, under the all-encompassing umbrella of causal
opacity and goal demotion.
What is Ritual Cognition?
Ritual cognition is the study of ritual, typically from a psychological perspective.
This is in contrast to approaches generally taken by anthropologists or theologists.
Ritual cognition is an attempt to understand the features of mind (or populations of
minds) that produce and/or comprehend rituals as distinct social phenomena. This
area of enquiry generally adopts a CSR approach to the question, presupposing that
rituals (and their constituent elements) are not special, but rather ordinary in their
mechanisms (even if rituals do appear distinct from other kinds of social action). The
following list outlines many topics associated with ritual cognition.
Topic within ’Ritual Cognition’
• Determining the stability of rituals within populations as a function of their
features (Atkinson & Whitehouse, 2011; Fux et al., 2013; Henrich, 2009; Sosis &
Ruﬄe, 2003; Whitehouse, 2001)
• The manner in which rituals influence the behaviour of individuals towards
in-group and out-group members (Reddish et al., 2014; Ruﬄe & Sosis, 2007; Soler,
2012; Sosis & Ruﬄe, 2003; Wen et al., 2015; Whitehouse & Lanman, 2014;
Wiltermuth & Heath, 2009; Xygalatas et al., 2013; ?)
• How rituals influence the identity of group members (Cheung & Chi-mei Li, 2011;
Hermanowicz & Morgan, 2013; Legare & Wen, 2014; Mann, Feddes, Doosje, &
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Fischer, 2016)
• The ways in which rituals interact with emotions and physiology (Bulbulia et al.,
2013; Fischer et al., 2014; Konvalinka et al., 2011; Lang, Krátký, Shaver,
Jerotijević, & Xygalatas, 2015; Norton & Gino, 2013; Zohar & Felz, 2001)
• The featural qualities determining efficacy of rituals (H. Barrett, 2002; J. Barrett
& Lawson, 2001; Legare & Souza, 2012, 2014; Sørensen, 2007b; Sørensen, Lienard,
& Feeny, 2006)
• Theoretical understanding of rituals as informed by biological/evolutionary theory
(Atran & Henrich, 2010; Blute, 2006; Boyer & Liénard, 2006; Liénard & Boyer,
2006; Palmer & Pomianek, 2007; Purzycki & Sosis, 2013; Shaver & Sosis, 2014)
• The relationship between ritual, and learning and culture (Rossano, 2012; Wilks,
Kapitány, & Nielsen, 2016)
However, the study of rituals as it relates to how we understand and interact with
objects has received relatively little attention (Keren, Boyer, Mort, & Eilam, 2013;
Vohs, Wang, Gino, & Norton, 2013), as has the study into how we actually perceive and
cognitively understand rituals (Nielbo & Sørensen, 2011, 2016; Schjødt & Sørensen,
2013; Sørensen & Nielbo, 2013).
What follows hereafter is a discussion of a subset of theories as they relate to the
empirical work that I will present. While many theoretical and methodological
approaches are regretfully left without introduction, they have been omitted as they do
not bear directly upon the work presented.
The ritual stance. The ritual stance proposes an explanation for individuals’
responses when observing causally opaque actions (Herrmann, Legare, Harris, &
Whitehouse, 2013; Legare & Herrmann, 2013; Legare, Whitehouse, et al., 2015) and was
first developed in the context of children’s imitative behaviour within a framework of
cultural learning. The ritual stance is the claim that “cultural learning in humans may
involve a ritual stance (i.e., seeking out a rationale for actions based on social
convention) in addition to an instrumental stance (i.e., seeking out a rationale for
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actions based on physical causation)” (Legare & Herrmann, 2013) and that “...the
rationale for interpreting an action [a ritualized action] is not in principle knowable
from the perspective of physical causality and instead is based on social conventionality”
(Legare, Whitehouse, et al., 2015). The ritual stance may be triggered by causal
opacity, as well as conventional language. While a conventional interpretation in the
context of conventional language is unsurprising, the utility of the theory is that causal
opacity begets an interpretation that these [causally opaque] actions are conventional
and normative, and as a consequence, facilitates a conventional and normative
behavioural response. But why? It is argued that [children] must learn to become
competent members of their cultural communities, and in addition to acquiring
instrumental skills (how to use particular technologies), they must develop an
understanding of both ordinary conventional actions (such as handshaking, kissing,
genuflections, etc.) as well as ritual conventions (such as marriages, funerals, birthdays,
etc.) (Legare, Whitehouse, et al., 2015).
What does a conventional response look like? In Watson-Jones et al. (2014) and
Legare, Wen, et al. (2015) ritual sequences (defined as “conventions [that are] causally
opaque, [and] socially shared”, and which were operationalized as have start-end-state
equivalency) elicited higher rates of imitative fidelity from children than did non-ritual
sequences. Specifically, a demonstrator (presented in a video) sat in front of a
peg-board, three blocks, and a sealed box (which concealed behind it a large block-like
object). In the ritual condition (with start-end-state equivalency) the sequence involved
the demonstrator picking up the blocks and tapping them against the board before
placing them back into their original position. The demonstrator then pressed their fists
together. This process was repeated twice. The third block was picked up and used to
slide open the lid of the box, then this piece was returned to it’s original position, and
the demonstrator closed the box with their hand. In the instrumental condition (where
start- and end-states varied), rather than using the third block to open the box, the
demonstrator revealed the previously concealed object and used it to open the box
before placing it inside, before closing the box with her hand. The authors argue that
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the ritual stance was activated in the ritual/conventional condition as there was
start-end-state equivalency. They found, across three experiments, that there was a
main-effect associated with end states, such that children imitated the demonstrated
actions more accurately when there was equivalency than when there was not. They
argue that because rituals (as conventions) can not be made more correct or efficient,
the most appropriate way to reproduce them is as they were originally performed. A
conventional response within this formulation of the ritual stance is, then, ‘to produce
the ritualized action as exactly as possible when given the opportunity’.
It is worth noting here that the manipulation employed may have been causally
opaque to the extent that the actions performed provided no salient mechanism of
action, but that because there was no change in states there was no actual mechanism
that required discerning. Rather, these repetitive, redundant and formal actions were
actually goal demoted, in the sense that it is unclear why the actor was performing the
actions rather than how they were bringing about an effect.
Nielsen, Kapitány, and Elkins (2014) conducted two studies that better illuminate
the role of causal opacity and goal demotion. In the first of two experiments, a child
met an experimenter who introduced their favourite toy, played with it, then placed it
inside a box. The first experimenter left and a second experimenter arrived, who
retrieved the toy, then placed it inside a second, different, locked box. The second
experimenter then demonstrated to the child how to retrieve the toy from the locked
box with a standardized series of ritualized (repetitive, redundant) actions, and causally
efficacious (but inefficient) actions. The second experimenter than, either a) left the
room, b) remained in the room, or c) provided the child the opportunity to retrieve the
toy immediately (by saying “now it’s your turn”). In the first two conditions, the first
experimenter returned and asked the child “... can you get my toy for me?”. It was
found that, as far as the reproduction of arbitrary actions goes, there was no difference
between any of the three conditions. That is, the causally opaque actions (redundant,
repetitive, formal) were copied despite the fact that there was not start-end-state
equivalency (suggesting support for the definition of opacity that relates to disrupted
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causal-dependency structures). Unlike the previous work, the actions were not goal
demoted: the actor was apparently performing the actions in order to open the box. In
a second experiment the procedure was repeated with three conditions. One condition
involved the child responding directly after being shown the sequence (as per
experiment one). The second and third conditions employed the same sequence of
action and re-ordered the elements. The ritualized actions were moved to the end of the
sequence after the box had been opened (the actions were both causally opaque -
broadly conforming to both understandings of the term - as well as goal demoted: it
was not clear why the actor was performing the actions because the apparent goal had
been satisfied). In the second condition the child responded immediately, and in the
third condition the experimenter left the room and the first experimenter returned and
asked the child to help them get their toy out of the box. Reproduction of the arbitrary
actions was highest when the sequence was causally opaque but not goal demoted (the
sequence was not shuﬄed) and the child had a direct opportunity to perform the
actions after demonstration. Reproduction was lowest when the sequence was causally
opaque and goal demoted (with a shuﬄed sequence) and when the experimenter who
demonstrated the actions (experimenter 2) was absent. However, even under these
conditions - when the actions were causally opaque and goal demoted and the modeller
of the actions would have no idea whether those actions were performed - reproduction
of arbitrary actions was still evident! Suggesting, as predicted by the ritual stance, that
causal opacity and goal demotion lead to conventional responses; that is, some children
chose ‘to produce the ritualized action as exactly as possible when given the
opportunity’.
How is the ritual stance theory relevant to this thesis? First, it is primary theory
under consideration, and has directly shaped each empirical chapter hereafter. This is
primarily due to the fact that I think the ritual stance is underspecified. Within it the
role of causal opacity and goal demotion is not clearly demarcated theoretically or
operationally (addressed primarily in empirical chapters one and two). Second,
conventional or normative behaviour is not always expressed through imitation or
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copying, and, groups have various conventional expectations as they relate to objects.
Thus, to the extent that the ritual stance makes the claim that ritualized actions arouse
a conventional interpretation, such a claim should also apply to objects (this is explored
in all three empirical chapters). Third, normative behaviour need not always be
affiliative behaviour; the ritual stance does not specify how valence of actions influences
perceptions and behaviour (explored in empirical chapter two). Fourth, the ritual stance
is underspecified inasmuch as it makes no claims regarding how the ritual stance is
activated from a perceptual or cognitive point of view (investigated in empirical chapter
two and three). And Fifth, the ritual stance is claimed to be one route by which children
become competent members of their communities as they age, and consequently, it is
how they come to understand and appropriately respond to conventions and norms -
such a claim ought to extend to objects subjected to rituals (empirical chapter three).
The Social-Action Hypothesis. The social-action hypothesis is introduced in
chapter one and discussed extensively therein. The social-action hypothesis specifies
that an observer’s intuitions about ritual are constrained by ordinary cognitions and are
cross culturally preserved (Lawson & McCauley, 1990; McCauley & Lawson, 2002).
Further, it predicts that given minimal information regarding a ritual’s structure, both
in terms of the actions performed, as well as the objects and the agencies involved
(Sørensen, 2007b; Sørensen et al., 2006), people can reliably develop intuitions about
the efficacy of the ritual’s efficacy. The logic of the social-action hypothesis is that, in
wordly affairs, actions are often performed to rouse another to action, or arouse a
change in their disposition. It’s just that within a ritual structure this ‘other’ is
super-natural. A further condition of the social-action hypothesis is that it weights each
element of a ritual hierarchically (J. Barrett & Lawson, 2001; Lawson & McCauley,
1990; Sørensen, 2007a; Sørensen et al., 2006). Consider a real-world example: a religious
marriage. To become married rings must be exchanged (objects), after the appropriate
sermonizing and exchanging of vows (actions) under the authority of a Priest (an agent)
who, himself, is authorized by God (a super-natural agent). The social-action
hypothesis proposes the most heavily weighted factor in determining whether or not a
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ritual is successful (for example, whether a marriage is authentic and binding) is, first,
whether or not there is an appropriate super-natural agency presiding over the ritual,
and second, whether the intentional agent is an appropriate conduit for expressing the
super-natural agent’s authority. The theory asserts that, because the mechanism of
action is causally opaque (though they use different nomenclature), then the mechanism
of causation is ‘non-mechanistic, non-natural’ and that “even observers with little
cultural knowledge of a particular religious system will still have intuitions that
superhuman agency must be involved for the [ritual] action to work” (J. Barrett &
Lawson, 2001). By these intuitions, they argue that rituals are actions performed to
influence the behaviour of super-natural others or to change their dispositions. As a
result, rituals (and often, specifically, religious rituals) must have such an agency
embedded within the structure of the ritual in order to persuade participants and
observers that the actions really will cause an outcome. Due to the causal opacity of
the actions employed, the only way to effectively rouse such a being to action is to have
someone the being recognizes as their proxy. Thus, after the super-natural agent, the
second largest contributor to perceptions of efficacy is the ‘intentional agent’ performing
the ritual (a priest, for example, can’t accidentally marry a couple). The social-action
hypothesis simply takes the schemas associated with the perception of ordinary social
acts, and intermingles super-natural agency as just another relevant social factor, albeit,
within the context of ritual, it is argued to the the most important social factor.
The social-action hypothesis, and the empirical questions associated with it, have
not been the subject of extensive investigation. In chapter one I critique this theory,
and as such, will not go into further depth on the topic here. However, to summarise,
the social-action hypothesis is not particularly divergent in the assumptions it makes
about rituals. Much like the ritual stance, and the theories that will be discussed
hereafter, it assumes that rituals can primarily be understood in terms of ordinary
cognitions. Unlike the ritual stance, which supposes that by way of opaque actions
rituals are identified as conventional or normative acts, the social-action hypothesis
suggests that rituals are acts of persuasion, and that the inclusion of super-natural
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agency is what makes them identifiable and efficacious.
The hazard precaution and Action Parsing system. The hazard
precaution and action parsing system is discussed in detail in empirical chapter two, and
is addressed again in chapter three. Proposed by Boyer and Liénard (2006) and Liénard
and Boyer (2006) it can be described thusly: The underlying features of ritualized
actions, which constitute a critical but not exclusive role in rituals more generally, can
be explained by the conjunction of two specialized cognitive systems. The first is the
‘hazard and precaution system’ which governs our ability to infer whether there is a
potential threat in our environment, and to respond in a protective or anticipatory
manner. The second is the ‘action parsing system’, which governs how humans divide
the flow of action sequences into meaningful units of action. Liénard and Boyer (2006)
and Boyer and Liénard (2006) argue that these two cognitive systems can explain why
rituals the world over tend to be constructed with the same core elements (repetition,
redundancy, formality, stereotypy, etc.). The logical extension of this theory is that it
provides both ultimate and ontological (developmental) explanations for rituals.
With respect to an evolutionary (ultimate) explanation of why rituals exist at all,
the authors suggest that ritualized actions (often, but not always, in the service of
larger rituals) are associated with specific themes cross-culturally, such as purity and
cleanliness, contamination and health, reproduction, in-groups and kin, food and
resources, and social harm. Such themes, they argue, are adaptive and represent
evolved anticipatory-responses to selective pressures (see also: Abed and de Pauw
(1999) for a discussion on the ‘psychological immune system’). If these themes were
categorized super-ordinately and described under the umbrella of ‘safety’ (something
too abstract to have been shaped by evolutionary pressures) we might see rituals
associated with preventing car crashes or improving the efficacy of antibiotics, but we
don’t. Further, we don’t tend to observe rituals in contexts that are not associated with
evolutionary imperatives. We do not tend to observe rituals in the service of beauty as
an abstract aesthetic quality, except when it serves as a proxy for reproduction; we do
not tend to observe rituals in the service of mountains and rocks, unless those
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mountains and rocks represent territory we claim as our own (and would fight to defend
against others); and we do not observe rituals associated with melted-cheese on toast,
unless it melted in such a way as to look like a first-century Jewish radical who claimed
he can mitigate our culpability of social misdeeds1. Liénard and Boyer (2006) argue
that the limited range of ritual topics is due to the fact that the system is calibrated to
infer the [potential] presence of real threats. For example, when we observe conspecifics
actively eschewing particular foodstuffs it may indicate something about the value or
danger of the food being avoided - as a consequential by-product, we observe food
taboos in many religions (Meyer-Rochow, 2009); when we observe others assuming
postures of supplication or submission it typically indicates the presence of a
high-status individual or formidable enemy, thus, a reasonable course of anticipatory
action is to treat the subject of such supplication cautiously - which may explain the
stances assumed during prayer and worship (even if the other - a god or deity - is
conspicuously absent); and to observe another cleaning an object is to proactively
prevent the potential spread of contamination and avoid sickness as a result - thus, we
find rituals that involve the repetitive cleaning and re-cleaning of objects in order to
avoid a kind of spiritual contamination. Though it is worth noting that ritual and
ritualized actions are not necessarily evolved: “To be evolved through natural selection, a
capacity for rituals should be beneficial to individual reproductive potential. Or, more
specifically, one would need to consider that a higher or more focused involvement in
ritual performance would result, on average, in better reproductive potential... it seems
to us that we have very little direct evidence for the reproductive benefit of such a tool”
(Liénard & Boyer, 2006). To the extent that the hazard and precaution system
adaptively infers the presence of legitimate threats, ritualized actions tend to weakly
‘misidentify’ ritual actions as adaptively significant - a kind of evolutionary Type 1
error. As a result, this theory goes some distance to answering the question: Why does
anything like a ritual exist at all? Answer: Ritual is the unintentional cognitive
1see https://www.buzzfeed.com/arielknutson/people-who-found-jesus-in-their-food?utm
_term=.pjw1jRJ0m#.blZgQn2vR
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by-catch of a system which helps us detect potential threats in our environment.
Ritualized action, and rituals, tend to be performed in a certain way: they are
often compulsory or obligatory, they require high-fidelity reproduction of the script, and
they are repetitive and redundant (Boyer & Liénard, 2006; Liénard & Boyer, 2006). But
there are arguably good reasons for all of these things. Boyer and Liénard (2006) and
Liénard and Boyer (2006) argue that rituals, much like instrumental ordinary action
sequences, are necessary to avert or resolve a crisis. To the extent that failing to clean
particular objects or supplicate at the correct time may result in anxiety associated
with a potential sickness or insult, the production of ritualized action at the appropriate
time can resolve anxiety associated with situations outside of our control. And there is
empirical evidence to support this claim.
Norton and Gino (2013) examined how rituals were used by ordinary people after
highly aversive events (such as the death of a loved one), and prompted them to
consider rituals they participated in (or, as a control, asked them to consider an
unrelated topic). Based on these retrospective reports, it was found that those who
recalled a ritual after recalling a traumatic event reported more control and less grief
than those who did not recall a ritual. Next (in two similar experiments), participants
were bought into the lab and enrolled in a $200 lottery. All but one lost the lottery and
the remainder privately participated in a nonsense ritual, or engaged in a filler task.
Those who engaged with the ritual reported more control and less grief associated with
losing the lottery. In situations which are beyond our control and which arouse in us a
sense of anxiety or loss, rituals appear ameliorative.
Similarly, Legare and Souza (2014) examined the perceptions of Americans and
Brazilians under various conditions of priming where they induced a sense of
randomness, negativity, or neutrality. Participants in the random condition rated
descriptions of nonsense rituals as more efficacious than those in the negative or neutral
conditions. With respect to the hazard precaution system, it follows that since some
ordinary actions do adaptively allow for reliable inference of threat, that lead to
adaptive and precautionary behaviours, then ritualized actions may co-opt this
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sensibility and instil in observers and performers an imperative to produce such
ritualized actions that mitigate anxiety associated the threat by providing or facilitating
a sense of control. Thus, their production becomes increasingly obligatory as a tool for
managing our emotions and our (subjective control over our) environment.
With respect to the necessity of high-fidelity reproduction of the script, since it is
the case that causally opaque sequences can’t really be innovated upon to improve their
efficacy, there is no better or best way to perform a ritual, except to do it as it has been
done before (Legare & Nielsen, 2015; Legare & Souza, 2012; Legare, Whitehouse, et al.,
2015; Wen et al., 2015) - although that doesn’t preclude certain features being more
persuasive than others. And just because a series of actions doesn’t have an immediate
causal affordance (for example, reciting a specific number of Ave Marias), doesn’t mean
it is unknowable (Harrison, Roberts, Gabrilska, Rumbaugh, & Diggle, 2015) 2
Furthermore, some rituals require synchronized performance, and individual deviation
outside of the expected set of action is likely to disrupt the proximal goal of synchrony
(Cohen et al., 2013; Tunçgenç & Cohen, 2016; Wiltermuth & Heath, 2009). This
expectation of adherence is likely related to features of repetition and redundancy.
While it is the case that there is no better-or-best way to perform a causally opaque
ritual (based on inferences of causality alone), it is the case that some features of ritual
elicit higher ratings of efficacy than other features due to ordinary cognitive heuristics.
Legare and Souza (2012) showed that Brazilians and Americans identified some
features of ritual as being more efficacious than others. Repetition, number of steps,
and specificity of time were considered more efficacious than rituals without these
features. Features such as number of items, specificity of place, edible (ingredients) and
religious iconography did not influence ratings of efficacy. Put simply, it may be the
2When speaking on recreating and empirically testing an antibiotic treatment from a 1000 year old
recipe, Mary McKennon said “there are remedies which require you to sing four Ava Marias, but then
again, we should also remember this is a period when people do not have watches... everybody knows
the length of an Ave Maria...” where the implication is that - whatever the proponents once believed -
the technique may have been maintained for efficacious reasons unrelated to the expected causal relation
(i.e., divine favour). See: http://www.radiolab.org/story/best-medicine/)
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case that ordinary cognitive heuristics underpinning folk-causation are being co-opted
in the service of rituals: doing something many times is better than doing it fewer
times, a sophisticated procedure is better than a simple one, and doing something at a
specific time is better than doing it any time. Moreover, it doesn’t necessarily hold that
eating something is better than not eating something, or doing something here is better
than doing something there. In instances of causally opaque ritualized actions, where
the mechanism may not be known (but may be knowable), it is not possible to do the
actions better than the way they were demonstrated, particularly if such actions are
already co-opting ordinary cognitions in the service of faux-causation.
The hazard precaution system explains the logic behind our behavioural responses
once the system is activated, but how does the system come to be activated in the first
place? In empirical chapters two and three I discuss this in depth, but the thrust of the
argument is that all the observable features of ritualized action (repetition, redundancy,
formality, etc.) are in the service of generating causal opacity and forcing goal
demotion. The hotel room attendant problem articulates this position in broad strokes,
here, however, the logic of the action parsing system provides a cognitive foundation for
these perceptions.
Humans, when observing the actions of others, parse the action sequences they
observe into meaningful units and sub-units of information (Newtson, 1973; Nielbo &
Sørensen, 2011, 2015; Zacks et al., 2004; Zacks & Tversky, 2001; Zacks, Tversky, & Iyer,
2001). For example, consider how meaningful the phrase ‘to make a coffee’ is. This
spartan phrase conveys a great deal of information and intent. To make a coffee
involves boiling water, retrieving the coffee tin, obtaining a spoon, opening the tin,
using the spoon to collect coffee grains... and so on (not to mention the fact that
‘boiling water’, ‘obtaining the coffee tin’ and ‘obtaining a spoon’, all carry a great deal
of motor information also). This is the study of partonomics, or ‘action parsing’. Zacks
et al. (2004); Zacks and Tversky (2001) and Zacks et al. (2001) argue that the action
sequences we observe are partitioned hierarchically into schemata based on perceptual
and functional information, and that this information is partitioned according to
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achieving a hierarchy of goals. For example, the sub-goal of ‘putting coffee grains into a
cup’ needs to be satisfied before realizing the larger goal of ‘making a hot coffee’. In this
example ‘making a hot coffee’ is parsed as a behaviour, for it efficiently subsumes a
great deal of (learned) information and pivots on the fact that we understand what the
goal of that sequence of actions is (to produce a coffee; likewise, from the phrase and
the inherent goal information therein, we can reverse engineer the actions and gestures
required to produce the outcome). Behaviour is the default level of action-parsing,
contingent upon our understanding of the causal processes and goals that bring about
the end-state. Gestures are the sub-units of actions which make up behaviour, and
appear to be guided by observers recognizing the hierarchical necessity of sub-goals.
The gestures of ‘boiling water’ are a necessary component within the behaviour of
‘making a coffee’. This, of course, is somewhat dependent on our understanding of
schemas or scripts. How we understand a series of actions and gestures depends upon
our familiarity with them. While conducting research for Chapter three, I spent time
among the Ni-Van on the island of Tanna in Vanuatu. Each evening the men and boys
would retreat to the Nakamal (a cleared space in the jungle reserved for the men) to
drink kava (a barely palatable concoction that brings about a range of effects from
relaxation to stupor). To describe the behaviour associated with ‘making kava’ would
not be informative to someone unfamiliar with the overall schema as would a description
of the gestures involved: choosing appropriate kava root-stems, de-barking them with a
knife, chewing them into pulp, spitting the pulp onto banana leaves, and filtering the
pulp with water into coconut shells (not to mention this was only done at a specific
time, in a specific place, by specific people; and that the manner of drinking was highly
stipulated and formal, and the order regarding who drinks first was very important).
While the behaviour of ‘making kava’ would initially be difficult to understand, a
description of the gestures that constitute it, and with an accompanying causal and
intentional understanding of how the goals of those gestures served to facilitate larger
goals (to produce the kava drink) demonstrates the relationship between action units.
In observing action-sequences humans tend to perceive and recall action units via
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top-down and bottom-up processes. Top-down processes are based on ‘knowledge
structures’ of the event (Zacks et al., 2004). Consider the Hotel Attendant again. Our
perception of those events would organize around our knowledge structures associated
with cleaning: the repetitive, redundant, formal, and stereotyped actions would be
understood with reference to the goal of ‘making the room clean’. Those same actions,
performed in the forest, could not be understood based on existing knowledge
structures, but rather, would be understood with regard to the features of the actions in
a bottom-up manner: the attendant sprays mist in a pattern on the bark to remove it
immediately with a cloth, they tickle the leaves with a feather duster, they replace
sticks on the ground with identical looking alternatives. Further, the degree to which we
demarcate action units may be built around the largest goal we can discern within the
sequence (Zacks et al., 2004), particularly since we may be trying to actively construct
an understanding of the actor’s intention on the fly (Wilder, 1978a, 1978b). Thus, we
identify the goal of the sub-action as ‘spraying mist’ when directed toward a tree as we
lack a larger behaviour to attribute it to, and yet the same action of ‘spraying mist’
when directed toward a mirror is identifiably in the service of ‘making the room clean’.
Rituals, and ritualized action, are unique (as a general category of motor action)
because they involve a great deal of redundancy, repetition, rigidity, formality, and so
on. Under ordinary circumstances, the observation of a typical action sequence which
involves various elements consistent with ritualized action (e.g., cleaning a bowl with a
cloth) is parsed into units of action based on what we understand the actor’s intention
to be (in this instance, to make the bowl clean). As a result the actions are parsed into
quite large units: (1) he picked up a cloth, and (2) cleaned the bowl (or perhaps a
typical description would omit (1) entirely). If one utilizes the features of ritualized
action but disrupts the causal-dependency structure (such as, making a cleaning action
toward of a bowl, but not bring the cloth and bowl into contact with each other) goal
demotion is ‘forced’ on the observer as it becomes impossible to determine what the
actor’s intentions are based on the causal structure and the outcome of the sequence.
Additionally, the sub-units of action of shorter: (1) he picks up a cloth, (2) he picks up
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a bowl, (3) he waves the cloth up and down near the bowl, (4) he puts the bowl and the
cloth down).
Boyer and Liénard (2006) argue that “rituals generally include action-sequences
selected from ordinary goal-directed behaviour. But the context in which they are
performed, or the manner of performance, results in “goal demotion” in performance
divorced from observable goals”. Ordinary actions, as described, are governed by
top-down knowledge structures. This process is active, is contingent upon the observer’s
goal, and is used to anticipate future actions (Land, 2009; Lassiter, Geers, Apple, &
Beers, 2000). Boyer and Liénard (2006) and Schjødt and Sørensen (2013) see this as a
key feature of ritual - one that ‘forces’ goal demotion’, Schjødt and Sørensen say “the
brain makes sense of the world by constantly generating predictive models. The brain
generates predictions about the world (top-down models) which are continuously
compared and updated according to input from the sensory apparatus (bottom-up
models)”. Thus, when observing ritualized actions which may be built around a very
typical series of actions (e.g., cleaning a bowl), with associated top-down models and
associated [actor] intentions, observations of actions that deviate from these models are
surprising violations (e.g., failing to bring the cloth and the bowl into contact with each
other, despite performing a cleaning motion). As a result, rather than continuing to
parse the observed actions as behaviours, we are forced to parse them as gestures. In
effect, these cognitively unexpected features disrupt existing causal relationships,
emancipating and obscuring [our understanding of the actor’s] intentions from the
action being performed. By doing something repetitively, redundantly, with apparently
unnecessary formality and rigidity, we force a ‘goal demoted’ quality upon the sequence.
The observer doesn’t have access to the inner state of the actor. And yet, because
behaviour is the default level of action parsing, and because the process of observation
is cognitively active, we are motivated to resolve our observations of these discrete
gestures into behaviours: we want to restore goal information (Herrmann et al., 2013;
Legare & Souza, 2012; Nielbo & Sørensen, 2015; Rossano, 2012; Schjødt & Sørensen,
2013; Sørensen & Nielbo, 2013).
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Thus, we come to a point in which we can make sense of both the hazard
precaution and action parsing hypotheses with respect to ritualized action. When we
observe ordinary actions, we cognitively determine what effect is being caused and the
process by which it is being caused. Additionally, we attribute an intention or goal to
the actor performing the actions. If those actions fit a set of evolved criteria which
imply that the actions being performed are in the service of preventing some potential
environmental or social insult, we are motivated to respond. In the context of rituals,
ritualized actions tend to disrupt our understanding of the actor’s goals, in part because
we are forced to parse actions as gestures rather than behaviours, and in part because
the mechanism of causal action has been disrupted. In effect, ritualized actions bring
about the quality of goal demotion and causal opacity. These ritualized actions may
arouse in observers a motivation to act, as they trigger a system designed to identify
threat outside the range of functional range of legitimate threat. The hazard precaution
and action parsing hypotheses are discussed in chapters two and three.
Overimitation. Overimitation is not, strictly speaking, a part of the ritual
cognition literature, but does share a considerable degree of theoretical and definitional
overlap. Indeed, some authors argue that the cognitive systems and biases that
predispose children to imitate are pivotal, not only for our acquisition of social norms
and conventions, but for our understanding of rituals in later life (Atran & Henrich,
2010; Herrmann et al., 2013; Legare & Nielsen, 2015; Nielsen, Kapitány, & Elkins, 2014;
Rossano, 2012; Wen et al., 2015; Wilks et al., 2016). Overimitation is the tendency for
children and adults to copy the actions of a model even when those actions are
inefficient, irrelevant, redundant, or do not cause an observable change of state (Horner
& Whiten, 2005; Kenward, Karlsson, & Persson, 2011; Lyons, Young, & Keil, 2007;
McGuigan, Whiten, Flynn, & Horner, 2007; Nielsen, 2006; Nielsen & Tomaselli, 2010).
Furthermore, it seems to arise due to the observer’s tendency to focus on the behaviour
of the modeller, rather than on the outcomes the modeller brings about. And while
there is some debate regarding the how and why, there is considerable evidence
suggesting that this behaviour is primarily affiliative and normative (Horner & Whiten,
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2005; Kenward et al., 2011; Nielsen & Blank, 2011). It is interesting to note that while
overimitation was first observed in children (Horner & Whiten, 2005) and appears to
emerge around 18-months (Nielsen, 2006), our tendency to overimitate increases as we
get older, rather than decreases (McGuigan, Makinson, & Whiten, 2011; Whiten et al.,
2016).
As much as the definition of overimitation appears on the face of it to be highly
related to ritual cognitions an illustration of the paradigm is also useful. The classic
overimitation task involves a short stick, and a box that is clear or opaque, inside of
which is hidden a reward. This box is an approximate cube, and the top surface has two
sliding-bolts obscuring an opening into the box. The bolts are easily manipulated by
multiple methods. Inside this opening is a false bottom; the inside of the opening has
no relationship with the rest of the box. The front of the box has a sliding door which is
also mounted on a hinge (as such, participants can use one of two methods to reveal the
chute behind the door). The stick is used to open the door by one method, then is
thrust into the chute to retrieve a prize (often by way of velco or sticking-gum). The
box itself can usually be opened very easily by opening/sliding the door by hand and
retrieving the prize with the stick directly. However, experimentally, what transpires is
an experimenter demonstrates in a pedagogical manner (i.e., “now watch what I’m
about to do” ; formality) to a participant a combination of relevant (but inefficient)
actions, and irrelevant actions. For example, the stick is used to stoke the side of the
box three times (repetitive, redundant actions), and is then used to slide the two bolts
into an open position exposing an opening (relevant but inefficient). The stick is then
held vertically and is used to tap through the opening into the box three times
(repetitive, redundant actions). The stick is then used to slide/open the door (relevant,
but inefficient), and is thrust into the chute to retrieve the prize (relevant, efficient)
(Berl & Hewlett, 2015; Horner & Whiten, 2005; Lyons et al., 2007; McGuigan et al.,
2007; Nielsen & Tomaselli, 2010). It should be noted that, one, fidelity between opaque
and transparent boxes is typically compared and children copy the transparent box at
extremely high rates (keeping in mind that transparency enhances the saliency of the
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redundancy of many of the actions), and two, while this specific apparatus is widely
used, any box with certain affordances, and an action sequence involving a combination
of actions conforming to the description provided can be be employed. In practice,
overimitation is the study of our behavioural tendencies to copy at high-fidelity causally
opaque and goal demoted actions, which are repetitive, redundant, stereotyped, (and
frequently presented formally and pedagogically), in which the participant appears to
prioritize performance of actions rather than outcomes.
The similarities between overimitation and ritual cognition are unlikely to be
superficial. A considerable amount of research examining how rituals influence groups
looks highly similar to overimitation paradigms. For example, Legare and colleagues
frequently use a task that involves children observing a model creating a necklace which
employs a mixture of relevant and irrelevant actions to achieve their goal (similar to
those described above: repetitions, redundant, formality, etc.). Children then get the
opportunity to make their own necklace, and the degree to which they reproduce the
irrelevant/ritualistic actions is used to predict their subsequent affiliation with a group
(Clegg & Legare, 2016a, 2016b; Legare & Wen, 2014; Legare, Wen, et al., 2015). Our
understanding of overimitation is also consistent with the more robust theories of ritual
cognition. Consider the ritual stance - that actions which are not easily interpreted
through an instrumental lens are interpreted as socially stipulated conventional actions.
This is not a considerable departure from our understanding of overimitation as
motivated by normative and social concerns (Horner & Whiten, 2005; Kenward, 2012;
Kenward et al., 2011; Nielsen & Blank, 2011). Nor is it that different from the hazard
precaution hypothesis, in which the high-fidelity reproduction of actions are often felt to
be obligatory by the observer (Kenward, 2012), even when they are repetitive and
redundant. Indeed, I support the proposition (articulated in empirical Chapter two)
that overimitation is likely an adaptive feature which emerges in childhood (Horner &
Whiten, 2005; Legare & Nielsen, 2015) and is used to acquire and transmit social and
cultural information early and efficiently (Rossano, 2012), and which facilitates group
membership and belonging (Clegg & Legare, 2016a, 2016b; Legare & Wen, 2014;
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Legare, Wen, et al., 2015). Explicit overimitation-type actions rarely occur ‘in the wild’,
so to speak (consider the paradigms described) - but do occur frequently within cultural
rituals: to the extent that overimitation may by adaptive in childhood, it may very well
be adaptive in adulthood (Atran & Henrich, 2010; Henrich, 2009; Rossano, 2009).
While this thesis is not primarily concerned with supporting the link between
overimitation and ritual cognition, I have been involved in research investigating this
relationship previously (Nielsen, Kapitány, & Elkins, 2014; Wilks et al., 2016), and do
touch on the relationship between development and ritual in chapter three.
On the Importance of a Cross-cultural and Developmental Theory of Ritual
Cognition
The Cognitive Sciences of Religion explicitly investigates how religion (a cultural
institution) can be explained by way of ordinary cognitions nested within an
evolutionary framework. In the study of humans, an evolutionary framework
encompasses both biological evolution, which encompasses the mind (H. Barrett, 2014),
as well as the evolution of culture (a product of the mind). This has been described as
the ‘dual inheritance’ model (Henrich & McElreath, 2007; Richerson & Boyd, 1978),
and specifies that the selection pressures upon humans may be at a phenotypic optima
in response to cultural selection pressures rather than biological selection pressures.
However, empirical psychological science has a diversity problem, inasmuch as the
populations studied to address evolutionary questions are often far too limited to draw
generalizable conclusions (as cultural variation itself can be both an adaptation and a
selection pressure; Laland (2001)); as Henrich, Heine, and Norenzayan (2010) put it
“Most people are not WEIRD”, that is, most people are not White, Educated, living in
Industrialized, Rich, and Democratic countries). While the tendency for those within
the field of cognitive sciences of religion is to study far more diverse populations than
other fields, which - in theory - allows for more generalizable conclusions, it is still the
case that any psychological theory that aspires to universality must take into account
cultural considerations, and most theories that claim to be evolutionary must consider
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the trait’s development (Mesoudi, 2011; Nielsen & Haun, 2016).
Approaches to the study of ritual cognition, including those discussed at length
here, include those that are explicitly and theoretically evolutionary (as with the hazard
precaution hypothesis), as well as those that are implicitly evolutionary (such as the
ritual stance), and which are examined, in practice, in cross-cultural and developmental
contexts (Clegg & Legare, 2016a; Wen et al., 2015). Further, theories that bear upon its
study, such as overimitation, are studied very broadly across cultures and age-groups
(see: (Nielsen, Mushin, et al., 2014; Nielsen, Mushin, Tomaselli, & Whiten, 2016;
Nielsen & Tomaselli, 2010). Thus, if we consider the topic of ritual and ritualized
behaviour as one worthy of investigation by virtue of it’s universality (Brown, 1991),
then any theory that claims to explain it must have predictive power across cultures,
and where appropriate (as is the case here) across development. Thus, in empirical
chapter three I explicitly attempt to account for predictions built off chapter one and
two in a developmental and cross-cultural context.
Methodological and Epistemological approaches in Ritual Cognition
During the period of my candidature I have attempted to take seriously my own
methodological and epistemological craft. Evidence of commitment to improving
empirical approaches can be broken down into three broad categories. The first relates
to features of the stimuli, while the latter two relate to the present ‘crisis in psychology’
(Pashler & Wagenmakers, 2012), wherein I commit myself to pre-registration, and open
science.
In chapter one I discuss how various empirical approaches may be insufficient, and
propose how the use of videos is superior to vignettes. This point is explored in chapter
one; what I do not discuss in depth, but actively pursued during chapter one (and for
each chapter thereafter) is the use of diverse stimuli. Specifically, by operationalizing
‘rituals’ clearly, I was able to create three different sets of rituals (with corresponding
matched control stimuli) in which each alone ought to have, theoretically, elicited the
desired effect. I then collapsed all analyses across stimuli, and never reported or
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attempted any analysis of differences between each instance in the set. While it may be
possible that stimuli A is more effective at arousing hypothesis-consistent responses
than stimuli B and C, it may not be the case that it is because stimuli A is ‘more
ritualistic’ or theoretically appropriate. By conducting analyses across a range of
stimuli I attempted to control for artefactual features, which consequently should serve
to make my conclusions more conservative and theoretically appropriate.
The ‘Crisis in psychology’ describes an alarming rate of reported false positives in
the published cannon. There are multiple potential causes for this, which include lack of
replication (Earp & Trafimow, 2015; Pashler & Wagenmakers, 2012), post-hoc
theorizing or HARKing (Kerr, 1998), underpowered studies (Maxwell, 2004), and a
publication bias known as the file-drawer effect (Rosenthal, 1979), to name a few. I
replicated several conditions across multiple experiments in an attempt to draw a very
clear, linear and narrative thread between each experiment. For example, both
experiments in chapter one share many features, and indeed, each experiment of chapter
one shares two (of four) identical conditions. Likewise, chapter two shares two identical
conditions with experiments in chapter one. Further, chapter three contains one
condition conceptually identical to the two experiments from chapters one and two, but
examined in a behavioural context. However, while the developmental study in chapter
three is highly similar to preceding work, due to the demands of working with children
in cross-cultural environments, some features were varied. Notable also is my
commitment to open science and pre-registration. The data and syntax for Chapters
one through three is currently publicly available on the Open Science Framework (OSF;
www.OSF.io). Furthermore, the adult experiment in chapter three was pre-registered.
However, in the spirit of improving my empirical craft, it is worth noting that Kapitány
and Nielsen (2017) was fully pre-registered, as was Kapitány and Nielsen (n.d.).
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Chapter One: Adopting the ritual stance: The role of opacity and context in
ritual and everyday actions.
Kapitány, R., & Nielsen, M.
Preface
The present empirical chapter was first published in Cognition in 2015. It is
presented without change (save for factual corrections that do not change the methods,
results, or analysis in any way; as well as changes made to ensure consistent
terminology). The purpose of the first experiment in this chapter was to falsify the
initial claim that ritualized actions directed towards objects influenced the perception of
the object. The purpose of the second experiment was to manipulate the valence of the
social context in order to provide greater resolution on theoretical aspects of the ritual
stance.
Abstract
Rituals are a pervasive and ubiquitous aspect of human culture, but when we
naïvely observe an opaque set of ritual actions, how do we come to understand its
significance? To investigate this, across two experiments we manipulated the degree to
which actions were ritualistic or ordinary, and whether or not they were accompanied
with context. In Experiment 1, 474 adult participants were presented with videos of
novel rituals (causally opaque actions) or control actions (causally transparent)
performed on a set of objects accompanied with neutral-valance written context.
Experiment 2 presented the same video stimuli but with negative and aversive written
context. In both experiments ritualized objects were rated as physically unchanged, but
more ‘special’ and more ‘desirable’ than objects subjected to control actions, with
context amplifying this effect. Results are discussed with reference to the ritual stance
and the social-action hypothesis. Implications for both theories are discussed, as are
methodological concerns regarding the empirical investigation of ritual cognition. We
argue that causally opaque ritual actions guide the behaviour of naïve viewers because
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such actions are perceived as socially normative, rather than with reference to
supernatural intervention or causation.
Introduction
We routinely encounter rituals, in some form or another, in the course of our daily
lives (Brown, 1991; Fiese et al., 2002; Helman, 1994). While we readily identify some
behaviours as ritualistic, such as attending a religious service, we can fail to do so for
others, like standing for a national anthem or celebrating a co-worker’s birthday. There
is evidence that our understanding of ritual emerges early and is built upon social
concepts and idiosyncratic processes (Klavir & Leiser, 2002). But how do we know
when a sequence of actions should be treated as ritualistic, as signifying meaning
beyond the actual actions, and how does such recognition influence our behaviour,
especially when we encounter a ritual for the first time and have little knowledge of its
purpose, content, or associated rules? The aim of this research is to provide some
answers to these questions.
The term ‘ritual’ is generally applied to a wide range of actions and behaviours.
For the purposes of the current research we consider rituals to be a coherent series of
actions characterized by formality, repetition, redundancy, stereotypy, and causal
opacity, in which performance is more important than outcome, and little variability is
permitted in the action’s execution (Bulbulia & Sosis, 2011; Legare & Souza, 2012;
Rappaport, 1999; Rossano, 2012). Causal Opacity, as argued by Watson-Jones et al.
and Legare, Whitehouse, et al. (2015) is a key element of ritual, and is defined as a
situation in which there is start-end-state equivalency, that is when an action sequence
does not afford a discriminable difference in the pre-action (start-) state of an
object/situation from the (end-) state. As observers cannot meaningfully interpret these
actions as having caused a physical outcomes they are are, in effect, ‘unknowable’. On
the other hand, causal transparency results from a series of actions that are ‘potentially
knowable’; there is a meaningful, possible, physical-causal interpretation (and this
interpretation is valid even if making an actual distinction between start-end-states is
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not immediately possible). For example, singing the national anthem with one’s hand
across one’s heart, features redundancy, formality, stereotypy, and causal opacity (there
is no possible physical-causal outcome). However lighting candles on a birthday cake,
while including redundancy, formality, and stereotypy, affords a possible, potentially
knowable physical-causal outcome that results from the physical act of lighting candles.
Rituals serve a dual purpose: their first ostensible purpose is to control or
influence the environment, to effect an outcome of a supernatural nature or by
supernatural means, or to alter the symbolic aspects of people, places, or objects
(Dawson, 1999; McCauley & Lawson, 2002; Sørensen, 2007b; Sørensen et al., 2006).
The second purpose of a ritual typically concerns group relations, in which we bond
ourselves with our in-group (Konvalinka et al., 2011; Reddish et al., 2014; Wiltermuth
& Heath, 2009), demonstrate commitment to it and its values (Ensminger, 1997;
Henrich, 2009; Irons, 2001; Ruﬄe & Sosis, 2007; Sosis & Ruﬄe, 2003), enforce norms
upon group members (Atran & Henrich, 2010; Sosis & Bressler, 2003), or aid in the
transmission of [cultural] information (Chudek & Henrich, 2011; Rossano, 2012; Schjødt
& Sørensen, 2013). According to the ritual stance (Legare & Souza, 2012; Legare, Wen,
et al., 2015; Legare, Whitehouse, et al., 2015; Nielsen, Kapitány, & Elkins, 2014) when
we cannot easily understand the physical or causal significance of a ritual (due to the
causal opacity of the act) we are motivated to generate an understanding built upon
normative and social inference which subsequently influences our behaviour. That is,
the cognitive mechanisms that are employed to understand ritual are mechanisms which
help us navigate a wide range of social and normative information. The ritual stance,
however, is one end of a continuum; the difference between opaque and transparent
action is not easily discriminated by observing the actions alone, particularly by novices
(Humphrey & Laidlaw, 1994; Stall, 1990; Whitehouse & Laidlaw, 2004). Social and
contextual cues (independent of the action itself) can motivate observers to interpret
the action instrumentally (i.e., according to the instrumental stance). For example,
lighting candles then carrying them into a fully lit room may elicit a ritual
interpretation, whereas lighting candles then carrying them into a fully darkened room
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may elicit an instrumental interpretation. An alternative explanation regarding ritual
understanding is the social-action hypothesis, which argues that rituals are performed
(and regarded as effective or successful) when they are in the service of, or appeal to,
supernatural agents; just as an ordinary act might be performed to influence the
behaviour or disposition of a friend or other social agent, a ritual act is performed to
influence the behaviour or disposition of a supernatural agent (J. Barrett & Lawson,
2001; McCauley & Lawson, 2002; Sørensen et al., 2006). Rituals are fundamentally
motor actions which (occasionally) employ physical objects or tools; in such a light they
may be considered similar to other forms of behaviour (Boyer & Liénard, 2006). When
the purpose, motivation, or intended outcome of such actions are opaque, we typically
find them salient and engaging in a way other actions are not; these actions result in
‘cognitive capture’. Ritualistic actions arrest attention by engaging cognitive ‘action
parsing systems’, hijacking existing systems which are used to infer information about
the actor or the environment (Boyer & Liénard, 2006). Once ‘captured’ we are
motivated to make sense of the ‘why’ and ‘how’ by applying intuitive causal or social
heuristics, or by appealing to supernatural influence or causation (J. Barrett & Lawson,
2001; Lawson & McCauley, 1990; Legare & Souza, 2012; Schjødt & Sørensen, 2013;
Sørensen et al., 2006). In two studies of similar design, J. Barrett and Lawson (2001)
and Sørensen et al. (2006) investigated which characteristics of ritual contribute to
perceptions of ritual effectiveness. In both studies participants were presented with a
series of vignettes in which elements of a ritual were manipulated.
J. Barrett and Lawson (2001) provided a ‘prototype’ statement to participants
(e.g., ‘A special person blew ordinary dust on a field and the field yielded good crops’)
with aspects of that prototype varied in order to determine the contribution of the
special status of objects, the nature of objects and individuals, and the described action
(e.g., ‘An ordinary person blew special dust on a field. . . ’, and ‘A special person kicked
ordinary dust on a field. . . ’). Participants then responded to the question ‘How likely is
each of the following actions to find favor with the gods and yield good crops?’.
Similarly, Sørensen et al. (2006) provided a prototype statement (e.g., ‘In order to settle
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the division of land among the Uu’lofa the medicine-man strikes the ground
emphatically three times with the sacrificial axe’), and provided varied iterations (‘The
medicine-man strikes the ground emphatically once with the sacrificial axe’ and ‘The
medicine-man strikes the ground emphatically three times with an axe’). Participants
were then asked ‘How likely is it that the Uu’lofa believe each of the following acts will
settle the division of land?’.
J. Barrett and Lawson (2001) were particularly interested in how markers of
specialness (i.e., ‘S-markers’) influenced ratings of effectiveness, where participants were
told that ‘specialness’ was ‘. . . something that has been given special properties or
authority by the gods’. They predicted that participants would rely on an
understanding of ‘social action’ to infer the act’s efficacy. In support of this claim,
where elements of ritual were described as ‘special’, participants’ ratings of efficacy
increased especially when the agent was ‘special’, and when the larger sequence of
actions involved more than one ‘special’ element (i.e., when a special agent acted on a
special object). However, participants still rated rituals without S-markers as likely to
be effective, albeit at significantly lower rates. Sørensen et al. (2006) found that when
they changed the agent of a ritual (from a Medicine-man to Farmer, for example) it had
a greater influence on ratings of effectiveness than similar changes to the instrument
(from an axe to a hoe) or the action performed (from strike to drop); yet they found
mixed and conflicting results regarding the S-marker’s contribution to efficacy ratings.
That is, removing an S-marker did not reliably diminish ratings of efficacy in all
analyses (particularly for instruments). Their strongest finding relates to the
contribution a special agent made to the ritual. Sørensen et al. (2006) and J. Barrett
and Lawson (2001) argue that ritual acts are ‘special’ in a way profane acts are not,
that the agent occupies a privileged position in the ritual, and rituals are performed in
the service of, or as appeals to, supernatural agents. And yet we must consider the
following in interpreting their conclusions: The work of Sorensen and colleagues
removed the participant from the context of the ritual when they were providing their
responses. They asked “Rate how likely it is that the Uu’lofa believe each of the
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following acts will have the desired effect?” [emphasis added]. This is a question, not
about whether a participant believes a ritual act is efficacious, or the mechanism is
veridical, but whether or not the participant believes the Uu’lofa believe the act will
cause an effect. This does not directly speak to the participant’s perceptions of ritual
efficacy. For example, a non-Catholic may recognize that Catholics believe communion
appeases their god, and that Catholics recognize the act as legitimate, but a
non-Catholic can easily eschew sharing such convictions, and not be persuaded that the
ritual is more (or less) effective if various elements of the ritual were changed. Such
variations would influence the responses of a Catholic, just as variations would influence
the hypothetical Uu’lofa people. Participants, in this experiment, are making a
second-order attribution. They are making a claim about the beliefs of others.
J. Barrett and Lawson (2001) conclusions are not without their own problems,
either. In the key manipulation in both experiments, participants were provided with
the statement that ‘special’ is “. . . someone or something that has been given special
property or authority by the gods’ ’ and found that when they used the term special
people agreed a supernatural outcome was likely. A rich interpretation of the data
suggests that participants believe special agents (or action, or instruments) can bring
about supernatural outcomes (for a given definition of special); but a leaner accounts
suggests that participants understood that the experimenters wanted them to
understand that ‘special’ = ‘supernatural’ and then logically applied the premise
throughout. For example, J. K. Rowling, in her obscenely successful Harry Potter
series, has set the premise that magic exists, the spell ‘Patronus’ exists, and
‘Dementors’ exist. Further, the spell Patronus, via magical mechanisms, repels
Dementors and protects the caster from their sinister influence. If you were to ask a
Harry Potter fan ‘Does casting the magic spell ‘Patronus’ scare away Dementors?’ the
only reasonably answer they can provide is ‘Yes’. This reveals they understood the
premise and they followed the premise to its logical conclusions. No actual belief about
supernatural influence is required to logically simulate this sequence of events and
affirm the expectation that ‘magic works’ (or, in the case of Barrett and Lawson, that
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‘supernatural authority begets supernatural outcomes’).
Furthermore, in Experiment 1, Barrett and Lawson (2001) ask participants: “How
likely is each of the following actions to find favor with the gods and yield good crops?”.
This is problematic, as the question is double-barreled, and a score of ‘very likely’ may
be with reference to the god’s favor, the good crops, or both. Given that ‘special’ was
explicitly defined prior to the experiment (in all cases) we can have no empirical faith
that a ‘very likely’ response is anything but a participant responding to instructions
within the framework provided.
The data provided in both of the afore-discussed studies do not satisfactorily
address how and why typical participants (with typical cognitive resources) interpret
ritual actions. Thus, it may not simply be that participants apply causal and social
heuristics to rituals under the assumption that they are for the gods (as with the
social-action hypothesis), but that they can simply follow instructions and willfully
suspend disbelief. In both instances participants are responding to the expectations of
the experimenters and following the logic laid out in the experiment.
Recently, Legare and Souza (2012) examined the extent to which participants
infer ritual efficacy based on intuitive causal principles and heuristics, and in so doing,
avoided the second-order attribution problem, as well as avoiding problematic
methodologies. They appropriated a ritual practice native to Brazil (known as a
‘Simpatia’) and obscured its apparent purpose to participants. An example of a
Simpatia, one used to prevent a partner’s infidelity, involves throwing a white
handkerchief into a running river. First, they established that Brazilian participants did
not reliably (or accurately) pair a given Simpatia with its original purpose at rates
above chance (which avoid criticisms that participants are simply logically applying a
provided definition within a set context). They report that particular elements of the
act contributed to ratings of ritual efficacy. Of 9 ritual elements, 3 were found to
significantly improve efficacy ratings if they were situated within a larger sequence of
ritual actions. These elements were specificity in time (e.g., first day of a last quarter
moon), greater repetition of procedures, and greater number of steps. This was true of
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a sample of Brazilians who actively use and endorse Simpatias in their daily lives, as
well as a group with no such convictions (the former group also reported greater efficacy
if the ritual included a religious icon, while the latter did not). Similarly, American
undergraduates (at a South-West university) were influenced by the same ritual
elements: repetition, number of steps, and presence of religious iconography (unlike
Brazilians, however, they did not rate specificity in time as a significant contributor).
Strangely, no groups perceived that common elements like specificity of place, material,
or the number of items, contributed to the efficacy of rituals. Importantly, participants
were not asked whether they thought an adherent to simpatia-magic would consider it
effective, but rather ‘the extent to which they thought the simpatia would be effective
for treating the specific problem’. This avoid the second-order attribution problem (as
with Sorensen et al. (2006), and allowed the participant to reason about the ritual
without having been primed in the manner of Barrett and Lawson (2001); they also
avoided double-barreled questions). Their results suggest that, to the extent that it is
impossible [for the participant] to directly infer the causal relationship of a ritual (how
exactly does a thrown handkerchief reduce infidelity?), observers rely on a set of
ordinary and intuitive causal heuristics – doing something at the specific time is better
than at any time, doing something many times is better than doing something once,
and sophisticated procedures are better than simple ones. More importantly, these are
the participants’ own responses; it is easy to imagine that Americans naïve to simpatias
would rate ‘specificity of place’ (a feature not found to contribute to efficacy for either
group) highly if they were asked whether they thought a Brazilian believed it was
important for the ritual, or whether a foreign supernatural agent required it.
In the current set of experiments we build upon this literature in a number of
ways. First, we address issues of methodology and stimuli. Previous research has
employed written vignettes, which, while versatile, leave much to the participant’s
imagination. For participants to consider a Uu’lofa medicine-man is to permit them to
imagine him consistent with their own stereotypes, prejudices, and imagery (perhaps
adorned with feathers, face-paint, or after having eaten psychedelics). In contrast we
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use video stimuli in order to minimize the influence of a participants’ idiosyncratic
imagination. Second, we emphasize the role of causal opacity, which up to this point
has been generally overlooked. Rituals are perceived as more effective when specific
conditions are met, but why these conditions and not others? We predict such
conditions are made salient by virtue of their opacity. A special medicine-man has the
authority of the gods, and a special act courts divine favor, but how? Doing something
many times is better than once, and complicated acts are superior to simple ones, but
why? The relationship between act and the intended outcome is opaque, and this is a
key element of our research. Third, we omit reference to the supernatural. We believe
that much of the research presented earlier can be interpreted in light of ordinary social
factors (consistent with the ritual stance) without needing to consider another group’s
supernatural social-causal beliefs (which we address, in part, by reconciling the
second-order attribution problem).
We are mindful, in the current study, of this attribution problem, and in reference
to the stimuli, we ask participants to report their own thoughts, and predict their own
behaviour. We also directly manipulate the degree to which a ritual belongs to an
identifiable group with specific beliefs. Naturally, each of our rituals is in accordance
with the definition provided: They are causally opaque, include formality, repetition,
redundancy, stereotypy, focus on process, and are presented inflexibly. But rather than
pairing ritual stimuli with similarly opaque actions (as previous cited studies have done)
we pair them with matched control actions which are causally transparent (they are
instrumental, less formal, and are presented relatively flexibly). We further enhance the
opacity of the act by denying participants any knowledge of the ritual’s purpose (what
is the ritual supposed to achieve?) or the authority by which the act is performed (who
or what specified the actions in question?). In fact, we omit any reference to
supernatural authority. Moreover, we use the world ‘special’ in an undefined way, rather
than imbuing the word with supernatural significance. Using the word special may
prime participants to think about the actions in a particular way, but since we use it
equally across all conditions we do not believe it confounds our design. Importantly, the
RITUAL COGNITION 56
word ‘special’ alone, by any typical definition or use of the word, does not include
reference to the supernatural. By using the term in this manner, we deny participants
knowledge (or inference) that the actions are performed by, or for, a supernatural agent
(as with past research).
The ritual stance, upon which this research is based, broadly predicts that when
we naively observe a causally opaque ritual act (that is, when we cannot easily infer the
instrumental purpose, causal mechanism, or even the performer’s underlying
motivation) we interpret it as socially normative and informative, and subsequently
consider that it may require a change in beliefs or behaviour (Herrmann et al., 2013;
Legare & Souza, 2012; Legare, Whitehouse, et al., 2015; Nielsen, Kapitány, & Elkins,
2014; Vohs et al., 2013). This is similar and generally consistent with other authors who
propose that rituals arrest our attention and executive functions, and create an
attributional and inferential gap which we are motivated to fill with meaning,
interpretation or behaviour (Csibra & Gergely, 2011; Rossano, 2012; Schjødt &
Sørensen, 2013). This is in contrast to proponents of the social-action hypothesis
(J. Barrett & Lawson, 2001; Lawson & McCauley, 1990), who predict that we
understand a ritual with reference to its‘special’ (supernatural) qualities.
We employed a 2x2 between-participants design in which participants were
randomly assigned to one of four conditions: 1) Ritual with no context, 2) Ritual with
context, 3) Control actions with no context, or 4) Control actions with context. As
there is no ‘knowable’ physical-causal relationship between the actions performed and
any perceivable outcomes, we did not anticipate any difference across conditions in
participants’ attribution of physical change to the objects. Conversely, consistent with
the ritual stance (Herrmann et al., 2013; Legare & Souza, 2012; Nielsen, Kapitány, &
Elkins, 2014), we hypothesized that participants who observe opaque (ritualistic)
actions (i.e., those in conditions 1 and 2) will be more likely to attribute a change in the
object’s ‘specialness’ (here left undefined in order to solicit natural responses) than
those who observe transparent (ordinary) actions (conditions 3 and 4). We similarly
hypothesized that participants observing opaque actions will be more likely to
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desire/prefer ritualized objects compared to participants in control conditions. These
effects will be moderated by the presence of context, such that participants in
conditions 2 and 4, who are told the actions belong to an established ritual, will
continue to infer no physical change, but will more frequently attribute status change
and more frequently find the acted-upon object desirable.
Experiment 1
Methods.
Participants. One hundred and one undergraduates of a large metropolitan
university (77 female, 23 male, and 1 unreported) participated in this study in exchange
for course-credit. The age of participants ranged from 17 – 37 years (M = 19.76, SD =
3.20), and 88% reported English as their native language (details of native language was
not collected of those for whom English was a second language). An additional 373
adults (176 female, 197 male, and 1 unreported) were recruited on Amazon’s
Mechanical Turk (mTurk) in exchange for US$1.70. These participants ranged in age
from 18 – 72 years (M = 35.33, SD = 11.35), 99.5% reported English as their native
language, and 99.5% reported living in the US (.5% values unreported). A total of 39%
reported completing a tertiary degree and a further 11% reported holding a
Post-graduate degree, while 31.6% reported ‘some tertiary’. Of the remaining
participants, 17.6% completed high school while only .3% reporting ‘some high school’;
there were 2 missing values (0.5%). 42.2% of participants earned less than $25,000(US)
a year, 16.7% earned between $25,001 and $35,000, and 14.5% earned between $45,001
and $55,000 (all of whom accounted for 86.8% of the sample), the remaining 13.2%
reported earning in excess of $55,001 annually.
Procedure. All participants were briefed on the task and completed basic
demographic details before being randomly assigned to one of four conditions in which
they were shown a total of 6 videos (two videos per each block of stimuli; video and
block order fully randomized). After viewing each video participants were asked to
respond to a number of quantitative and qualitative questions. Qualitative questions
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were collected in order to help illuminate any confusing participant responses or
attributions. They included “Which drink is special, and why?” and “Why did you
select that drink [to drink]?”. A brief and informal survey of these data was undertaken,
but it was concluded that they provided no information above-and-beyond the
quantitative data, and hence these were not included in any later analyses. Participants
then completed a number of surveys including ‘The Revised Paranormal Beliefs Scale’
(26-items;Tobacyk, ‘The Rational-Experiential Inventory’ (40-items; Pacini and
Epstein,a ‘Religiosity Scale’ (8-items; Rohrbaugh and Jessor), and a novel scale
assessing the participant’s ‘History of religious and ritual exposure’ (16-items; See
Appendix A). The novel scale was created in order to determine active involvement in
both everyday and religious rituals, as well as participants’ expectations that
involvement in such rituals was normative.
Materials. Three novel rituals were created which contained a series of causally,
instrumentally and motivationally opaque motor actions. Three matched action
sequences were developed as controls, in which the actions were causally, instrumentally
and motivationally transparent. All videos involved the pouring of a drink (from a
small glass) into a (larger) glass. Examples of videos are available at [website redacted
to maintain anonymity; see attachment for examples of stimuli], and all videos are
available from the first author upon request.
Videos were integrated into three discreet stimuli blocks. Block 1 involved one
action (ritual or control) performed on one of two glasses, Block 2 involved one action
performed on one of three glasses, and Block 3 involved two actions performed on two
of three glasses. While we predict that the efficacy of a ritual may be due to its opacity,
it may also be due to the fact that rituals tend to single out specific items. In Blocks 1
and 2, one glass is singled out by virtue of the act performed upon it (thus making
salient its ‘singleness’). In Block 3, however, two of three glasses are acted upon, which
singles out the third glass (which was not acted upon). Thus, this third block was
included to determine whether ritual acts, rather than singling acts, imbue objects with
special qualities. In order to fully counter-balance the location of the acted-upon object
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across each block a total of 24 ritual and 24 control videos were created in which all
possible iterations of action and glass-position (left, right, and center) were recorded for
each Block. A total of 12 videos were created for the Block 1 presentations (six per
condition); 18 videos were created for the Block 2 presentations (nine per condition);
and a further 18 videos were created for the Block 3 presentations (nine per condition).
Both the ritual and control videos follow identical formats (see Figure 1). In each
video all materials were presented on a table at the beginning of the sequence. The
demonstrator moved each of the [larger] glasses toward the front of the table, and then
performed an action (varied according to condition). A golden-yellow liquid was then
poured from the smaller glass into the larger glass, from right to left. In the ritual
condition the smaller glass was raised vertically prior to pouring, whereas the control
condition omitted this redundant, opaque action. Finally, the glasses subjected to the
action sequence were then raised and either bowed to (ritual condition) or inspected (as
if viewing the level of the liquid; control condition). Glasses were returned to their
forward position and the demonstrator returned to a neutral posture. Three ritual
actions were created and matched with three control actions.
For two conditions the actions were paired with a brief statement about the
context of the act, which followed the form: ‘This video contains elements of established
ritual seen around the world. The actions in this video can be seen in [ceremony name]
of [Location]’. The ceremonies used were: ‘Bwiti Ceremony (Gabon, Africa)’, ‘Kava
Ceremony (Fiji, Pacific Islands), and ‘Ayahuasca Ceremony (Ecuador, South America)’.
Participants were randomly assigned to one of the following four conditions: Condition
1 – Ritual action with context; Condition 2 – Ritual action without context; Condition
3 – Control action with context; and Condition 4 – Control action without context. All
participants were provided brief written instructions asking them to ‘watch the
following video in full before moving on to the next page’ (videos were set to a timer so
that participants couldn’t move on until a length of time slightly greater than the
duration of the video had passed). For our stimuli, we selected motor actions that were
flexible enough to be applied opaquely (in a ritual context) and transparently (in a
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control context), and which were not already laden with cultural meaning - for example,
lighting candles may imply mourning or celebration; waving a cloth, on the other hand,
holds fewer cultural assumptions, given the context. The transparent actions needed to
afford viewers an easy instrumental interpretation, and so we chose actions that were
simple, familiar, and relatable (involving cleaning or inspection).
The ‘Cloth’ and ‘Gesture’ control actions are cleaning actions, while the ‘Hum’
control gesture was a familiar utterance that conveys an identifiable motive (inspection,
noting something of interest, or identifying an interesting quality of the referent). The
opaque/ritual actions were neither familiar nor identifiable, nor did they afford
participants a simple physical interpretation; furthermore, these actions were obviously
causally redundant. In all instances, the opaque ritual actions had start-end-state
equivalency. That is, the objects in this condition were not discernibly (nor actually)
different after the actions than they were before them (Watson-Jones et al., 2014). The
actions in the transparent/control condition, however, conceivably made (or revealed)
changes in the object. In the ‘Cloth’ and ‘Gesture’ actions, the object has been
physically interacted with (it’s been cleaned), which affords a valid interpretation of a
[possible] real, physical change; the ‘Hum’, while making no physical change to the
object, implies the actor has observed a veridical difference in this object; the ‘Hum’
cues an interpretation of a revealed difference. Thus, transparent/control actions violate
start-end-state equivalency, and allow for the valid interpretation that the actions make
or reveal a physical difference in the object (even if making such a distinction is not
immediately possible), while the opaque/ritual actions comply with start-end-state
equivalency, and do not allow for any reasonable or valid interpretation that the actions
caused physical outcomes.
The nature and content of the rituals and control actions were as follows:
Cloth Action. In the ritual condition a small black cloth was waved
up-and-down vigorously at the glass; at no point did the cloth make contact with the
glass. The matched control action had the demonstrator vigorously clean the glass with
the same cloth using the same up-and-down motion.
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Gesture Action. In the ritual condition the demonstrator closed his hand and
pointed with two fingers at the glass, while making two circular motions around the
opening of the glass (the diameter of the gesture was approximately twice the diameter
of the opening); at no point did the gesture make contact with the glass. The matched
control action had the demonstrator – using the same hand position – ‘dust’ the glass
with his fingers as if removing grit.
Hum action. In the ritual condition the demonstrator held the glass at
head-height and began to hum in a long, unwavering and sustained fashion (of the
nature ‘mmmmm. . . ’ ; duration approximately three seconds). In the control condition
the demonstrator held the glass similarly and made a shorter, more variable noise, of
the nature ‘hmm. . . ’ (as if inspecting or observing a curious aspect of the object). No
physical or causal relationship between object and action was discernible in either
condition.
Common to all actions. All ritual actions included two further elements. In
both the control and ritual conditions, glasses that were not subject to a ritual (but
which may have been subject to a control action) were filled by lifting a smaller glass
and pouring directly and efficiently into the larger glass. When an object was subject to
a ritual action (but not a matched control action) the smaller glass was lifted as if it
were about to be poured into the larger glass, but was then swiftly raised vertically
before being lowered and poured in the glass. Furthermore, after the completion of the
pouring, the target glass(es) (in both conditions) was (were) acted upon once more. In
the ritual condition the ritual glass(es) was (were) raised with both hands and bowed to
in a reverential fashion. In the control condition the glass(es) were raised with one hand
and inspected with a head-cocking motion in an irreverent (if curious) fashion.
Measures and Coding. We had three primary dependent variables. We first
asked whether participants thought the drinks were the same/identical, whether any of
the drinks were ‘special’, and which drink they would prefer to drink. In the first
instance, to gauge if participants inferred whether a physical-causal process had
occurred, we asked whether the drinks were the same/identical. This was of primary
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interest in the Ritual condition – if opaque actions had start-end-state equivalency, then
there ought not be any observable difference. In the second instance, we measured
whether participants perceived ‘specialness’ among the object set. On the prediction
that no physical differences would be observed, we needed to determine whether
participants made any attribution regarding the objects, then, whether or not the
attribution was specific to ritual actions or simply to objects which were singled out.
We deliberately left the term ‘special’ undefined in order to get at whether participants
perceived (perhaps idiosyncratically) a change in the object’s status (and not exclusively
in relation to supernatural power, as Barrett and Lawson (2001) and Sorensen et al
(2006) have previously used the term). And in the final instance, the ritual stance
predicts a normative interpretation of ritual actions, which, based on previous research
begets a behavioural response (Herrmann et al., 2013; Legare & Souza, 2012; Legare,
Wen, et al., 2015; Nielsen, Kapitány, & Elkins, 2014; Watson-Jones et al., 2014).
All participants watched at total of six videos (two videos from each of the three
blocks). After each video participants were asked a series of questions. When asked
‘Are the drinks the same?’ (or ‘are the three drinks the same’ in blocks 2 and 3)
participants could report that they were the same/identical (coded = 1), or that they
were not the same/not-identical (coded = 0). When asked ‘is either drink special?’ (or
‘are any of the three drinks special’ in blocks 2 and 3 participants could report either
‘Yes’ (coded = 1), or ‘No’ (coded = 0). When asked ‘which drink would you select to
drink?’ participants could indicate their selection by clicking ‘I would drink the
[location] drink’ (where ‘left’, ‘center’, or ‘right’ was specified). Their responses were
dummy coded by location, and later converted into values that represented whether
they selected a drink that was acted upon (coded = 1) or a drink that was not acted
upon (coded = 0). Scores were summed for all variables; given that participants saw
only 2 videos per block, a maximum score of 2 was possible (per block) for each stimuli
type on each of the above three measures.
Data Analysis. We treated the coded product of our experiment as ordered
categorical data,. The appropriate analytic tool for such data is an Ordinal Logistic
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Regression (OLR). Where assumptions of OLR are violated, we use Multinomial
Logistic Regression (MLR). Much like a Binary Logistic Regression, an OLR returns a
Wald value to determine significance, and is interpreted by way of an Odds Ratio. An
Odds Ratio represents the likelihood of belonging to one of the categorical DVs given
the value of an IV. Specific to OLR, the odds ratio applies consistently for each level of
the DV.
An important assumption of an OLR is that of proportional odds. When this
assumption is violated it is appropriate to run a MLR, which treats the relationships
between the categories as arbitrary. For further information on OLR and MLR please
see: Field (2013); Kleinbaum and Klein (2010); Menard (2010).
Results
There were no differences between the undergraduate participants and those
recruited via mTurk on any of the dependent variables. Subsequent analyses of these
variables were therefore conducted on a single dataset, collapsed across populations (N
= 475).
Did participants perceive drinks as ‘the same’?. Data on the ‘same’
variable was coded such that one point was assigned to a response in which the
participant indicated that the glasses were different. Thus, across two trials, if a
participant said that the glasses are different on both trials, they had a total score of 2
(corresponding to category 2 – ‘Glasses the same on both trials’). All ‘same’ analysis
returned a null result on the Test of Parallel Lines (p > .05) and satisfied the
assumption of proportional odds, indicating OLR was an appropriate statistical tool.
Results are presented in Table 1.
Across Blocks 1 and 2 (two glasses one action, and three glasses one action,
respectively) we found that our OLR did not provide a better fit than the general
model. In Block 1 the final model fit was not significant, χ2(2) = 3.735, p = .155, nor
was the model fit in Block 2 χ2(2)= 2.922, p = .232. In both cases this indicates that a
model with predictors is not better than a general model without predictors.
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In Block 3 (three glasses two actions) we found a significantly better final model
fit, χ2(2)= 6.577, p = .037, indicating that a model with predictors was better than a
model without predictors. Pearson’s Goodness-of-fit, χ2(4)= 9.509, p = .05, did not fall
below the threshold (p < .05). As Table 1 shows, the presence of opacity makes it 1.595
times more likely that participants will report that there is a difference between glasses
at each level of the DV. Pseudo-R2 values range from .011 (McFadden) to .014
(Nagelkerke). Figure 2 shows the proportion of responses in each category across all
four conditions.
Table 1
Parameter estimates of ordinal logistic regression for ‘same’ scores for all three blocks of
stimuli
Predictor Log Odds SE Wald’s χ2 p 95%CI Odds Ratio
Block 1: Two Glasses One Action
Opacity (1) vs Transparency (0) -0.49 0.263 3.456 0.063 -0.026 - 1.006 -
Context (1) vs No Context (0) -0.134 0.261 0.265 0.606 -0.377 - 0.645 -
Block 2: Three Glasses One Action
Opacity (1) vs Transparency (0) -0.195 0.224 0.758 0.384 -0.244 - 0.635 -
Context (1) vs No Context (0) -0.337 0.226 2.237 0.135 -0.105 - 0.780 -
Block 3: Three Glasses Two Actions
Opacity (1) vs Transparency (0) -0.467 0.229 4.165 0.041 0.019 - 0.916 1.595
Context (1) vs No Context (0) -0.361 0.229 2.483 0.115 -0.088 - 0.809 -
Did participants perceive ‘specialness’ among the drinks?. Data on the
‘special’ variable was coded such that one point was assigned to a response in which the
participant indicated that a special glass was present. Thus, across two trials, if a
participant said that a special glass was present on both trials, they had a total score of
2 (corresponding to category 2 – ‘special glasses were present on both trials’). All
‘special’ analysis returned a null result on the Test of Parallel Lines (p > .05) and
satisfied the assumption of proportional odds, indicating OLR was an appropriate
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statistical tool. Results are presented in table 2.
In Block 1 (two glasses one action) we found a significantly better final model fit,
χ2(2)= 27.525, p < .001, indicating that a model with predictors was better than a
model without predictors. Pearson’s Goodness-of-fit, χ2(4)= 8.368, p = .079, did not
fall below the threshold (p < .05). As Table 2 shows, when actions are opaque,
participants are 1.76 times more likely to report the presence of specialness at each
[increasing] level of the DV. Likewise, when context is present, participants are 2.30
times more likely to report the presence of specialness at each [increasing] level of the
DV. Pseudo-R2 values range from .035 (McFadden) to .073 (Nagelkerke).
In Block 2 (three glasses one action) we found a significantly better final model fit,
χ2(2)= 32.524, p < .001, indicating that a model with predictors was better than a
model without predictors. Pearson’s Goodness-of-fit, χ2(4)= 8.006, p = .091, did not
fall below the threshold (p < .05). As Table 2 shows, when actions are opaque,
participants are 2.65 times more likely to report the presence of specialness at each
[increasing] level of the DV. Likewise, when context is present, participants are 1.46
times more likely to report the presence of specialness at each [increasing] level of the
DV. Pseudo-R2 values range from .036 (McFadden) to .078 (Nagelkerke).
In Block 3 (three glasses two actions) we found a significantly better final model
fit, χ2(2)= 39.556, p < .001, indicating that a model with predictors was better than a
model without predictors. Pearson’s Goodness-of-fit, χ2(4)= 8.131, p = .087, did not
fall below the threshold (p < .05). As Table 2 shows, when actions are opaque,
participants are 2.73 times more likely to report the presence of specialness at each
[increasing] level of the DV. Likewise, when context is present, participants are 1.76
times more likely to report the presence of specialness at each [increasing] level of the
DV. Pseudo-R2 values range from .036 (McFadden) to .078 (Nagelkerke). Figure 3
shows the proportion of responses in each category across all four conditions.
Which drink did participants select to drink?. Data on the ‘drink’ variable
was coded such that one point was assigned to a response in which the participant
indicated that they would drink the acted upon drink. Thus, across two trials, if a
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Table 2
Parameter estimates of ordinal logistic regression for ‘special’ scores for all three blocks
of stimuli
Predictor Log Odds SE Wald’s χ2 p 95%CI Odds Ratio
Block 1: Two Glasses One Action
Opacity (1) vs Transparency (0) -0.565 0.191 8.702 0.003 0.189 - 0.940 1.759
Context (1) vs No Context (0) -0.834 0.191 19.014 < .001 0.459 - 1.209 2.303
Block 2: Three Glasses One Action
Opacity (1) vs Transparency (0) -0.975 0.182 28.542 < .001 0.617 - 1.332 2.651
Context (1) vs No Context (0) -0.376 0.182 4.279 0.039 0.020 - 0.733 1.456
Block 3: Three Glasses Two Actions
Opacity (1) vs Transparency (0) -1.006 0.185 29.570 < .001 0.643 - 1.396 2.735
Context (1) vs No Context (0) -0.566 0.184 9.437 0.002 0.205 - 0.928 1.761
participant said that they would drink the acted upon drink on both trials, they had a
total score of 2 corresponding to category 2 – ‘chose acted-upon objects exclusively’).
All ‘drink’ analysis returned a significant result on the Test of Parallel Lines (p < .05),
indicating that the logit (the odds ratio) varies between levels of the DV for a given
significant IV. As a result, we used MLR analysis, which ignores the ordered nature of
the data and treats it as nominal (arbitrarily ordered). Results are presented in table 3.
In Block 1 (two glasses one action) we found a significantly better final model fit,
χ2(4)= 31.085, p < .001, indicating that a model with predictors was better than a
model without predictors. Pearson’s Goodness-of-fit, χ2(2)= .317, p = .854, did not fall
below the threshold (p < .05). As Table 3 shows, when actions are opaque, participants
are 2.84 times more likely to report preferring to drink the acted upon object only at
level 2 of the DV. Likewise, when context is present, participants are 2.00 times more
likely to report preferring to drink the acted upon object only at level 2 of the DV.
Pseudo-R2 values range from .030 (McFadden) to .072 (Nagelkerke). Neither Action
Type nor Context significantly predicted responses at Level 1 of the DV.
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In Block 2 (three glasses one action) we found a significantly better final model fit,
χ2(4)= 43.296, p < .001, indicating that a model with predictors was better than a
model without predictors. Pearson’s Goodness-of-fit, χ2(2)= .085, p = .958, did not fall
below the threshold (p < .05). As Table 3 shows, when actions are opaque, participants
are 3.60 times more likely to report preferring to drink the acted upon object only at
level 2 of the DV. Likewise, when context is present, participants are 1.76 times more
likely to report preferring to drink the acted upon object only at level 2 of the DV.
Pseudo-R2 values range from .043 (McFadden) to .099 (Nagelkerke). Neither Action
Type nor Context significantly predicted responses at Level 1 of the DV.
In Block 3 (three glasses two actions) we found a significantly better final model
fit, χ2(4)= 13.611, p = .009, indicating that a model with predictors was better than a
model without predictors. Pearson’s Goodness-of-fit, χ2(2)= .652, p = .722, did not fall
below the threshold (p < .05). As Table 3 shows, when actions are opaque, participants
are .56 times as likely to report preferring to drink the acted upon object only at level 1
of the DV. Separately, when context is present, participants are 1.68 times more likely
to report preferring to drink the acted upon object only at level 2 of the DV. No other
significant effects were observed. Pseudo-R2 values range from .013 (McFadden) to .032
(Nagelkerke).
Figure 4 shows the proportion of responses in each category across all four
conditions.
Survey results. Undergraduates (M = 2.61, SD = 1.23) scored significantly
higher on the Religiosity scale than mTurk participants (M = 2.28, SD = 1.28), t(474)
= 2.318, p = .021; Similarly, on the novel scale of Ritual and Religious exposure,
undergraduates (M = 3.24, SD = .65) had more exposure and involvement in ritual
than mTurk participants (M = 2.99, SD = .72), F(1,473) = 10.294, p = .001 (See Table
4 for separate and combined means and standard deviations on survey items).
Regardless, there were no consistent patterns of association between survey items and
dependent variables for the populations combined (Table 5; correlations for each
population separately can be found in Tables B1 and B2 of Appendix B).
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Figure 1 . Matching ritual and control actions
The 6 illustrated steps demonstrate the similarities between the ritual and control
actions (images show the ‘Cloth’ ritual acted upon the center glass). For both the ritual
and control conditions steps 1 and 2 are identical, wherein the action begins and the
demonstrator moves the smaller glasses in front of the larger glasses. In ritual Step 3
the cloth is waved vigorously at the glass, while in the control condition the cloth is used
to clean the glass. In ritual step 4 the smaller glass is raised high before being poured
into the larger glass, whereas in the control condition the smaller glass is poured
directly. In ritual step 5 the glass is raised with both hands and bowed to, whereas in the
control condition it is raised with one hand and inspected. Step 6 (for both conditions)
shows the demonstrator returning to a neutral position.
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Figure 2 . Responses as a percentage of total responses on ‘same’ variable across all
blocks.
Figure 3 . Responses as a percentage of total responses on ‘special’ variable across all
blocks.
Figure 4 . Responses as a percentage of total responses on ‘drink preference’ variable
across all blocks.
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Table 3
Parameter estimates of multinomial logistic regression for ‘drink’ scores for all three
blocks of stimuli
Predictor Log Odds SE Wald’s χ2 p 95%CI Odds Ratio
Block 1: Two Glasses One Action
Pick acted-upon object once
Opacity (0) vs Transparency (1) 0.082 0.216 8.99 0.144 0.711 - 1.658 -
Context (0) vs No Context (1) -0.021 0.215 0.010 0.921 0.643 - 1.491 -
Pick acted-upon object twice
Opacity (0) vs Transparency (1) 1.045 0.244 18.36 < .001 1.763 - 4.585 2.843
Context (0) vs No Context (1) 0.691 0.242 8.179 0.004 1.243 - 3.204 1.996
Block 2: Three Glasses One Action
Pick acted-upon object once
Opacity (0) vs Transparency (1) 0.061 0.236 0.067 0.796 0.669 - 1.668 -
Context (0) vs No Context (1) 0.104 0.232 0.200 0.655 0.704 - 1.746 -
Pick acted-upon object twice
Opacity (0) vs Transparency (1) 1.282 0.230 31.141 < .001 2.297 - 5.651 3.604
Context (0) vs No Context (1) 0.563 0.225 6.251 0.012 1.129 - 2.730 1.756
Block 3: Three Glasses Two Actions
Pick acted-upon object once
Opacity (0) vs Transparency (1) -0.580 0.227 6.515 0.011 0.658 - 0.874 0.560
Context (0) vs No Context (1) 0.144 0.226 0.408 0.523 0.742 - 1.798 -
Pick acted-upon object twice
Opacity (0) vs Transparency (1) -0.015 0.221 .005 .945 0.638 - 1.520 -
Context (0) vs No Context (1) 0.519 0.222 5.475 0.019 1.088 - 2.596 1.680
Note: The dummy coding of the IV’s has been reverse from previous OLR analysis. this has
been done so that, as IV levels increase, a positive Log Odds Coefficient reveals an increase in
the likelihood for DV categories. This makes the results more easily interpreted, and is due to
hte underlying mathematical structure of MLR compared to OLR using SPSS. The reference
category for the DV (0) is ’Did not pick any acted upon objects’.
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Table 4
Survey results for both undergraduates and mTurk samples (including collapsed totals;
Study1)
Scale Undergraduate mean (SD) mTurk mean (SD) Combined mean (SD)
Revised Paranormal Beliefs Scale 2.82 (0.93) 2.77 (0.93) 2.78 (1.16)
7-point
Rational Subscale 3.52 (0.49) 3.63 (0.71) 3.61 (0.67)
5-point
Intuitive Subscale 3.28 (0.53) 3.19 (0.80) 3.21 (0.75)
5-point
Religiosity Scale 2.61 (1.23)* 2.28 (1.28)* 2.35 (1.28)
6-point
Ritual and Religious Exposure 3.24 (0.65)* 2.99 (0.72)* 3.04 (0.72)
5-point
p < .05
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Discussion
In Experiment 1 participants were exposed to videos of rituals or matched control
tasks, and were either given written context describing the actions or not. The ritual
actions were constructed based on common elements of ritual (e.g., redundancy,
repetition, formality) with a particular focus on making the actions causally opaque.
That is, the ritual actions were designed to have no knowable physical causal
relationship with the object, so that it would be impossible for participants to validly
infer any physical-causal effects. Our data substantiate these claims, and our
hypotheses were supported. In Blocks 1 and 2 (one ritual act performed on one of two,
or one of three glasses, respectively) neither action-type nor the presence of context
made the models of participants responses more accurate than a general model. Indeed,
even in Block 3 where we did find a better fit, it explained less than 1.5% of the
variance in the model. In Block 3 (two ritual acts on one of three glasses), we found
opacity made it 1.60 times more likely for participants to report that objects differed at
each level of the DV, though no effect for context was observed. This finding was
unexpected, but is possibly attributable to the fact that one cup was singled out by the
demonstrator by virtue of being excluded from specific ritual acts. It may be the case
that this cup was made ‘less same’ by virtue of the ritual act, but it’s also possible that
participants inferred this cup was excluded as it was different to the other cups prior to
the ritual actions. Determining the reason for this finding is beyond the scope of this
experiment, but may nevertheless warrant future investigation (assuming this is not a
Type I error, given that this effect was not found in Experiment 2).
While ritual acts did not appear to systematically vary physical qualities of the
objects studied (and context had no influence whatsoever), this was not the case for
intangible qualities. Opaque actions made it considerably more likely that participants
would report the presence of ‘specialness’ within the object set, with Odds Ratios (OR)
between 1.76 and 2.65; the presence of context had a similar influence (OR between
1.46 and 2.30). On average, opaque actions increased this likelihood more than the
presence of context.
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In Blocks 1 and 2, participants were more likely to exclusively prefer the
acted-upon object if opacity was present (OR between 2.84 and 3.60), but not to
occasionally prefer the acted upon object (i.e., chose ‘acted upon’ only once over both
trials). Context also appeared to increase likelihood (in Blocks 1 and 2) that
participants would exclusively prefer acted-upon objects (OR between 1.68 and 2.00),
but not to occasional prefer the acted-upon object. We did not find this explicit effect
in Block 3, though we did notice a decrease in the likelihood that they would
occasionally prefer the acted upon object (OR = 0.56). We interpret this as weak
evidence that participants’ preference regarding acted-upon and non-acted-upon objects
varies as the relationship between action and singleness varies. In Block 3, acting
opaquely toward two objects and singling out the third, results in greater preference for
non-acted (singled-out) objects, relative to preference in Blocks 1 and 2. That said, the
presence of context makes it 1.68 times more likely for participants to exclusively prefer
acted-upon objects. Thus, our hypotheses were supported. Ritual actions with causal
opacity (with no ‘knowable’ physical-causal relationship) were not more likely to be
reported as physically different from objects subjected to transparent actions (indeed,
neither action-type appeared to influence physical attributions of the object). However,
the presence of opacity lead to ‘special’ object-attributions, which in turn, lead to
greater preference for acted upon objects. Providing context, which served a normative
cue (i.e., these actions are the actions of a specific group of people) increased the effect.
This supports predictions derived from the ritual stance which describe a normative
interpretation of ritual actions.
No systematic relationship was observed between survey items and scores on
sameness, specialness, or drink preference. This was generally surprising, and while
much caution should be exercised in drawing conclusions from null results, it may
suggest the literature holds hidden assumptions regarding the role learning and
enculturation play in ritual cognition. For example, the literature on ritual is frequently
coupled with religion, draws heavily on anthropological studies, and is embedded within
a broader literature on the evolution of religion; indeed, many of the rituals we observe
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emerging in the wake of social and secular disasters are religiously motivated (Jacobs,
2004). In our study, scores on the Religiosity scale (Rohrbaugh & Jessor, 1975) did not
correlate with scores on sameness, specialness, or desirability. Nor did scores on the
revised scale of paranormal belief (Tobacyk, 2004), despite having 7 dimensions which
cover beliefs relating to Superstition, Spiritualism, Psi, Witchcraft, Religion,
Pre-cognition, and Extraordinary life forms. Thinking styles also failed to correlate with
the dependent variables; Intuitive thinking has been implicated in superstitious
reasoning (Sadler-Smith, 2011) and thinking styles more broadly have been implicated
in religiosity and belief (Gervais & Norenzayan, 2012; Shenhav, Rand, & Greene, 2012).
Finally, the index of religious and ritual exposure did not correlate with any of the
target DVs, despite measuring the degree to which participants had experience with,
and normative expectations for, ritual exposure and participation. These null results,
though weak from an inferential point of view, suggest that the relationship between
ritual and religion may need to be better qualified in the future.
Experiment 2
In Experiment 1 it was shown that context, when paired with ritual actions, can
increase perceptions of specialness and preference – presumably by way of the
normative social information it provides. Experiment 2 was conducted in order to
determine whether the valence of the context influenced the apparent effect. In
Experiment 1, the rituals chosen to provide context were relatively novel and neutrally
valanced. That is, by using obscure rituals as stimuli participants were unlikely to draw
upon prior information (about the groups described) to infer the ritual’s emotional tone
– yet still allowed them to validly infer normative, social information. In making this
decision we limited the role of context to merely describing the act as belonging to a
group and denying participants a meaningful sense of ritual intent. To evaluate the
potential impact of prior knowledge, in Experiment 2 the contexts we employed
belonged to well recognized groups who are generally regarded as aversive; we described
rituals (or control acts) as either satanic, voodooistic, or wiccan (witchcraft). Again, we
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denied participants any explicit sense of ritual purpose, but in using these groups we
provided participants with inferentially rich information. The religions of Satanism,
Voodoo (or Voodou), and Wicca (Modern Witchcraft) are all exceeding minorities in
the population sampled (the US) and around the world, but have a history of
misrepresentation and malignment in the media and in pop-culture. They are
frequently portrayed as threatening, evil, sinister, and being generally in opposition to
majority values of the United States. If rituals allow individuals to express
identification with groups, and facilitating expressions of commitment to beliefs and
values of the groups and its members (Atran & Henrich, 2010; Ensminger, 1997;
Henrich, 2009; Konvalinka et al., 2011; Legare & Watson-jones, 2015; Reddish et al.,
2014; Ruﬄe & Sosis, 2007; Sosis & Bressler, 2003; Sosis & Ruﬄe, 2003; Whitehouse &
Lanman, 2014; Wiltermuth & Heath, 2009) then we ought to be relatively calibrated to
identifying rituals of groups to which we do not belong, or which we find aversive.
Thus, groups such as the ones employed here ought to lead participants to avoid
acted-upon objects. Stated another way, we predict that the valence of attributions
towards ritualized objects will be congruent with the valence of attributions to the
group (though we still expect attributions of ‘specialness’ to remain high, as
‘specialness’, in the lay-sense, is not limited to positive contexts).
Methods.
Participants. A total of 353 participants were recruited via mTurk. The
sample consisted of 163 female and 189 male participants (with 1 missing value), who
ranged in age from 18 to 92 years (M = 35.29, SD = 11.79), and who overwhelmingly
reported English as their native language (98.6%). A total of 45.0% reported
completing a tertiary degree and a further 10.2% reported holding a Post-graduate
degree, while 30.7% reported ‘some tertiary’. Of the remaining participants, 13.6%
completed high school while only .3% reporting ‘some high school’; there was 1 missing
values (0.3%). 43.8% of participants earned less than $25,000(US) a year, 17.0% earned
between $25,001 and $35,000, and 10.5% earned between $45,001 and $55,000 (all of
whom accounted for 80.7% of the sample), the remaining 19.2% reported earning in
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excess of $55,001 annually.
Materials. The materials employed in Experiment 2 were identical to those
employed in Experiment 1, except for one difference. While the same videos were
presented to participants, we altered the nature of the contextual information. Instead
of describing three relatively obscure and neutrally valanced rituals (i.e., Kava, Bwititi,
and Ayuahasca) we described more aversive rituals. Using the same written form, “This
video contains elements of established ritual seen around the world. The actions in this
video can be seen in [ceremony name] of [Location]”, we described each video as
representing Satanic Ritual (North America), Voodoo Ritual (Caribbean Sea) or
Wicca/Witchcraft Ritual (British Isles).
Design, Procedure and Coding. As per Experiment 1, participants were
randomly assigned to one of four conditions: 1) Ritual with no context, 2) Ritual with
context, 3) Control actions with no context, or 4) Control actions with context. The
procedure and coding were identical to Experiment 1.
Did participants perceive drinks as ‘the same’?. Data on the ‘same’
variable was coded such that one point was assigned to a response in which the
participant indicated that the glasses were different. Thus, across two trials, if a
participant said that the glasses are different on both trials, they had a total score of 2
(corresponding to category 2 – ‘Glasses the same on both trials’). All ‘same’ analysis
returned a null result on the Test of Parallel Lines (p > .05) and satisfied the
assumption of proportional odds, indicating OLR was an appropriate statistical tool.
Across all blocks (two glasses one action, three glasses one action, and three
glasses two actions) we found that our OLR did not provide a better fit than the
general model. In Block 1 the final model fit was not significant, χ2(2) = .274, p = .696,
nor was the model fit in Block 2 χ2(2)= .701, p = .704, nor was the model fit in Block
3, χ2(2)= .650, p = .723. In all cases this indicates that a model with predictors is not
better than a general model without predictors. See table 6 for specific values. Figure 5
shows the proportion of responses in each category across all four conditions.
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Table 6
Parameter estimates of ordinal logistic regression for ‘same’ scores for all three blocks of
stimuli
Predictor Log Odds SE Wald’s χ2 p 95%CI Odds Ratio
Block 1: Two Glasses One Action
Opacity (1) vs Transparency (0) -0.119 0.214 0.310 0.557 -0.539 - 0.300 -
Context (1) vs No Context (0) -0.137 0.214 0.411 0.521 -0.556 - 0.282 -
Block 2: Three Glasses One Action
Opacity (1) vs Transparency (0) -0.074 0.256 0.085 0.771 -0.577 - 0.428 -
Context (1) vs No Context (0) -0.202 0.256 0.622 0.410 -0.704 - 0.300 -
Block 3: Three Glasses Two Actions
Opacity (1) vs Transparency (0) -0.069 0.251 0.075 0.785 -0.985 - -
Context (1) vs No Context (0) -0.192 0.251 0.584 0.445 -0.685 - 0.301 -
Figure 5 . Responses as a percentage of total responses on ‘same’ variable across all
blocks.
Did participants perceive ‘specialness’ among the drinks?. Data on the
‘special’ variable was coded such that one point was assigned to a response in which
participants reported that one of the glasses was special. Thus, across two trials, if a
participant said one of the glasses was special on both trials, they had a total score of 2
(corresponding to category 2 – ‘specialness present on both trials’). All ‘special’ analyses
returned a null result on the Test of Parallel Lines (p > .05) and, thus, satisfied the
assumption of proportional odds, indicating OLR was an appropriate statistical tool.
In Block 1 (two glasses one actions) we found a significantly better final model fit,
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χ2(2)= 12.536, p = .002, indicating that a model with predictors was better than a
model without predictors. Pearson’s Goodness-of-fit, χ2(4)= 2.980, p = .561, did not
fall below the threshold (p < .05). As Table 7 shows, when actions are opaque,
participants are 1.48 times more likely to report the presence of specialness at each
[increasing] level of the DV. Likewise, when context is present, participants are 1.83
times more likely to report the presence of specialness at each [increasing] level of the
DV. Pseudo-R2 values range from .017 (McFadden) to .040 (Nagelkerke).
In Block 2 (three glasses one actions) we found a significantly better final model
fit, χ2(2)= 32.028, p < .001, indicating that a model with predictors was better than a
model without predictors. Pearson’s Goodness-of-fit, χ2(4)= 7.316, p = .120, did not
fall below the threshold (p < .05). As Table 7 shows, when actions are opaque,
participants are 3.02 times more likely to report the presence of specialness at each
[increasing] level of the DV. Likewise, when context is present, participants are 1.74
times more likely to report the presence of specialness at each [increasing] level of the
DV. Pseudo-R2 values range from .048 (McFadden) to .102 (Nagelkerke).
In Block 3 (three glasses two actions) we found a significantly better final model
fit, χ2(2)= 16.463, p < .001, indicating that a model with predictors was better than a
model without predictors. Pearson’s Goodness-of-fit, χ2(4)= 2.179, p = .703, did not
fall below the threshold (p < .05). As Table 7 shows, when actions are opaque,
participants are 1.66 times more likely to report the presence of specialness at each
[increasing] level of the DV. Likewise, when context is present, participants are 2.07
times more likely to report the presence of specialness at each [increasing] level of the
DV. Pseudo-R2 values range from .026 (McFadden) to .055 (Nagelkerke). Figure 6
shows the proportion of responses in each category across all four conditions
Which drink did participants select to drink?. Data on the ‘drink’
variable was coded such that one point was assigned to a response if the participant
chose [one of] the acted upon glasses. Thus, across two trials, if a participant chose an
acted upon glass on both trials, they had a total score of 2 (corresponding to category 2
– ‘chose acted-upon objects exclusively’). All ‘drink’ analyses returned a null result on
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Table 7
Parameter estimates of ordinal logistic regression for ‘special’ scores for all three blocks
of stimuli
Predictor Log Odds SE Wald’s χ2 p 95%CI Odds Ratio
Block 1: Two Glasses One Action
Opacity (1) vs Transparency (0) -0.395 0.203 3.775 0.052 -0.793 - 0.003 1.484
Context (1) vs No Context (0) -0.604 0.204 8.794 0.003 -1.003 - -0.205 1.829
Block 2: Three Glasses One Action
Opacity (1) vs Transparency (0) -1.104 0.218 25.729 < .001 -1.531 - -0.678 3.016
Context (1) vs No Context (0) -0.553 0.215 6.610 0.010 -0.975 - -0.132 1.738
Block 3: Three Glasses Two Actions
Opacity (1) vs Transparency (0) -0.507 0.218 5.432 0.020 -0.934 - -0.080 1.660
Context (1) vs No Context (0) -0.727 0.218 11.129 < .001 -1.155 - -0.300 2.069
Figure 6 . Responses as a percentage of total responses on ‘special’ variable across all
blocks.
the Test of Parallel Lines (p > .05) and, thus, satisfied the assumption of proportional
odds, indicating OLR was an appropriate statistical tool.
In Block 1 (two glasses one actions) we found a significantly better final model fit,
χ2(2)= 12.740, p = .002, indicating that a model with predictors was better than a
model without predictors. Pearson’s Goodness-of-fit, χ2(4)= 2.494, p = .646, did not
fall below the threshold (p < .05). As Table 8 shows, when actions are opaque,
participants are 2.03 times more likely to report the presence of specialness at each
[increasing] level of the DV. No effect of context was observed. Pseudo-R2 values range
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from .017 (McFadden) to .040 (Nagelkerke).
In Block 2 (three glasses one action) we found a significantly better final model fit,
χ2(2)= 12.468, p = .002, indicating that a model with predictors was better than a
model without predictors. Pearson’s Goodness-of-fit, χ2(4)= 7.141, p = .129, did not
fall below the threshold (p < .05). As Table 8 shows, when actions are opaque,
participants are 2.02 times more likely to report the presence of specialness at each
[increasing] level of the DV. No effect of context was observed. Pseudo-R2 values range
from .003 (McFadden) to .006 (Nagelkerke).
The model fit for Block 3 with predictors was not better than the general model
without predictors. No effects of action type nor context was observed. Figure 7 shows
the proportion of responses in each category across all four conditions.
Table 8
Parameter estimates of ordinal logistic regression for drink preference scores for all
three blocks of stimuli
Predictor Log Odds SE Wald’s χ2 p 95%CI Odds Ratio
Block 1: Two Glasses One Action
Opacity (1) vs Transparency (0) -0.706 0.202 12.149 < .001 -1.102 - -0.309 1.484
Context (1) vs No Context (0) -0.131 0.201 0.425 0.515 -0.524 - 0.262 -
Block 2: Three Glasses One Action
Opacity (1) vs Transparency (0) -0.202 0.218 12.238 < .001 -1.100 - -0.310 2.024
Context (1) vs No Context (0) 0.050 0.020 0.062 0.803 -0.343 - 0.442 -
Block 3: Three Glasses Two Actions
Opacity (1) vs Transparency (0) 0.202 0.197 1.058 0.304 -0.134 - 0.589 -
Context (1) vs No Context (0) 0.179 0.197 0.828 0.363 -0.207 - 0.565 -
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Figure 7 . Responses as a percentage of total responses on ‘drink’ variable across all
blocks.
Discussion. Results of Experiment 2 mirror those of Experiment 1. Across all
conditions and blocks of stimuli, neither action-type nor presence of context improved a
general predictive model on measures of sameness. In Experiment 1, opacity lead to an
increased likelihood that participants would rate objects as different in Block 3 – this
effect was not replicated in the present experiment. As with Experiment 1, action-type
and context generated significant differences in status attributions. Opaque actions
made it considerably more likely that participants would report the presence of
specialness within the object set (OR between 1.48 and 3.02), and the presence of
context had a similar influence (OR between 1.74 and 2.07). On average, opaque
actions increased this likelihood more than the presence of context.
We expected participants to avoid objects when they were described as Satanic,
Voodooistic, or Wiccan, irrespective of action-type, due to the aversive nature of the
context. This was not the case. Describing ritual and control actions in these terms did
not reverse the trend identified in Experiment 1. That is, we predicted that the
presence of aversive context would make it less likely (i.e., an OR < 1) that participants
would prefer these objects. Instead, we found no significant influence of context on
likelihoods of choice whatsoever. We still observed (in Block 1 and 2) that ritual actions
increased the likelihood of exclusive preference for acted-upon objects. We observed no
effects in block 3.
While our hypotheses were not fully supported, all data are interpretable within
the framework of the ritual stance. Ritual actions with causal opacity (with no
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‘knowable’ physical-causal relationship) were not more likely to be reported as
physically different from objects subjected to transparent actions (indeed, neither
action-type appeared to influence physical attributions of the object). However, the
presence of opacity lead to ‘special’ object-attributions, which in turn, lead to greater
preference for acted upon objects. Unlike Experiment 1, providing context, which
served a normative cue (i.e., these actions are the actions of a specific group of people)
had neither a positive nor a negative effect on preference – despite the fact we predicted
a pattern of avoidance. This supports predictions derived from the ritual stance which
describe a normative interpretation of ritual actions, and which are more deeply
discussed in the General Discussion.
General Discussion
Rituals of various forms are deeply embedded in all human cultures. At one
extreme, rituals are understood as elements within institutions (such as religions), and
at the other extreme, are understood as a process by which ordinary actions are
divorced of their initial [potentially instrumental] purpose to become what we recognize
as rituals (Boyer & Liénard, 2006; Liénard & Boyer, 2006; McCauley & Lawson, 2002;
Whitehouse & Laidlaw, 2004). This can sometimes make them difficult to identify. It
intuitively feels odd to draw comparisons between singing hymns and singing the
national anthem, lighting candles in a vigil and lighting Christmas decorations, and
making ‘magic’ potions and making tea. Why do we sing for gods and country, why do
we light our homes to honor both a family memory and a childhood lie, and why are
particular actions demanded for particular drinks? In isolation these actions are opaque
– they do not cause an actual physical change in the real world, nor is any inference of
physical-cause change valid, and yet we recognize that these actions have significance,
and may influence our social and psychological worlds. Here we have presented results
and argued that ritual acts, by virtue of their causal, instrumental and motivational
opacity, convey socially important normative information. Moreover, while minimal
context helps us place a ritual act within a normative social framework, we are still able
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to infer the significance of an act even when that context is denied to us, allowing us to
alter our behaviour. Indeed, on average, the influence of opacity has a larger influence
on the likelihood of special attributions and preference than does the presence of
context.
In both Experiment 1 and 2, participants recognized that objects were not
physically changed, irrespective of whether an opaque ritual acts or a transparent
control act was performed. Yet in both experiments opaque acts increased perceptions
that a set of objects were imbued with something ‘special’. Providing some social
context (i.e., describing an act as belonging to a ritual and a group of people) served to
enhance this effect. Finally, opaque ritual acts continued to increase participants’
preference for consuming acted-upon objects – accounting for variance when the ritual
was accompanied with descriptions of relatively unknown and neutrally valanced groups
(Bwiti, Kava, or Ayahuasca) and when accompanied by recognizably aversive groups
(Satanic, Wiccan, or Voodooistic). These results support predictions derived from the
ritual stance: when confronted with opaque, ritual actions, we interpret them through a
normative, social lens.
Two findings need further consideration: how rituals influence perception and
behaviour, and why aversive contexts did not systematically and negatively influence
preferences as predicted. In the first instance, we methodologically controlled for the
possibility that singling acts may lead to interpretations consistent with the ritual
stance. Our data provide tentative evidence that, in Block 3 (across both experiments),
participants’ tendency to choose the acted-upon object was diminished when the object
singled out was not the object acted upon. While opaque actions tend to make objects
special, singling out objects by ignoring them in the context of other actions (including
transparent actions) also appears to influence self-reported behaviour. This can be
interpreted in two non-exclusive ways.
First, we may privilege the inner state of the performer above the physical effect
they are trying to bring about. When the motivation of the demonstrator is opaque
(why did he leave that drink alone when he acted on the others?), we may be more
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motivated to rely on a mental/cognitive heuristic than a causal heuristic (he must have
a reason, even if I don’t know it). This is consistent with the ritual stance. Second, the
way in which we, as observers, demarcate ritual acts may be important. In Block 3,
participants may infer that the ritual begins when the first small glass is moved
forward, and ends after the bow. Under such conditions the most salient aspect was the
unexplained avoidance of a single object within the complete sequence. Alternatively, in
Blocks 1 and 2, participants may focus on the individual elements of ritual (the waving,
humming, gesturing, and bowing) rather than perceiving the whole sequence as a
complete ritual – in which case the ritual acts are the singling acts. Here rituals are
performed within a larger sequence, rather than the larger sequence constituting a
whole ritual. Our data do not allow us to resolve this question satisfactorily, but do
provide weak evidence that participants may be employing the latter strategy – given
that the likelihood of picking an acted-upon object was not improved in Block 3 in
Experiment 2 (using an OLR), and may have had a slightly negative influence on
likelihood to pick acted-upon objects in Block 3 of Experiment 1.
Importantly, the afore-noted results are in stark contrast to the influence opacity
has in Block 1 and Block 2 for acted-upon objects. Recently published data by Nielsen,
Kapitány, and Elkins (2014) suggest – at least in children – that ritualistic actions are
understood in isolation, rather than as part of a larger coherent sequence. Work by
Nielbo, Schjødt, and Sørensen (2013); Nielbo and Sørensen (2011); Zacks et al. (2004)
also suggests that when the physical-causal relationship is not immediately discernible
participants tend to group actions within a sequence into smaller chunks than
equivalent actions in a sequence that does afford a physical-causal relationship. We thus
argue that the change in participants’ response in Block 3 is explained by this
grouping-strategy: action-parsing within rituals tends towards smaller discrete
action-units, rather than towards an integrative whole. By singling out an object within
a whole (even through inaction) we find participants making different attributions
regarding intended outcomes or consequences. This emerging data points to a more
complicated and nuanced picture of ritual cognition, which provides a range of
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interesting opportunities for future research.
It is surprising that rituals with a neutrally valanced context lead to similar
outcomes as rituals described as Satanic, Voodooistic, or Wiccan. Proponents of the
ritual stance predict that ritual acts are interpreted as normative and socially relevant.
That said, the theory makes no predictions regarding qualities of arousal or valance. If
we are to assume, all things being equal, that all rituals are approximately equally
socially normative and informative, irrespective of the valence, then we do not have just
cause to predict a reversal of preference. However, if rituals play a role in regulating
and expressing the beliefs and values of groups and group members (Atran & Henrich,
2010; Ensminger, 1997; Henrich, 2009; Konvalinka et al., 2011; Reddish et al., 2014;
Ruﬄe & Sosis, 2007; Sosis & Bressler, 2003; Sosis & Ruﬄe, 2003; Wiltermuth & Heath,
2009) then we ought to be relatively calibrated to identifying the rituals of groups that
we do not belong to, or which we find aversive. For example, a member of one
community may avoid a ritualized object from another community, but nonetheless
recognize the object in question as significant (and possibly desirable) for those in that
group. On the one hand, it’s possible that the same action (avoidance) might reflect
prejudiced motivations, but on the other, reflect intergroup sensitivity (as we may not
fully understand the rules surrounding the ritualized object and wish to avoid causing
offence). We must keep in mind that while some participants knew to whom the ritual
belonged, they did not know what purpose the ritual served – perhaps leading to an
unaccounted for set of participant assumptions.
However, there is an alternative explanation for our results. Our rituals were
novel, emphasized opacity, and were focused on something edible - it is possible that
food has a privileged position with respect to ritual actions – such that it uniquely
becomes desirable. Vohs et al. (2013) asked participants to watch and perform ritual
acts on chocolate bars, lemonade, and carrots. They found that ritual acts (compared
to no act) made chocolate and lemonade more flavorful, valuable, and more worthy of
savoring. They also found that such effects did not manifest if the performed acts were
perceived as random, rather than ritualistic. With regard to our results, it’s possible,
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then, that rituals make objects (particularly foodstuffs) desirable, and the valence of the
context matters little (as seen in Experiment 2). We hypothesize that if a purpose for
the ritual was assigned (i.e., ‘this ritual is a curse and is personally harmful vs. ‘this
ritual is a blessing and personally beneficial)’ then we may see the effect moderated.
How are we to interpret the results in relation to the social-action hypothesis
(J. Barrett & Lawson, 2001; Lawson & McCauley, 1990; Sørensen et al., 2006)? As
described previously, we argue that the work by Sørensen et al. (2006) and by J. Barrett
and Lawson (2001) are somewhat hamstrung by (a) not directly addressing participant
experience, but rather what they believe about others’ beliefs, and (b) by prescribing a
premise and participants logically applying the premise to produce a conclusion. We
found that variation in participants’ responses were uniquely explained by both
action-type and context, and yet it did not seem to matter whether the rituals were
recognizable or not, or whether they were apparently neutrally valanced or not; again,
no supernatural agents were referenced . When we asked participants whether they
thought any objects were ‘special’ we deliberately left the term undefined, unlike
Barrett and Lawson who defined it with reference to the authority and power of a
supernatural agent. While it seems inevitable that participants would understand
‘special’ in this study differently from earlier studies, it is not necessarily clear that this
is problematic. Indeed, we found that participants’ naturally attributed some kind of
status-change (i.e., specialness) to objects. We do not have sufficient data to determine
whether or not a reference to the supernatural would increase the observed effect, or
whether it could account for additional variance that natural (i.e., not supernatural)
explanations miss. That said, our methodology avoids invoking participants’
preconceptions (by way of video rather than vignette), avoids second-order attributions,
and avoids both double-barreled questions and leading primes.
We argue the ritual stance – that rituals are interpreted with reference to social
normativity – is more parsimonious than the social-action hypothesis – in which rituals
are interpreted with reference to supernatural authority recognized by natural agents.
To further this point, we observed that objects that were singled-out and made
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desirable by virtue of not being acted upon couldn’t– logically – have been made so by
the authority of any inferred supernatural authority. If, as Lawson and McCauley
(1990), Sørensen et al. (2006) and J. Barrett and Lawson (2001) predict, the agent or
act is the tool by which ritual effect is brought about, then not performing a ritual can’t
possibly result in the described ritual-outcome. Critically, it is worth noting that,
despite the intuitively large Odds Ratios, the Psuedo-R2 values (which we can, in a
rough sense, interpret as a measure of variance accounted for by the model) reach a
maximum of 10.2%. There has been considerable debate about the appropriateness of
this measure, primarily due to its highly responsive nature to multiple inputs, and it’s
somewhat conservative nature compared to R2 (see (McFadden, 1974). That said, if we
are to assume that Psuedo-R2 gives us an estimate, our model does not explain a great
deal of variance. However, this should not be surprising given the incredibly
impoverished nature of our stimuli compared to phenomena observed in the real world.
That we found an effect at all using a procedure administered online via mTurk (see:
Buhrmester, Kwang, and Gosling (2011); Casler, Bickel, and Hackett (2013)) for a
discussion on mTurk), which required participants to make hypothetical judgments
about consumption, may actually be taken as a demonstrable proof-of-concept. Future
research employing this paradigm under lab conditions employing face-to-face testing
will resolve the true extent of this phenomenon.
It is also worth noting here that a quirk of our procedure could be perceived as
accounting for the data we report. That is, at first glance it may appear that in the
control conditions the experimenter touches a glass, something they do not in the ritual
conditions, potentially resulting in a contamination avoidance effect in the case of the
former. However, we do not believe contamination is an issue. First, in all conditions,
across all blocks, all glasses were touched by the demonstrator (when the demonstrator
moved the glasses forward into a more prominent position). Thus, to avoid a glass
which had been touched is not practically possible. Second, since contamination is a
physical property, and we found that, when participants were asked whether the glasses
were the same/identical, neither opaque nor transparent acts altered the likelihood that
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objects were reported as being different. Thus, in the participants’ own responses, we
find evidence against the claim they are motivated by a contagion. Finally, even if the
results could be explained by appealing to a contagion on the acted upon glasses, the
evidence provided that context increases likelihood of choosing the acted-upon glass in
both opaque and transparent conditions would be incongruent. The ritual stance
predicts a normative response, and our evidence from both motor- and semantic-cues
parsimoniously supports this claim. Further research, which employs artifacts/objects
which are less susceptible to contamination, would clarify this point, though we do not
believe there is a strong theoretical reason to reverse our predictions under such
circumstances.
By way of conclusion, consider a ritual many of us are familiar with: the birthday
party. If we strip away the rich beliefs surrounding the act, what transpires is actually
rather odd. A group begins chanting in synchrony toward a specific individual (on a
very specific day), independently, someone retrieves a uniquely adorned item of food,
sets it on fire, and delivers it to the group as the chanting climaxes. A singular
individual within the group, organically determined in the moment, begins a second,
shorter chant in an A-B format (and repeats it three times), before the central
individual breathily puffs all over the food. Everyone cheers a third time (this time
without structure and for a briefer duration) and bangs their hands together making
noise. Now ask the following question: Under what circumstances would you eat such
food? Would you happily oblige if this is how steak-and-chips were routinely delivered?
Would you drink a glass of wine that had been breathily sanctified? Once our
expectations have been stripped away, the difference is not in whether a birthday cake
is more or less hygienic or its arrival is more or less bizarre, but in our understanding of
the significance of the strange and apparently inexplicable acts that surround it. To be
naïve to an observed ritual act is to search for meaning and interpretation, either in
light of intended or expected outcomes (if any are available), or with reference to the
performer’s motives. Under such circumstances we may find ourselves lost for explicit
explanation. This deficit (or gap), generated by causal-, instrumental-, or
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motivational-opacity, is subsequently interpreted naturally – these actions must be
relevant; they are socially informative, and are likely socially normative, and they may
beget a change in behaviour. We need not know why a thing is done, nor what the
expected outcome is, just that here and now this is what people are doing, and we
should act in accordance with the group’s expectations. Thus, we eat the cake, not in
spite of its strange preparation, but because of it, and because it’s expected by all those
around us.
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Chapter Two: The Ritual Stance and the Precaution System: The role of
goal demotion and opacity in ritual and everyday actions
Preface
The present empirical chapter was first published in Religion, Brain and
behaviour in 2016. It is presented without change (save for factual corrections that do
not change the methods, results, or analysis in any way; as well as changes made to
ensure consistent terminology). The purpose of this chapter was to extend the findings
presented in the previous chapter. Specifically, we wanted to more directly manipulate
how goal demotion, as a theoretical construct, interacted with established patterns of
behaviour associated with ritualized actions and objects.
Abstract
Rituals tend to be both causally opaque and goal demoted, yet these two qualities
are rarely dissociated in the literature. Here we manipulate both factors and
demonstrate their unique influence on ritual cognition. In a 2 x 3 (Action-Type x
goal-information) between subjects design 484 US adults viewed causally opaque
(Ritual) or causally transparent (Ordinary) actions performed on identical objects.
They were provided with no goal information, positive goal information (‘Blessing’) or
negative goal information (‘Cursing’). Neither causal opacity nor goal information
influenced perceptions of physical change/causation. In contrast, causal opacity
increased attributions of ‘specialness’, whereas goal-information did not. Finally,
goal-information interacted with action-type on measures of preference, such that
ordinary actions are influenced by both ‘blessings’ and ‘curses’, but ritual actions are
only influenced by ‘curses’. These findings are interpreted in light of the ritual stance,
and the cognitive bases of the effects are described with reference to Boyer and Liénard’s
Precaution theory of ritualized behaviour. The combined value of these two theories is
discussed, and extended to a causal model of developmental ritual ‘calibration’
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Introduction
Ritual-like behaviour appears to have been a part of the Homo behavioural
repertoire for tens of thousands of years, with evidence of Neandertal burial dating back
30kya (Rendu et al., 2014). The ubiquity of such actions in modern Homo sapiens, and
their general absence in our closest living relatives, suggests an adaptive role. Rituals
solve evolutionary and cultural problems, including bonding and cooperation
(Konvalinka et al., 2011; Legare & Nielsen, 2015; Reddish et al., 2014; Wiltermuth &
Heath, 2009), commitment to group values (Ensminger, 1997; Henrich, 2009; Irons,
2001; Ruﬄe & Sosis, 2007; Sosis & Ruﬄe, 2003), and transmission of normative and
cultural information (Atran & Henrich, 2010; Chudek & Henrich, 2011; Rossano, 2012;
Schjødt & Sørensen, 2013; Sosis & Bressler, 2003). While the effects of ritual are well
documented, less is understood regarding the cognitive mechanisms that bring these
effects about. Ritualized actions can be recognized for their repetition, redundancy,
stereotypy, and formality (Boyer & Liénard, 2006; Bulbulia & Sosis, 2011; Eilam, Zor,
Szechtman, & Hermesh, 2006; Legare & Souza, 2012; Rappaport, 1999; Rossano, 2012).
Such actions also feature causal opacity and goal demotion: qualities which can apply
to the whole sequence of actions (‘ritual’; (Nielbo & Sørensen, 2015; Sørensen & Nielbo,
2013). While many ordinary behaviours embody these qualities (as with the repetition
of cleaning, or the formalities of social life) rituals feature these qualities in conjunction
and often without instrumental justification. In the absence of a rich exegetical history
associated with particular actions (as is often the case with religious rituals) both
causal opacity and goal demotion, which are common qualities of many rituals, allow
observers to identify an action sequence as a ritual rather than as an ordinary
alternative (Nielbo & Sørensen, 2015; Sørensen & Nielbo, 2013), thus cuing different
behavioural and cognitive responses.
However, not all rituals are created equal. Rituals may not be causally opaque,
nor goal demoted (nor do they always occur simultaneously). Religious rituals, for
example, typically have a great deal of history and exegetical justification (which means
they are not goal demoted), and may involve instrumental outcomes, such as making
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something clean (which means they are causally transparent). Hereafter, we refer to the
phenomenon under consideration as ritualized behaviour (as defined in the first
paragraph) and refer to sequences of ritualized behaviours, not as ‘rituals’, but as
ritualized actions. This terminology has been used in order to avoid confusion or
conflation with other kinds of ritual, particularly religious rituals.
Causally opaque actions (like crossing one’s fingers for good luck) deny observers
intuitive access to the mechanism by which the action causes an effect. According to a
number of authors such actions obfuscate instrumental interpretations due to a
“decoupling of an action sequence’s causal dependency structure” (Kapitány & Nielsen,
2015; Legare & Wen, 2014; Legare, Whitehouse, et al., 2015; McGuigan et al., 2011;
Nielsen, Kapitány, & Elkins, 2014; Schjødt & Sørensen, 2013; ?). Conversely, causally
transparent (ordinary) actions can be easily and intuitively understood (as is the case
with hammering a nail into wood). While causal opacity describes whether or not an
action sequence has an observable potential mechanism, goal demotion refers to an
observer’s ability to infer and understand an actor’s reason (e.g., goals or motivations)
for a given action sequence (Boyer & Liénard, 2006; Keren et al., 2013; Liénard &
Boyer, 2006; Nielbo & Sørensen, 2011,?; Schjødt & Sørensen, 2013). Put simply, causal
opacity begets the question ‘by what mechanism is an effect being caused’ while goal
demotion begets ‘Why does the actor act?’. Rituals tend to be both opaque and goal
demoted, and as a result, are rarely dissociated in the literature.
When we perceive an action as opaque and goal demoted we recognize it as
deliberate (not incidental or accidental) and adopt the ritual stance; via conventional
and affiliative motives we make normative and social inferences which inform our
subsequent behaviour (Herrmann et al., 2013; Legare & Souza, 2012; Nielsen, Kapitány,
& Elkins, 2014). This has been demonstrated in children (Diyanni, Corriveau, Kurkul,
& Nasrini, 2015; Herrmann et al., 2013; Legare, Wen, et al., 2015; Nielsen, Kapitány, &
Elkins, 2014) and adults (Ensminger, 1997; Henrich, 2009; Irons, 2001; Ruﬄe & Sosis,
2007; Sosis & Ruﬄe, 2003). Furthermore, artificial neural networks have been shown to
learn how to discriminate between ritualized and non-ritualized action sequences
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(Nielbo & Sørensen, 2015; Sørensen & Nielbo, 2013). But what are the proximate and
ultimate explanations for discriminating between ritualised actions and non-ritualized
actions? What cognitive mechanisms or systems are responsible?
According to Boyer and Liénard (2006) and Liénard and Boyer (2006) ritualized
behaviour constitutes the elements of ritual. They argue that ritualized actions are
‘partly parasitic’ on cognitive systems adapted to serve other purposes and that cultural
rituals are a by-product. These systems, identified respectively as the hazard precaution
and the action parsing system, are design to detect inferred threat and potential harm
to protect the organism, but misfire in the case of ritualized action . The ‘proper
functional range’ of activation is a range of stimuli calibrated by evolution adaptive to
the organism, while the ‘actual domain’ includes an extended range of stimuli, not
shaped by evolution, which share a sufficient number of features with ‘proper’ stimuli.
For example, children may adaptively avoid dangerous foods by virtue of taste cues -
like bitterness - but may incorrectly reject palatable food - like broccoli - as a result
(Wardle & Cooke, 2008). The hazard precaution and action parsing systems are
calibrated to respond to inferred threat via cues in the behaviour of others who are
directly responding to legitimate threats. For example, the proper range of activation
for hazard precaution may include responding to others’ behaviour as they respond to
pathogen or social threat. To illustrate: observing a response to pathogen threat may
include observing deliberate repetitive cleaning and caution (in the form of stereotypy);
observing a response to social threat may include imitation/synchrony,
submission/supplication, or conformity (Watson-jones, Busch, & Legare, 2016).
Ritualized actions share many features and cues with ‘proper’ threat response, and
tend to disrupt the level at which the actions are analysed and interpreted, arresting
the system, a phenomenon known as ‘cognitive capture’ (Boyer & Liénard, 2006;
Liénard & Boyer, 2006; Nielbo et al., 2013; Zacks et al., 2004, 2007). There are three
hierarchical levels of action parsing: ‘Scripts’ ‘Behaviour’, and ‘Gesture’. The default
2A great deal has been written on action parsing independent of these authors. See (Nielbo et al.,
2013; Nielbo & Sørensen, 2015; Sørensen & Nielbo, 2013; Zacks et al., 2004, 2007)
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level is behaviour. For example, you might observe someone in a kitchen and describe
their behaviour as cleaning a glass, because you can intuit the actor’s intentions and the
mechanisms of action. This contrasts with Gesture. Here, the same actions are parsed
discretely as [raising a glass], [grasping a cloth] and [rubbing the glass with a cloth].
Scripts generate a broader description, like ‘preparing lunch’ or ‘cleaning the kitchen’.
When the action-elements involved in cleaning a glass are used in such a way as to
prevent an instrumental outcome we shift down to [gesture]. For example, we cannot
say someone is cleaning if a cloth, despite being moved in a cleaning motion, is never
bought into contact with the glass. Thus, we automatically parse the actions discretely
as [raising a glass] [grasping a cloth] and [waving the cloth in the air].
Our systems are arrested when cognitive predictions are disrupted by
error-checking processes. When actions are goal demoted and causally opaque we are
forced to parse at a gestural, rather than a behavioural, level (Schjødt & Sørensen,
2013; Watson-jones et al., 2016; Zacks et al., 2001). However, we are motivated to
return to the default level of interpretation, and so we attempt to attribute and infer
meaning (Herrmann et al., 2013; Legare & Souza, 2012; Nielbo & Sørensen, 2015;
Rossano, 2012; Schjødt & Sørensen, 2013; Sørensen & Nielbo, 2013). Causal opacity has
been discussed in the literature in depth (Kapitány & Nielsen, 2015; Nielsen, Kapitány,
& Elkins, 2014; Schjødt & Sørensen, 2013; Watson-Jones et al., 2014). In a recent study
Kapitány and Nielsen (2015) showed that objects subjected to opaque actions were
reported as more special and desirable compared to objects subjected to transparent
actions. Providing benign social context increased this effect, while aversive context had
no influence. They concluded that ritualized actions are interpreted normatively. Unlike
causal opacity, goal demotion has been less explored (but see: (Keren et al., 2013;
Mitkidis et al., 2014; Nielbo & Sørensen, 2015; Sørensen & Nielbo, 2013).
In the current study we directly manipulate and dissociate causal opacity and goal
demotion. Participants were shown a series of videos featuring an actor performing
actions on sets of identical glasses containing an amber liquid. Actions were presented
as either ritualistic (causally opaque) or ordinary (causally transparent) and were
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accompanied with a description of the actor’s intentions (‘goals’) as either a blessing or
a curse, or were left without a description. We chose to employ two opposite-valence
goals in order to better assess the magnitude of any potential effect (as we anticipate
they will elicit different responses). All actions were described as belonging to a specific
benign ritual tradition. After viewing the videos participants responded to questions
addressing whether each glass was the ‘same’ and/or ‘special’, and which they’d most
like to drink from.
Our predictions derive from the ritual stance (that ritualistic actions are
interpreted normatively). We hypothesised that objects subjected to ritualized actions
(opaque actions) would be rated as more special and desirable (i.e., they would be
chosen as the glass to drink from) than objects subjected to ordinary (transparent)
actions. Additionally, compared to no goal information, blessings (positive goal
information) would increase desirability, and curses (negative goal information) would
decrease it. We made no predictions regarding the ‘same’ question, as this question
primarily serves as an attention-check Kapitány and Nielsen (2015) found judgements of
‘sameness’ to be unaffected by the types of actions presented).
Methods
Participants. Participants were recruited via mTurk and were offered
$1.20(US) for their time. Based on the methods and analyses of Kapitany and Nielsen
(2015), and an informal p-curve analyses conducted on those findings (unpublished), we
made an a priori decision to attempt to collect 100 participants per cell. Data was
collected in a single wave, and no ad hoc decisions were made to alter the desired N. A
total of 694 people accepted the initial HIT, but 170 immediately dropped out. A
further 22 completed less than 51% of the key questions and were omitted from the final
dataset. Finally, we deleted 19 participants from condition 5 (Ordinary / Blessing), as
experimenter error compromised their data (they were accidentally given a question
from condition 3 – Ritual / Blessing). The final sample comprised 484 participants
(Mean age = 34.34 years, SD = 11.18). Of these, 41.5% completed a tertiary degree,
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10.4% held a Post-graduate degree, 29.0% reported some tertiary education, and 18%
had only completed high school, 1% reporting ‘some high school’ and 1 participant did
not provide a response. The majority of participants (48.3%) earned less than
$25,000(US) annually, 13.3% earned between $25,001 and $35,000, and 18.5% earned
more than $45,001 annually. Participants comprised 57.6% males and 42.2% female
(with one value missing; note that we also provided a third option, ‘other’, for gender.
It was not used). Possible gender effects were examined in analyses (upon peer-review)
but did not indicate any cause for concern, as a result, all analyses disregard gender
information.
Procedure. Participants were briefed and randomly assigned to one of six
conditions that varied by Action-Type (either Ritual or Ordinary actions) or Goal-type
(Blessing, Curse, or Goal-Absent). They first completed a basic demographic survey,
then, over three blocks of stimuli, watched six videos (two per block) in which a male
adult acted on glasses containing an amber liquid. After viewing each video participants
responded to the same questions: ‘Are the drinks the same?’, ‘Is either/any drink
special? If so, which one?’, and ‘Which drink would you select to drink?’. After viewing
all videos, participants explained how they understood the terms ‘special’ and ‘same’.
Finally, participants completed a ‘Religiosity Scale’ (8-items; Rohrbaugh and Jessor
(1975), and a novel scale assessing their ‘History of religious and ritual exposure’
(16-items; (Kapitány & Nielsen, 2015).
Materials. Following (Kapitány & Nielsen, 2015), half of the videos used in this
experiment featured novel ritualized action sequences (causally opaque, goal demoted
actions). The other half were matched sequences of ordinary actions (causally
transparent, goal-apparent actions). There were three examples of each type of video in
each category. All videos involved pouring a liquid from a small glass into a large glass,
where superficial features of the procedure were varied according to condition. All
videos are available upon request.
Both ritual and ordinary videos followed identical formats (see Figure 1). In which
an experimenter presented a number of large glasses, performed a condition-specific
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action on them, and poured an amber liquid from a smaller glass into the larger glass.
The ritual condition included additional redundancy and concluded with the
experimenter bowing to the glass (it was simply inspected in the ordinary condition).
As per Kapitány and Nielsen (2015), videos belonged to one of three discrete blocks of
stimuli. Block 1 involved one action performed on one of two glasses, Block 2 involved
one action on one of three glasses, and Block 3 involved two actions on two of three
glasses. In Block 3 one glass is singled out through inaction, while in Block 1 and 2, one
glass was singled out by virtue of actions performed. Block 3 was included to ensure
that participants’ responses were attributable to qualities of the action, rather than the
fact that one glass was singled out. The locations of the acted-upon object(s) in each
block were fully counter-balanced (positions: Left, Right, or Centre). All videos were
accompanied with the following statement: ‘This video contains elements of established
ritual seen around the world. The actions in this video can be seen in [ceremony name]
of [Location]’. The ceremonies used were: ‘Bwiti Ceremony (Gabon, Africa)’, ‘Kava
Ceremony (Fiji, Pacific Islands), and ‘Ayahuasca Ceremony (Ecuador, South America)’.
Depending on goal condition, participants were either told that 1) These actions are a
blessing. They are performed to give someone good luck and excellent health, 2) These
actions a curse. They are performed to give someone bad luck and poor health, or 3)
were provided no goal information.
Coding and Analysis. After each video the same questions were asked. When
asked the forced-choice questions ‘are the drinks the same’ and ‘is either/any drink
special?’, an affirmative response was coded as 1, with a negative response coded 0.
Thus, a participant could score a maximum of 2 per block, where 2 affirms the quality
on both trials, 1 indicates alternating responses, and a score of 0 represents no support
for the quality. When asked to choose which drink they would select to drink, a score of
1 was awarded only if they selected a drink which had been acted-upon. Thus, 2
represents exclusive preference for the acted-upon object(s), 1 indicates alternating
responses, and 0 indicates they consistently avoided the acted-upon drinks.
Such ordered categorical data is best treated with an Ordinal Logistic Regression
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(OLR), but where the assumption of proportional odds was violated a Multinomial
Logistic Regression (MLR) was used. Unless otherwise stated, all OLR analyses
satisfied this assumption. For more information on OLR and MLR please see: Field
(2013); Kleinbaum and Klein (2010); Menard (2010)
Are the drinks the same?. Using an OLR, neither Block 1
χ2(3) = 2.753, p = .431) nor Block 2 χ2(3) = 1.305, p = .728) had a better fit than the
general model. A non-significant value indicates that a model with predictors is not
better than a general model without predictors. The data in Block 3 returned a
significant Test of Parallel lines (p < .001)3, but the final model fit was not significant,
χ2(3) = 1.279, p = .734. Based on these null results we have no evidence to conclude
that action-type or goal information influenced participants’ perceptions of sameness
amongst objects. Figure 2 shows the mean percentage of responses in each category
with goal information collapsed into action-type.
Is either drink special?. In Block 1 we found a significantly better final model
fit, χ2(3) = 18.953, p < .001, indicating that a model with predictors was better than a
model without predictors. Pearson’s Goodness-of-fit, χ2(7) = 3.234, p = .863, did not
fall below the threshold for rejection (p < .05). As Table 1 shows, when actions are
opaque, participants are 2.07 times more likely to report the presence of specialness at
each [increasing] level of the DV. No effect of Goal was observed. Pseudo-R2 values
range from .021 (McFadden) to .045 (Nagelkerke).
In Block 2 we found a significantly better final model fit, χ2(3) = 23.811, p <
.001. Pearson’s Goodness-of-fit, χ2(7) = 9.235, p = .236, did not fall below the threshold
3This suggests that the assumption of proportional odds was violated. When an MLR was run (and
the reference category was set ‘drinks Always the same’) the only significant result (p = .037) was
that Opacity made participants about half as likely (OR = .542) to have alternating responses across
presentations (but made no difference to reporting that objects different across both presentation).
However, this analysis violated Pearson’s Goodness of Fit statistic, χ2(6) = 17.190, p = .009. Inclusion
of an interaction term (as discussed in ‘Exploratory Analysis’) returned no significant results. Thus, for
the sake of consistency, and because no analysis appears superior to any other, the results of the OLR
are reported here.
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for rejection (p < .05). As Table 1 shows, when actions are opaque, participants are
2.28 times more likely to report the presence of specialness at each [increasing] level of
the DV. No effect of Goal was observed. Pseudo-R2 values range from .026 (McFadden)
to .057 (Nagelkerke).
In Block 3 we found a significantly better final model fit, χ2(3) = 28.919, p < .001.
Pearson’s Goodness-of-fit, χ2(7) = 9.027, p = .251, did not fall below the threshold for
rejection (p < .05). As Table 1 shows, when actions are opaque, participants are 2.58
times more likely to report the presence of specialness at each [increasing] level of the
DV. No effect of Goal was observed. Pseudo-R2 values range from .030 (McFadden) to
.067 (Nagelkerke). Figure 3 shows the mean proportion of responses in each category
with goal-information collapsed into action-type.
Thus, across all three blocks, when the modelled actions were opaque participants
were more than twice as likely to report the presence of a special object within the set
compared to causally transparent actions.
Which drink would you select to drink?. Blocks 1 and 3 on the ‘drink’
variable returned a significant result on the Test of Parallel Lines (p < .05), indicating
that the logit (the odds ratio) varies between levels of the DV for a given IV. Block 2
had a Pearson’s Goodness of fit violation. Thus, we used an MLR analysis.
In Block 1 we found a significantly better final model fit,
χ2(6) = 156.715, p < .001. Pearson’s Goodness-of-fit, χ2(4) = 5.087, p = .279, did not
fall below the threshold for rejection (p < .05). As Table 2 shows, at level 1 of the DV,
opacity does not significantly predict outcomes. However, at level 2 of the DV, opacity
makes participants 2.96 times more likely the select the acted upon drink exclusively
(i.e., to select it twice over two trials). Compared to no goal, a curse makes participants
.44 times as likely to select the acted upon object once (at Level 1), and .08 times as
likely to select the acted upon object exclusively (at Level 2). A blessing makes
participants 1.95 times more likely to select the acted upon object once (at Level 1),
and 1.98 times as likely to select the acted upon object exclusively (at Level 2).
Pseudo-R2 values range from .152 (McFadden) to .314 (Nagelkerke).
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Table 1
Parameter estimates of ordinal logistic regression for ‘special’ scores for all three blocks
of stimuli
Predictor Wald’s χ2 p 95%CI Odds Ratio
Block 1: Two Glasses One Action
Opacity (1) vs Transparency (2) 16.147 < .001 0.373 - 1.085 2.073
Curse (1) vs No Goal (3) 1.329 0.249 -0.174 - 0.671 -
Bless (2) vs No Goal (3) 1.613 0.204 -0.153 - 0.718 -
Block 2: Three Glasses One Action
Opacity (1) vs Transparency (2) 20.373 < .001 0.466 - 1.182 2.280
Curse (1) vs No Goal (3) 0.245 0.620 -0.315 - 0.528 -
Bless (2) vs No Goal (3) 2.021 0.155 -0.121 - 0.761 -
Block 3: Three Glasses Two Actions
Opacity (1) vs Transparency (2) 28.183 < .001 0.598 - 1.298 2.581
Curse (1) vs No Goal (3) 0.031 0.860 -0.378 - 0.454 -
Bless (2) vs No Goal (3) 0.072 0.789 -0.485 - 0.368 -
In Block 2 we found a significantly better final model fit,
χ2(6) = 114.913, p < .001. Pearson’s Goodness-of-fit, χ2(4) = 9.094, p = .059, did not
fall below the threshold for rejection (p < .05). As Table 2 shows, opacity does not
significantly predict outcomes at Level 1. However, it does make participants 2.78 times
more likely to select the acted upon object exclusively at Level 2. Compared to no goal,
a curse makes participants .50 times as likely to select the acted upon object once (at
Level 1), and .18 times as likely to select the acted upon object exclusively (at Level 2).
A blessing makes participants 2.39 times as likely to select the acted upon object once
(at Level 1), and 2.25 times as likely to select the acted upon object exclusively (at
Level 2). Pseudo-R2 values range from .112 (McFadden) to .240 (Nagelkerke).
In Block 3 we found a significantly better final model fit, χ2(6) = 49.685, p < .001.
Pearson’s Goodness-of-fit, χ2(4) = 14.129, p = .007, did fall below the threshold (p <
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.05), which suggests there are non-linearities in the data, and the model fit could be
improved by their inclusion (Field, 2013) a point discussed in the next section
‘Exploratory Analysis’. As Table 2 shows, opacity does not significantly predict
outcomes at Level 1. However, it does make participants 1.78 times more likely to select
the acted upon drink exclusively at Level 2.
Compared to no goal, a curse makes participants .49 times as likely to select the
acted upon object once (Level 1), and .24 times as likely to select the acted upon object
exclusively (Level 2). A blessing does not significantly predict responses at Level 1 or
Level 2. Pseudo-R2 values range from .048 (McFadden) to .110 (Nagelkerke).
In sum, across blocks, opacity increased likelihood of selecting an acted-upon
object exclusively. Curses reliably decrease the likelihood of selection across both levels
of the DV, and blessings generally increased the likelihood of selection.
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Figure 1 . Steps in Ritual and Control Sequences
The 6 illustrated steps demonstrate the similarities between the ritual and control
actions (images show the ‘Cloth’ ritual acted upon the center glass). For both the ritual
and control conditions steps 1 and 2 are identical, wherein the action begins and the
demonstrator moves the smaller glasses in front of the larger glasses. In ritual Step 3
the cloth is waved vigorously at the glass, while in the control condition the cloth is used
to clean the glass. In ritual step 4 the smaller glass is raised high before being poured
into the larger glass, whereas in the control condition the smaller glass is poured
directly. In ritual step 5 the glass is raised with both hands and bowed to, whereas in the
control condition it is raised with one hand and inspected. Step 6 (for both conditions)
shows the demonstrator returning to a neutral position.
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Figure 2 . Mean percentage of values on ‘same’ variables across all three blocks with
goal information collapsed into action type.
Figure 3 . Mean percentage values on ‘special’ responses in each category with goal
information collapsed into action type.
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Exploratory Analysis. An informed, post-hoc, decision was made to evaluate
whether or not there was a significant interaction between Action-Type and Goal, as
suggested by the Pearson’s goodness-of-fit statistic on the desirability measure. All
analyses were re-run including an interaction term. Using an OLR, the pattern of
results remained identical for ‘same’ and ‘special’ and no interaction was observed (as
one would expect, given the pattern of results in the a priori analyses). Using an MLR,
a significant interaction between Action-Type and Goal was observed in drink
preferences (as implied by the Pearson goodness-of-fit statistic), and the pattern of
results remained largely intact (i.e., opacity had a significant and positive impact at
level 2 across all three blocks). However, the influence of Goal Information varied. Due
to the difficulty in describing interactions of nominal categorical IVs on ordinal
categorical DVs with respect to a reference category we ran two separate analyses.
First, we manually split our data by Action-Type, then ran an OLR to determine the
influence of Goal on drink preference for those who observed ordinary actions, and a
separate OLR on drink preference for those who observed ritualized actions. The results
of these analyses (including tests of assumptions) can be seen in Table 3. For ordinary
actions, in Block 1 and 2 we found that Goal information influenced drink preference in
the expected directions at similar magnitudes as before. In Block 3, no effect of goal
information was observed, indeed, the model fit was not significant. For opaque actions,
curses made participants significantly less likely to select acted-upon objects at each
level across all three blocks. Interestingly, blessings had no effect on participants’
responses in any block. While both positive and negative goal information appears to
influence participant perceptions for transparent actions, only negative goal information
influences perceptions of opaque actions.
All analysis (see table 3) satisfied the assumption of proportional odds, and model
fitness (except for the effect of goal information on transparent actions in Block 3,
(χ2(2) = 2.404, p = .301).
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Figure 4 . Percentage responses for each category split by action type
Understanding participant responses on ‘specialness’ and ‘sameness’.
After the videos, but prior to the survey items, participants were asked “After you
watched the videos we asked you whether you thought objects were ‘special’ [‘the
same’]...” and were respectively presented with each of the following sentences: “If you
indicated that objects were special, in what way did you mean? How were you using the
label ‘special’?” and “In what way did you understand the objects as being ‘same’ (or
different)?”. Table 4 shows the coded qualitative responses with regard to their
understanding of ‘same’ and Table 5 shows the coded qualitative responses for ‘special’.
The lead author developed a coding system based on the existing responses, and
informed by previous work by Kapitány and Nielsen (2015) and predictions of the
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action parsing system (Boyer & Liénard, 2006; Liénard & Boyer, 2006; Zacks et al.,
2004). These responses were then coded in their entirety by two blind coders. special
Responses had a mean percentage agreement 84.9% and a Krippendorff’s Alpha of .767
(indicating ‘Substantial’ agreement; for context: values greater than .81 are regarded as
‘Almost Perfect Agreement’. See Hayes and Krippendorff (2007). same responses had a
mean percentage agreement of 89.64% and a Krippendorff’s Alph of .800.
When asked to define the term ‘same’, across all conditions, between 65.5% and
76.6% of all responses made reference to ‘physical or visually accessible qualities of the
object’ (See Table 4 for full breakdown). When asked to define the term ‘special’ across
all conditions, between 36.9% and 62.8% of all responses (forming the primary response
category) made reference to the actor’s actions or focus. We anticipated that this would
happen proportionally more in ritual conditions, by virtue of the action’s casual opacity.
When analyzed with an MLR, we found a significantly better fit,
χ2(18) = 42.452, p = .001. When the reference category was set to ‘Denial of specialness’
we found Opaque Actions made participants 2.136 times more likely to define special
with reference to ‘the actions or focus of the actor’ (Wald Value(1) = 7.898, p = .005,
β = 0.759, 95%CI = 1.258– 3.626). Opaque Actions also made participants 3.340 times
more likely to reference a non-physical quality of the object (Wald Value(1) = 8.953, p
= .003, β = 1.206, 95%CI = 1.516 – 7.359). Opaque actions also made participants
4.062 times more likely to refer to location of an object, (Wald Value(1) = 6.708, p =
.010, β = 1.402, 95%CI = 1.406 – 11.734). There was no effect of goal information.
Pseudo-R2 values for ‘special’ ranged from .035 (McFadden) to .098 (Nagelkerke).
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Participant Demographics. Participants completed a ‘Religiosity Scale’
(Rohrbaugh & Jessor, 1975), and a scale assessing their ‘History of religious and ritual
exposure’ (Kapitány & Nielsen, 2015). Religiosity was measured on 3-subscales and
aggregated into a single 5-point measure (M = 2.24; SD = 1.29; α = .95) while history
of religious and ritual exposure comprised 3 sub-scales (5-items on Superstitious
Rituals, 8-items on Cultural Rituals, and 3-items on Religious Rituals). These scales
were converted to a 6-points for aggregation (M = 2.92; SD = .71; α = .81). Religiosity
and Ritual exposure were moderately correlated at r = .562, p < .01. No systematic
pattern correlation between these scales and the dependent variables was observed.
Discussion
In this work we aimed to dissociate the roles of goal demotion and causal opacity
in adults’ processing of ritualized actions. First, neither action-type nor
goal-information influenced participants’ perceptions of whether or not the objects were
the ‘same’, with the vast majority interpreting sameness in terms of physical qualities of
the object. Opaque actions reliably caused attributions of specialness, while
goal-information had no effect. Indeed, the majority of participants organically defined
specialness with reference to the actions or focus of the actor. Further, opaque actions
made participants much more likely to exclusively prefer acted-upon objects. Such
actions did not influence preference on only one trial, suggesting (for some people)
ritualized actions provide a categorical imperative to select ritualized objects always.
Critically, curses made objects less desirable: any action labelled a curse considerably
increased avoidance. This is consistent with other work, in which people tend to be
cautious of things that are ‘magically dangerous’ (Subbotsky & Quinteros, 2002) or
essentially corrupted (Nemeroff & Rozin, 1994; Rohrbaugh & Jessor, 1975; Rozin,
Millman, & Nemeroff, 1986; Savani, Kumar, Naidu, & Dweck, 2011). However, calling
an action a blessing increased preference for acted-upon objects in Block 1 and 2, but
not in Block 3. Follow-up analysis revealed an interaction (explaining this anomaly).
We found that goal-information systematically varied preference across action-type.
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Objects subjected to ordinary actions became less desirable when called a curse, but
more desirable if called a blessing. Objects subjected to ritualistic actions became less
desirable when called a curse, but were not influenced when called a blessing. As far as
ritualized actions are interpreted positively by default (Kapitány & Nielsen, 2015)
adding additional positive goal information appears to have little effect. Actions, so the
saying goes, speak louder than words 4. This suggests an interesting dissociation
between causal opacity and goal demotion. Opacity informs our understanding of an
object’s status, while goal-information and opacity inform our approach/avoid
behaviour toward such objects. Moreover, while negative goal-information causes
aversion, positive goal-information does not always cause approach behaviour
above-and-beyond variance attributable to opacity.
Other researchers have produced equally interesting work on this dissociation,
modelling potential differences in action parsing attributable to these qualities (Nielbo
& Sørensen, 2015; Sørensen & Nielbo, 2013). They report that ‘cultural priors’ tend to
increase the degree to which cultural experts (those experienced and expert in a given
ritual tradition, for example, a priest) see a ritualized act as ordinary and instrumental
compared to one who is not a cultural expert. Thus, it is possible that actions are not
necessarily treated equally in the minds of all individuals. Our ritual condition included
a number of causally opaque and goal demoted actions, but also included bowing – a
highly familiar, abstract action that carries pre-existing culture-dependent associations
of respect and reverence. Any individual familiar, or ‘expert’, in the role a bow serves
may rely heavily (and perhaps exclusively) on this action at the expense of the novel
4It should be noted that the measure of effect size presented here, the Pseudo-R2 value, ‘should be
treated with caution’ (Field, 2013). While it can be regarded as somewhat analogous to R2 in linear
regression, many have argued the measure has issues. Thus, while the effect of specialness is small, it is
reliably elicited by the described methods, as it is consistent with experiments 1 and 2 of (Kapitány &
Nielsen, 2015). A p-curve analysis conducted prior to this experiment suggested the effect has evidentiary
value. A p-curve analysis of these prior experiments and the present experiment affirms this result. This
data can be extracted from the stated publications, or is available from the corresponding author upon
request.
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actions in determining an objects’ significance. However, we do not think this is the
case here. When participants were asked how they defined special, only six participants
(of 484) made explicit reference to the bow. Of those 6, all made reference to the bow
as one of multiple actions (e.g., ‘He . . . did something to the particular glass. . . i.e.
hum at it or bow to it’ and ‘I took it to mean if it [‘specialness’] was gestured to via the
flapping or sound or bowing’), and the two responses which appeared to make the
strongest case for bowing without referencing other actions explicitly still included other
generalities associated with the novel actions (i.e., ‘Objects were treated with respect,
and bowed head as a offering’ and ‘more elaborate ritual, the bowing and offering’).
Given that participants in the ritual conditions saw six bows (across six videos) and up
to three different kinds of ritualized actions, and only six made reference to the bow,
four of whom made explicit reference to other ritualized actions, we do not believe the
bow was privileged above-and-beyond the other actions.
Differences in how the term ‘special’ was understood across conditions revealed
different levels of action-parsing. Causally opaque actions caused parsing at the lowest
level (gesture) and generated an appeal to the actor’s inner state. This is consistent
with empirical work (Nielbo & Sørensen, 2011; Zacks et al., 2004, 2007, 2001) and
theoretical predictions (Boyer & Liénard, 2006; Liénard & Boyer, 2006). It is
nevertheless worth noting that ritual videos were typically slightly longer than the
control videos, and the ritual videos contained two extra event-boundaries not generated
by causal opacity: the redundant raising prior to pouring action, and the use of two
hands (rather than one hand) in the bow/inspection action at the end of the sequence.
However, the extent to which these two additional boundaries contributed to the overall
effect is likely to be relatively minor. Ritual actions, by their causally opaque nature,
generate more additional boundaries than ordinary actions, and so, the difference in
perceived event boundaries between the two conditions is already considerably weighted
in favor of the ritual condition. Further, this falls fully under the umbrella of cognitive
capture – these two additional boundaries further captured participants, which in turn,
likely increased the motivation to restore behavioural understanding. Finally, we are not
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making the claim that a specific number of subunits of action make a ritual special or
efficacious (though this is an interesting question), we are simply making the argument
that a greater number of subunits (generated by opacity and goal demotion) motivates
participants to restore a behavioural explanation for the actions, which begets appeals
to the actor’s goals. We found evidence in support of this position. However, we are
cautious, and maintain this is only modest evidence for the role of cognitive capture.
Ritualized actions activate cognitive systems outside the proper range causing
participants to process actions at a lower-level, in turn, motivating a search for the
actions’ meaning to restore default behavioural parsing and understanding (Herrmann
et al., 2013; Legare & Souza, 2012; Nielbo & Sørensen, 2011; Rossano, 2012; Schjødt &
Sørensen, 2013; Zacks et al., 2004, 2007, 2001). Lacking a clear way to integrate this
experience, we interpret these deliberate causally opaque actions as socially normative
(Field, 2013; Herrmann et al., 2013; Legare & Souza, 2012). Boyer and Liénard have
argued that cultural rituals are a special case of ritualized behaviour: Mis-activations of
the hazard system are calibrated throughout childhood, and adult responses are
constrained to a limited repertoire of learned behaviours. We suggest the dominant
calibrated response is to interpret the actions as normative. Further, we believe the
phenomenon of overimitation may be the mechanism of calibration. Overimitation
occurs when children copy obviously causally-irrelevant actions within a larger sequence
of adult-modeled behaviour: When children observe these redundant, repetitive, goal
demoted, causally opaque acts they interpret them normatively and conventionally
(Kenward, 2012). Additionally, they copy with high-fidelity (Horner & Whiten, 2005;
Lyons, Damrosch, Lin, Macris, & Keil, 2011) and do so reliably across cultures (Nielsen,
Mushin, et al., 2014; Nielsen & Tomaselli, 2010). It is possible our observations reflect
this calibration – ritualized actions activate the precaution system which has been
calibrated throughout development to respond in a normative manner (notably, adults
are more likely to overimitate than children;McGuigan et al. (2011)). We believe
over-imitation/calibration explains why providing positive goal information (a blessing)
doesn’t influence behaviour toward goal demoted acts.
RITUAL COGNITION 117
We propose, as predicted by the hazard precaution system, that over the course of
development we begin to understand many actions as socially normative, particularly
causally opaque and goal demoted actions (via over-imitation). Further, as predicted by
the action parsing system, ritualized actions are parsed differently from ordinary actions
due to the absence of a plausible causal mechanism and the obscurity of the actor’s
goals; ritualized actions are necessarily interpreted at the level of gesture rather than
[behaviour], resulting in ‘cognitive capture’. Such capture occurs when the precaution
system activates outside the ‘proper range’ of stimuli, motivating us to restore a
[behavioural] understanding. Thus, lacking a clear schema for why an action is being
performed, and due to calibration in childhood, we interpret these actions as socially
normative, as described by the ritual stance. More work needs to be done delineating
how this process operates, work well outside the scope of the present study. Though it
is notable that each of the distinct approaches has been previously validated and
empirically supported.
While rituals only emerged as a part of our behavioural repertoire in recent
evolutionary history, their ubiquity suggests they serve an adaptive role. Rituals, as
intentional motor acts, are unique: they disrupt our capacity to infer a causal
mechanism, they deny us insight into an actor’s inner-state, and they activate cognitive
systems adapted to other purposes. Understanding each of these elements is
complicated, but here we contribute to the growing body of evidence that illustrates the
importance each element plays. Moreover, we have taken modest steps toward
dissociating the influence of goal demotion from causal opacity, and have attempted to
unify into a causal chain several fields of psychological enquiry. While there are several
competing and complementary grand theories of ritual cognition (notably Whitehouse’s
Modes of Religiosity and Henrich’s CREDs), we believe Boyer and Liénard hazard
precaution theory, in conjunction with Legare’s ritual stance, coupled with a
understanding of the development of overimitation, provide a more comprehensive
frame-work than do the alternatives. Indeed, together they make important predictions
about the underlying developmental, cognitive and evolutionary mechanisms of ritual
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cognition, and dissociate the specific roles individual qualities play in ritual. Moreover,
they inform both why we participate in rituals, and how we respond when we observe
them. Targeted research is needed to test this proposal. Such work will reveal the
foundations, mechanisms, and consequences of ritual actions, and provide insight into a
core feature of the human behavioural repertoire.
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Chapter Three: Does the ritual stance apply to object-directed rituals?
Considering behaviour, development, and culture
Preface
The purpose the present chapter was two-fold. Based on prior findings, we
intended to examine when adult-like ritual cognition emerged in development. This was
done in Australia (a WEIRD culture) and Vanuatu (a non-WEIRD culture). We did
not find support for our hypotheses. Thus, the second purpose was to examine the
behaviour of adults in a more ecological setting (than was examined in prior chapters).
In so doing, we could determine whether our failure in the first instance was related to
development, culture, or construct.
Abstract
In experiment 1 we presented children from Australia (N = 93) and Vanuatu (N =
109) causally opaque and goal demoted actions directed towards objects. Over two
trials we examined a child’s preference for objects after they observed either ritualized
or ordinary actions performed toward one of two identical objects. When given the
choice, children did not appear to prefer objects that had been subjected to ritualized
actions more than objects subjected to ordinary (causally transparent) actions. In
experiment two we extended the findings presented in prior chapters. We exposed 101
undergraduate psychology students (in the first presentation) to either ritualized or
ordinary actions, then (in a second presentation) the same kind of action but with goal
information (the action was to ‘curse’ or to ‘bless’). Contrary to our predictions,
ritualized objects did not lead to attributions of specialness, nor did they influence
preference. While the effect of goal information did appear to influence preference, it
appeared to be driven by positive goal information (i.e., ’blessings’), which was contra
to predictions. Participants did report differing degrees of recall between ritualized and
ordinary actions. These null results are discussed in the context of prior findings.
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Introduction
Rituals permeate all societies. We use them to mark boundaries between
childhood and adulthood, life and death, and the past and future. They delineate us
and them, right and wrong, and the known and unknown. We may perform them as
often as once a day, or as infrequently as once a generation. Rituals, it seems, are rich
fodder for enquiry, potentially offering unique insights into human culture and human
cognition. Over the last few decades, the study of ritual from a psychological
perspective has primarily focused on questions related to groups and group
membership: such as how they form, cohere, spread, and transmit values and identities
(Bulbulia et al., 2013; Henrich, 2009; Konvalinka et al., 2011; Legare & Nielsen, 2015;
Legare & Souza, 2014; Mitkidis et al., 2014; Reddish et al., 2014; Rossano, 2012; Soler,
2012; Sosis, 2000; Sosis & Bressler, 2003; Sosis et al., 2007; Wen et al., 2015;
Whitehouse & Lanman, 2014; Wiltermuth & Heath, 2009). But rituals offer more than
an insight into groups. Due to their ubiquity cross-culturally, the examination of rituals
offers opportunity to answer interesting questions that relate to human development
and evolution. Such as what features need to emerge in childhood to facilitate and
motivate an adult-like understanding and adherence to ritual? And yet one line of
enquiry in this field has not received sufficient attention, despite the fact it might very
well be one of the most common forms of ritual expression: How do rituals directed
towards objects influence our cognitions and behaviour.
Our everyday experience suggests we treat ritual objects differently: a birthday
cake is not an ordinary dessert, communion wine is more like blood than liquor, and a
wedding ring is not merely a gold band. Intuitively, we regard these objects as different
from their counter-parts - and it seems reasonable to suggest that it is, in part, our
ritual treatment of these objects that makes this so. And so we ask: Does ritualized
action change our perception of, and behaviour toward, objects, and if so, how? In this
chapter I present two experiments, closely modelled off prior research, that examine our
behavioural responses toward objects subjected to ritualized action. Specifically, these
experiments were designed to measure actual behaviour and to address questions of
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cognitions associated with the perception of ritual. Further, we have also attempted to
consider how this kind of behaviour manifests across the life-span as well as across
cultures.
But before we attempt to understand how ritualized actions influence our
perception of objects, we must consider what rituals are, and how we identify them as
something different from ordinary action. To observe an ordinary action is to
understand or infer the intentions of the actor performing the actions, and to recognize
the causal contingencies that facilitate the desired outcome. To describe the form of a
typical ‘ordinary action’ is, in effect, absurd. In what ways are typing on a keyboard,
digging a hole, making coffee, having sex, or riding a bike similar? And yet, in each
instance (perhaps contingent upon a little prior learning), we can easily infer the actor’s
goals and intentions, and the methods by which they intend to bring about a desired
end-state. Ritual actions deviate from this pattern in important ways, and as such it is
possible to consider the form of a typical ritual (even if specific ritual forms might
appear highly variable and uncategorizable). Rituals tend to share features of repetition,
redundancy, formality, and stereotypy (Boyer & Liénard, 2006; Bulbulia & Sosis, 2011;
Eilam et al., 2006; Kapitány & Nielsen, 2015, 2016; Legare & Souza, 2012; Rappaport,
1999; Rossano, 2012). Yet many ordinary actions feature these qualities also, and so
this definition is clearly insufficient. Rituals also tend to prioritize correct performance
of the process over production of the outcome (if a physical outcome is even evident).
Similarly, many conventional actions also require these conditions to be met. Clapping
one’s hands in applause, dancing, even tying a tie (Acerbi & Mesoudi, 2015), all require
one to prioritize process over outcome. But the most pivotal distinction between
ritualized forms and ordinary forms is that rituals tend to feature causal opacity and
goal demotion (Boyer & Liénard, 2006; Fux et al., 2013; Legare & Souza, 2012; Legare,
Wen, et al., 2015; Liénard & Boyer, 2006; Mitkidis et al., 2014; Nielbo & Sørensen,
2011, 2016; Nielsen, Kapitány, & Elkins, 2014; Rossano, 2012; Schjødt & Sørensen,
2013; Sørensen & Nielbo, 2013; Watson-Jones et al., 2014; Wen et al., 2015).
Causal opacity describes a quality of action in which an observer of an action has
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little-to-no access to the mechanism by which the action causes an outcome (while
causal transparency describes the ease with which a causal mechanism is identified).
Goal demotion describes how the observation of an action affords little-to-no insight
into the motive or intention of the actor. And while there are still some ordinary
actions that features causal opacity and goal demotion (particularly when there is no
prior experience or learning), there are far fewer examples. And so we find (and will
argue hereafter) that the conjunction of these motor features, procedural emphases, and
task-and-mind reading qualities are what defines a ritual and ritualized behaviour.
That is, ritualized behaviour is typically causally opaque and goal demoted as a
consequence of the repetition, redundancy, formality, and stereotypy of the motor
features, and as a result we prioritize accurate performance of process over outcome.
But how do we perceive ritualized action? Consider the following thought
experiment, as described in the introduction of this dissertation:
Imagine the room attendant of an upmarket hotel. The attendant’s job is to clean
recently vacated rooms. In so doing, the task is typically performed while the following
conditions are met: the attendant is wearing an immaculate and standardized uniform
(formality), they perform their obligatory actions (rigidity) during a specific window of
opportunity. The attendant most likely enters the first room, and follows a reproducible
set of procedures (first clean the bed, then the bathroom, then the floors, then the
windows; accurate performance of actions). This attendant, by virtue of the prestige of
the hotel, likely performs all these actions whether or not they actually need to be
performed. If one of the beds has not been used it will nonetheless be cleaned
(redundancy). And, of course, the very act of cleaning itself is highly repetitive. And
this procedure will be repeated many times a day, every day of the week. The point is
that many kinds of ordinary actions, with perfectly instrumental explanations, embody
many of the features of ritualized behaviours. And yet, by any understanding - either in
the laysense, or a scientific sense - to conclude that the attendant’s actions were a part
of a ritual would be absurd (or at the very least useless). However, if you were to
observe a formally dressed person who, at a specific time, entered the woods and
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appeared to - in specific order - douse, rub, and anoint the bark, branches and leaves of
a tree, then to repeat these actions on another tree, and another... you would be at a
loss to describe that person as doing anything other than performing a ritual!
This scenario helps demarcate the difference between ritualized actions from
ordinary action, and articulates the difference as a matter of perception and cognition.
We perceive actions according to schemas (Schmidt, 2003). Schemas are large
over-arching frame-works of perception. One example (as above) might be ‘cleaning a
hotel room’. Schemas are broadly informative, but lack specific information. For there
are many actions that might contribute to cleaning a room, but no single action is
sufficient alone to satisfy the schema. Ordinary actions that constitute a schema are
categorized as behaviours (Zacks et al., 2007; Zacks & Tversky, 2001; Zacks et al., 2001).
Behaviours are specific instances of action that constitute the schema, examples might
include cleaning a mirror, vacuuming a carpet, or changing bedsheets. Each of these
behaviours alone might be native to the schema, but a) alone do not constitute a
schema, and b) their omission is not sufficient to violate or alter the schema. Each
behaviour is made up of individual gestures (Zacks et al., 2007; Zacks & Tversky, 2001;
Zacks et al., 2001). Gestures are explicit description of motor actions, and are (broadly)
the lowest level of action-parsing. Consider what is required to clean a mirror: one must
[hold a mist-bottle][squeeze the mist-bottle][hold a washcloth][wipe mist from mirror
using cloth] etc,. The observation of action can be usefully broken into these levels of
analysis, which appear to manifest slightly different between ordinary and ritual actions.
To return to the hotel attendant problem - there is no schema associated with the
ritual part of the example. What does it mean to ‘Clean a forest’. Nor can we
understand the actions described at a gestural level. Again, what does it mean to ‘clean
a tree’? Because the actions are ritualistic - in that the redundancy, repetition,
formality, and stereotypy obscure the intentions of the actor, as well as the mechanism
of action (which in turn necessitates a focus on accurate performance rather than
outcomes) - we are forced to parse what we observe as gestures. In this example, the
cognitively accessible approach is to describe the attendant’s actions: they [hold a
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mist-bottle][squeeze the mister on to a tree][hold a washcloth][wipe the mist/tree].
When we observe the actions of others’, particularly actions that we have no prior
experience with, we attend and cognitively prioritize the intentions and goals of the
actor over other characteristics (Bekkering, Wohlschläger, & Gattis, 2000; Gleissner,
Meltzoff, & Bekkering, 2000; Heider, 1958; Malle, Moses, & Baldwin, 2001) and actively
construct an understanding of the actor’s intention in real time (Wilder, 1978a, 1978b).
Further, when the actions themselves violate our intuitive understanding of causation
we find ourselves cognitively arrested (Boyer & Liénard, 2006; Liénard & Boyer, 2006).
These features, in turn motivate us to a restore our understanding of what we’re seeing,
from that of gesture, to that of behaviour (the default level of parsing) (Nielbo &
Sørensen, 2015; Schjødt & Sørensen, 2013; Sørensen, 2007b; Zacks et al., 2007; Zacks &
Tversky, 2001; Zacks et al., 2001). Thus, the perception of ritual action is qualitatively
and quantitatively different: we perceive ritualized actions at the level of the
constituent elements, all the while attempting to infer causal- and goal-related
information (Kapitány & Nielsen, 2016; Wilder, 1978a, 1978b).
From a social point of view, this ability - identifying ritualized action as distinct
from ordinary action - may be the product of an evolutionary imperative. Considerable
evidence exists demonstrating that rituals are an inherently social phenomena: they
may solve adaptive problems of group living, including identifying in-group members,
facilitating co-operation, acquiring and transmitting cultural knowledge, detecting
free-loaders, and signalling one’s own commitment to a group and the group’s values
(Atran & Ginges, 2012; Atran & Henrich, 2010; Ensminger, 1997; Henrich, 2009; Irons,
2001; Legare & Nielsen, 2015; Reddish et al., 2014; Rossano, 2012; Ruﬄe & Sosis, 2007;
Sosis & Bressler, 2003; Wiltermuth & Heath, 2009). Social groups, particularly groups
under pressure to endure or perish, appear to survive longer as their rituals become
more salient (as a function of ‘cost’) (Ruﬄe & Sosis, 2007; Sosis & Bressler, 2003; Sosis
et al., 2007). Thus, it appears a necessary and fundamental human ability to perceive,
understand, and respond to ritual acts. Any individual not capable of this is likely to be
at a disadvantage compared to their peers, for rituals provide means for forming
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important social relations, engendering trust, avoiding exploitation (Henrich, 2009) and
cuing appropriate conventional responses.
Now that we’ve established how rituals are perceived (and that we may be
fundamentally motivated to perceive them), the next task is to understand how this
influences behaviour. The ritual stance is one theoretical approach to understanding
and explaining behavioural and cognitive responses to rituals: when we observe
ritualized actions - actions with causal opacity and goal demotion, featuring repetition,
redundancy, formality, stereotypy, and so on - we interpret them as being socially
informative and normative (Herrmann et al., 2013; Legare & Souza, 2012). And while
this can be a particularly useful approach for understanding group-related behaviours,
we are still left with the question we posed in the beginning: how does ritualized action
change our perception of objects? Might the ritual stance make predictions in this
domain?
There is evidence to suggest that, even outside the context of the group, we
respond to rituals. Vohs et al. (2013) have shown that when individuals are asked to
perform ritualized behaviour on ordinary foods people perceive the food as being more
valuable and flavourful. Similarly, Kapitány and Nielsen (2015, 2016) have shown that
the observation of ritualized behaviours toward objects increases perceptions of
specialness of the objects, and prompts preferential responses towards those objects.
According to Boyer and Liénard (2006); Liénard and Boyer (2006) observing ritualized
actions (whether object-directed or not) may arouse a threat-response reaction, as the
ritualized action is misidentificed as an action indicative of inferred threat. Indeed,
under some circumstances, when participants are instructed that the objects they are
handling are ‘bio-hazardous’, they may unnecessarily increase the number of acts
performed in the execution of a recipe-like procedure. While the topic of object-directed
ritualized action is comparatively under-studied compared to group-relevant ritualized
action, the existing evidence does suggest that ritualized actions do cue specific
cognitive and behavioural responses. While the observation of ritualized performances
need not necessarily demand a response of a social nature, it may nonetheless inform
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subsequent cognition and behaviour. Is it the case that the ritual stance can also
explain responses to object-directed rituals in the absence of typical cues associated
with groups or conventionality? Might it be that ritualized behaviours are dictated by a
hidden necessity, and maintained by a normative mechanism? Can the ritual stance
predict how we respond towards ritualized objects, as well as does towards other kinds
of behaviour?
Ritualized actions are recognized as such by virtue of a dissociation between
causal relations and an obfuscation of actor’s intentions. Such actions, while
demonstrably social in nature, arrest our attention and motivate specific, positive
attributions and responses (Legare, Whitehouse, et al., 2015). For this reason it is not
enough to limit the investigation of ritual to social groups and social topics; rituals
ought to influence our perception of objects. Thus, we have attempted to conceptually
and behaviourally replicate the work of Kapitány and Nielsen (2015, 2016), in - first - a
developmental and cross-cultural context, in which we attempt to identify when
adult-like ritual cognition emerges, and whether or not it does so similarly
cross-culturally, and - second - in an adult behavioural context in which we attempt to
replicate prior findings, and more deeply examine questions of ritual cognition.
Experiment 1: Children across Cultures
Kapitány and Nielsen (2015, 2016) have shown that adults tend to perceive and
respond to ritualistic action in a qualitatively different manner from that of ordinary
action. While ritualistic and ordinary actions do not appear to have a differential
influence on whether people think the actions cause a physical change to take place, it
has been reported that ritualistic actions make people more likely to report that a
non-physical change has taken place - that the objects become ‘special’ - and this, in
turn, appears to make people desire the ritualized objects. And, as asserted in the
introduction of this chapter, it seems a commonplace occurrence that adults treat
objects subjected to rituals different from identical profane counterparts. The question
posed herein, then, is when do children come to exhibit adult-like behaviours in response
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to rituals?
In examining this we attempted to address two specific problems. The first has
already been stated (above). The second question has two parts, each of considerable
importance, and are: are our responses to rituals similar cross-culturally, and is the
developmental trajectory similar also? To address this we collected two age-matched
convenience samples, one in a WEIRD culture, and one from a traditional/indigenous
culture in Vanuatu. More details are given regarding these locations in the following
section, but the traditional culture was chosen as it appears orthogonal to western
culture. The group studied had minimal influence from WEIRD cultures, and, if we find
results consistent with our hypothesis, we can argue that aspects of ritual cognition may
be dissociable from culture.
We modified and simplified both the stimuli and design employed by Kapitány
and Nielsen (2015, 2016) so that it was appropriate for children and relatively
language-free (so that it could be conducted outside of an English language
environment). Rather than using three different kinds of stimuli (gesture, cloth, and
hum) we employed only two (gesture and cloth; the hum was omitted as we could not
confidently say, prior to testing, whether or not it held any specific meaning within the
non-WEIRD culture). While the methodology is described in more detail in the
appropriate section, in order to introduce the hypotheses, a brief outline is provided.
Children observed the experimenter performing either a ritualistic or an ordinary action
on one of two bowls (the bowls contained identical rewards). Children were then given
the opportunity to select a reward from one of the bowls. This process was a repeated a
second time. Using a logistic regression we predicted that there would be a main-effect
of condition, such that children would be more likely to select the focal bowl in the
ritual condition compared to the ordinary condition. And that there would be a main
effect of age, which would driven by a significant interaction - older children are more
likely to respond to ritualised action in an adult-like way than in the control action.
Given that the traditional culture of Ni-Van is more ritualistic than is typically observed
in WEIRD cultures (Rybanska, McKay, Jong, & Whitehouse, 2017), we anticipated that
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Ni-Van children may be more sensitive (responsive) to object-directed ritualistic actions.
Participants and location. Children were recruited in three locations.
Brisbane
The first location was in Brisbane, Australia. Brisbane is a large, developed city,
with compulsory free education (for children aged 5 years and older) and a
predominantly English speaking population. Testing was conducted in Brisbane’s
‘Sciencentre’, a large, public science museum located very near the central business
district. We recruited a convenience sample of 93 children aged between 2 - 13 years
who were entering/leaving the Sciencentre (mean age = 6.03 years, SD = 2.07 years).
Vanuatu: Ikunala and Yakel
The second and third locations were on the island of Tanna in Vanuatu.
Specifically, we tested children in the ‘Kastom’ (traditional) villages of Ikunala and
Yakel, where indigenous Melanesians live their lives according to Kastom (a traditional
set of beliefs and practices). Ikunala is located inland from the coastal village of
Lanakel, and children/families from other Kastom villages along the same mountain
ridge as Ikunala travelled to participate in our research. We did not observe any
children speaking English (though a few adults spoke rudimentary English, and a great
number spoke Bislama - an English creole and one of the official languages of Vanuatu).
Children in Ikunala do not have any kind of formal education. Unlike Yakel, Ikunala
does not typically allow visitors into their villages without a clear purpose, and it does
not generate any revenue from allowing tourists or outsiders (such as film crews) to
visit. Residents of Ikunala retain a very traditional way of life, and Western influence is
minimal. We provided Ikunala with gifts of food (e.g., coconuts, canned fish) and Kava
in exchange for their participation.
Yakel is a Kastom village unrelated to Ikunala, located further south. Similar to
Ikunala, children do not routinely receive formal education, and – to the best of our
knowledge – do not speak English. The primary difference between these locations is
that Yakel is more widely known, and is more accepting of visitors in exchange for gifts
and – specifically - money. The language spoken in Yakel is distinct from that spoken in
RITUAL COGNITION 129
Ikunala. The ages of all children (at both locations; N = 109) ranged between 3 - 9
years (mean age = 6.13 years, SD = 2.00 years).
Methods and Procedure. The present experiment was a simple
between-subjects design, in which children observed an experimenter acting upon one of
two bowls, each containing an identical small reward (a sticker). The actions were
either ritualistic (causally opaque and goal demoted) or ordinary in nature. Two actions
were adapted for use with children based on prior work (Kapitány & Nielsen, 2015,
2016). One action employed a cloth: in the ordinary condition the cloth was used to
clean the bowl, while in the ritualistic condition the cloth was waved toward the bowl
without making contact. The alternate action involved only the researcher’s hand: in
the ordinary condition the researcher picked up the bowl and cleaned/rubbed/scratched
at it with his fingers as if moving grit or a stain. In the ritualistic condition, the hands
and fingers were moved in a similar manner, slightly exaggerated, and in such a way
that the action did not make contact with the bowl. In this way, the ritualistic actions
were goal demoted (the intention of the actor was unclear) and causally opaque (how
the actions bought about a specific effect was not apparent). The ordinary actions had
similar qualities, but were causally transparent and goal apparent. All actions were
performed toward a bowl for several seconds, before the bowl was given a half turn, and
the actions repeated on an alternate face.
In Brisbane, families with children were approached and invited to participate in
the research. Children sat at a table across from the experimenter. The experimenter
then showed the child two identical stickers, and placed one into each of two bowls in
front of the child. According to condition, the experimenter performed an action toward
one of the bowls and told the child that they could have whichever sticker they wanted.
Both the action [cloth/hand], and bowl location [left/right] were randomized on the first
trial, and reversed on the second (such that a child did not see the same action twice,
nor were the actions performed on a bowl at the same location twice). After the child
chose, the bowls were stacked and the remaining sticker was removed. The process was
then repeated. At the point of choice, the experimenter withdrew somewhat from the
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interaction to avoid influencing the child’s choice through gaze or gesture. After the
process was complete children were then asked their age and date of birth.
The process in Vanuatu was identical, except we employed translators to ensure
children understood the task and all age appropriate children in the village participated
(consent was voluntarily provided by mothers and elders). Translators said to the child
in the appropriate language “Look at the man, he’s got two stickers. He’s going to do
some actions, then you can choose one of the stickers to have”. After the actions were
performed the experimenter said “you can choose whichever sticker you like”.
Translators were trained so that they never indicated to the child to chose a specific
bowl, either through gaze, gesture, or words. Instructions were back-translated into
English to the lead author’s satisfaction.
In all locations, across both trials, a child was awarded a single point if they
selected the acted-upon bowl. Thus, a child who selected the acted-upon object on both
trials could score a maximum of two points, while a child who picked the alternative,
would receive 0 points.
Results
Using a logistic regression we predicted that there would be a main-effect of
condition, such that children would be more likely to select the focal bowl in the ritual
condition compared to the ordinary condition. And that there would be a main effect of
age, which would driven by a significant interaction - older children are more likely to
respond to ritualised action in an adult-like way than in the control action. We made no
prediction regarding cultural differences, though this was to be tested nonetheless.
Using a multinomial logistic regression (MLR) in which Condition (Ritual,
Instrumental), Cultural Background (Brisbane, Vanuatu), Age, and a Condition*Age
interaction were entered, we did not find a significant model fit,
χ2(8) = 14.407, p = .072, with a Pearson’s goodness-of-fit statistic that did not fall
below the .05 rejection threshold, χ2(56) = 45.568, p = .791. Table 1 shows the full
pattern of results.
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Table 1
Results of a logistic regression on object preferences.
behaviour β Wald df p Exp(B) Lower CI Upper CI
Always Avoid Ordinary Action 0.919 0.648 1 0.421 2.506 0.268 23.458
Ritual Action - - - - - - -
Age 0.173 1.752 1 0.186 1.189 0.920 1.536
Condition * Age -0.097 0.294 1 0.588 0.907 0.638 1.290
Vanuatu -0.049 0.018 1 0.893 0.953 0.470 1.932
Australia - - - - - - -
Single preference Ordinary Action 0.553 0.231 1 0.630 1.738 0.183 16.534
Ritual Action - - - - - - -
Age 0.157 1.425 1 0.233 1.170 0.904 1.513
Condition * Age -0.066 0.130 1 0.718 0.937 0.656 1.337
Vanuatu -1.028 8.245 1 0.004* 0.358 0.177 0.722
Australia - - - - - - -
Note: The reference category is ’Always Prefer’.
We did observe, unexpectedly, that Ni-Van children (compared to Australian
children) appeared .358 times as likely to select the focal object once relative to twice.
To investigate this in an exploratory manner we conducted the same analyses but this
time we coded whether or not a child changed their preference - for example, a child
who did not change their preference chose the focal object on both occasions, while a
child who did change selected, for example, the focal object in the first presentation but
the alternative in the second. A multinomial logistic regression (MLR) in which
Condition (Ritual, Instrumental), Cultural Background (Brisbane, Vanuatu), Age, and
a Condition*Age interaction were entered, we found a significant model fit,
χ2(4) = 12.453, p = .014, with a Pearson’s goodness-of-fit statistic that did not fall
below the .05 rejection threshold, χ2(28) = 18.933, p = .900. The Psuedo-R2 values
suggested the model explained between 5.0 % (McFadden) and 8.5% (Nagelkerke) of the
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variance. Ni-van children, compared to Australian children, were 2.905 times more likely
change their preference between presentation. Table 2 shows the full pattern of results.
Table 2
Results of a logistic regression on preference switching.
Behaviour β Wald df p Exp(B) Lower CI Upper CI
Changed preference Ordinary Action -0.209 0.043 1 0.837 0.812 0.112 5.895
Ritual Action - - - - - - -
Age -0.075 0.446 1 0.504 0.928 0.745 1.155
Condition * Age 0.037 0.056 1 0.813 1.038 0.764 1.410
Vanuatu 1.066 11.459 1 0.001* 2.905 1.567 5.387
Australia - - - - - - -
Note: The reference category is ’Did not change preference’.
Discussion. We predicted that children, like adults, would be more likely to
prefer objects subjected to ritualistic actions over alternatives, compared to children
who were able to choose between an object subjected to an ordinary action and
alternatives. We did not find find support for this prediction. Similarly, we expected
that older children would be more likely to conform to this pattern of results - by virtue
of being more ‘adult-like’ than younger children. Again, we did not find support for this
prediction. We also did not observe any differences between cultures.
So what might explain this pattern of results? It’s possible that, despite our best
efforts to conceptually match the stimuli with that of prior findings, we unwittingly
made a change that dramatically changed the nature of participant responses. We do
not think this is likely to be the case - the stimuli were built around an a priori
definition of ritual, and we employed two different kinds of ritual-action in order to
control for artefacts. If it is the case that some undescribed change altered the pattern
of responses, it allows for two possible inferences. First, we can have little confidence in
prior findings as they relate to ritualistic action; it is nearly as likely that an artefact
was responsible for prior results as it is here. If such a small and undetectable change
influences the results so dramatically, it’s possible that the effect we intend to observe is
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not nearly as robust as anticipated, nor as robust as implied by our everyday
experience. The suggests that some other feature of ritual (perhaps employed
previously) provides considerably more explanatory power than ritualized action (as
conforms to the given definition). A second possible explanation is that the ages of our
participants (in which the maximum age was 9 in Vanuatu and 14 in Australia) was
below the threshold for adult-like ritual cognition. The sample in which this effect has
previously been observed was considerably older and as such it may be possible that
children up to the age tested simply do not show adult-like ritual cognition (inasmuch
as their behaviour is a proxy for this).
We did find that Ni-van children would persevere with their initial decision at
rates higher than Western children. While it appears to be that case that Western
children are statistically choosing at random in both presentations, the Ni-van children
choose at random in the first presentation (i.e., either the focal or alternative bowl) and
repeat the very same decision in the second presentation. Given that the first
presentation reveals no systematic sensitivity to ritualistic behaviour, we choose not to
dwell on this finding. It may reflect some curious tendency for children on Tanna to
persevere, or may simply be a statistical fluke.
Experiment 2: WEIRD Adults
The following experiment has multiple goals. Like the experiment before it, it
measures behavioural responses. Inasmuch as it is possible that results among children
may be attributable to them being too young to perform in an ‘adult-like’ manner, here
we examine the behaviour of adults in order to determine the validity of this claim.
Similarly, in examining the behaviour of adults, we are conducting a replication of the
results in chapter one and two in a behavioural context.
In examining results previously presented I have produced a number of specific
predictions. First, ritualized action is not likely to lead a viewer to believe a physical
change has taken place. Second, ritualised actions ought to lead a viewer to attribute
non-physical qualities to the object. And third, such actions ought to motivate specific
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object-directed responses. These predictions have all been derived from the results
obtained in chapters one and two.
All three studies previously described employed the same basic design:
participants watched videos of a model standing before a table. On the table were a
number of empty glasses. The model would present each glass by moving it forward on
the table. Once all the glasses were presented, they would perform an action on one of
the objects (while ensuring that at least one other identical object on the table was not
interacted with at all). The actions were either ordinary (like cleaning the glass with a
cloth, or rubbing it with their thumb as though removing dirt) or ritualistic (such as
waving a cloth at the glass in a ’cleaning motion’ without making contact, or circling
the object with their thumb without making contact). Here, the ritualistic actions were
causally opaque and goal demoted - the viewer was not able to determine how an effect
was bought about, nor why the act was performed by the model in the first place. After
such an action was performed the model would pour into each identical glass an equal
measure of an amber liquid. Participants were tasked with reporting whether they
thought any of the objects in the array were different from any others, whether any
objects were special (and if so, which one), and which of the objects was theirs to drink
from. In this between-participants design, it was found that neither ritualistic nor
ordinary actions led participants to believe that acted-upon objects were physically
different from non-acted-upon objects. They also found that objects subjected to
ritualistic actions were often more than twice as likely than those subjected to ordinary
actions to be considered ‘special’. Finally, those same objects were similarly more likely
to be selected by the participant to drink from. In effect, ritualistic actions (compared
to ordinary actions) did not lead to physical differences, but did lead to non-physical
attributions, and a corresponding behavioural response.
These results are attributable to the effect of causal opacity and goal demotion.
But what of causal opacity and goal demotion specifically? In chapter one I held
constant these features, while manipulating peripheral cues (i.e., the social context of
the act). In chapter two I manipulated the goal related qualities of the actions by
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explicitly describing the purpose of the actor, and the ostensible outcome being realized.
Participants saw the exact same range of actions with the following text: (“...know that
the actions I’m performing here are a [Blessing/Curse] designed to give you [good/bad]
luck and [good/bad] health”). In this case, while the actions themselves were causally
opaque, they were no longer goal demoted. Participants could not determine how a
curse (for example) was brought about, but they were aware that the intention of the
actor in performing those actions was to curse. Here they found, as before, that the
objects were physically unchanged. They found that objects subject to ritualized action
were considered to be more than twice as special as those subjected to ordinary actions,
and yet the knowledge of the actor’s intention (to bless or curse) had no effect on
attributed specialness. This suggests that the non-physical attributions made by the
participants related to the causal opacity of the action, and not their knowledge of the
action’s intended purpose. Finally, it was found, that to bless an object made
participants around twice as likely to report that the object was theirs to drink, while a
curse made an object around four or fives times less desirable. As before, the effect of
ritual action was replicated - but when the influence of goal information was more
closely analyzed, it was revealed that blesses and curses influenced ordinary actions in
expected ways, only curses had an impact of ritualized action (to bless an object with a
ritualized action did not account for variance above-and-beyond the effect of the action
alone!). This was interpreted as further support for the ritual stance: ritualized actions
are interpreted socially, and are associated with implicit expectations about behaviour.
Finally, the present experiment is an attempt to extend findings presented in
chapter two. Here we are asking how it is that we recognize a ritual when we see one.
As stated earlier, many ordinary actions contain repetition and redundancy, formality
and stereotypy. As used by Kapitány and Nielsen (2015, 2016), ritualized actions with
these features were compared to ordinary and interpretable actions with these features -
the inspection and cleaning of objects. If you observed someone cleaning a glass, you
would not describe their actions as ’he stroked a glass five times with a cloth to remove
dirt’, you would simply say ’he cleaned the glass’ (or perhaps ’he cleaned the glass with
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a cloth’). But those same actions, when performed at a remove, and without an obvious
goal or causal process, would arouse a response of the kind ’he waved a rag
up-and-down five times at the glass, not touching it’. Humans, when observing the
actions of others, parse the action sequences they observe into meaningful units and
sub-units of information (Newtson, 1973; Nielbo & Sørensen, 2011, 2015; Zacks et al.,
2004; Zacks & Tversky, 2001; Zacks et al., 2001). The actions sequences are partitioned
hierarchically into schemata based on perceptual and functional information, and this
information is partitioned according to achieving a hierarchy of goals (Zacks et al.,
2004; Zacks & Tversky, 2001; Zacks et al., 2001). When the actions do not afford an
understanding of larger goals (as a function of causality or intention) they tend to be
broken down into smaller, more discrete units, as we tend to demarcate action units
around the largest discernable goal within the sequence (Zacks et al., 2004), particularly
since we may be trying to actively construct an understanding of the actor’s intention
on the fly (Wilder, 1978a, 1978b). That is, when we see a ritual, our understanding of it
is coloured by our capacity to understand the intentions of the actor, and the manner in
which we partition the action into smaller, more frequent chunks.
In chapter two I presented some supporting evidence for this. When participants
were asked what they understood ‘special’ to mean in the ritual condition, they most
often appealed to processes and intentions (rather than denying specialness, appealing
to physical properties of the objects, or appealing to an intangible quality of the
object), and did so at higher rates than participants who observed ordinary actions
(who themselves more frequently denied specialness, and who only appealed to
intangible qualities at floor-rates, even when the intention of the actor was to bless or
curse). Thus, I have argued that this is evidence that people are attempting to make
meaning of ritualized actions (as one need not make an appeal if the intention is
implicitly understood). In the present experiment this idea is extended, by attempting
to quantify the number of action units perceived, to argue that ritualized actions are
identified as such by virtue of the way in which they are encoded and recalled.
Thus, the present experiment is essentially a registered replication attempt of
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Chapter one and two; of Kapitány and Nielsen (2015, 2016) - but rather than examining
self-reported intentions online - herein we examine actual behaviour. Thus, the
following hypotheses were registered with the Open Science Framework.
Pre-registration. This experiment was pre-registered with the Open Science
Framework (osf.io). The methods described here are an expanded, more formal, version
of those pre-registered. All hypotheses are derived from Kapitány and Nielsen (2015,
2016). Readers are invited to contrast these documents in the interest of transparency.
1. Neither ritual nor ordinary actions will influence participant’s rating of ‘sameness’.
2. Participants will regard objects subjected to ritualized actions as more special
than objects subjected to ordinary actions across both presentations.
3. Participants in the Ritual condition will more often choose acted-upon objects
than participants in the Ordinary condition.
4. In Presentation 2, across both action-type conditions, participants will be more
likely to avoid acted-upon objects if they are ‘cursed’.
5. In Presentation 2, the effect of describing an action as a blessing will only result in
a higher likelihood of preference in the Ordinary condition (i.e., there will be an
interaction between action-condition and goal-condition)
6. Participants in the Ritual condition will describe more action units in
Presentation 1 and Presentation 2 than participants in the transparent condition.
Participants. A total of 101 undergraduates were invited to participate in
exchange for course credit. The mean age of the participants was 20.30 years (SD =
4.66), of whom 65.4% were female. English was the native language of 77.2% of
participants (verbal checks revealed all participants understood the task).
Methods and Procedure
Participants were randomly assigned to an action-type condition and a goal-type
condition prior to arrival. Upon arrival participants were briefed that the experiment
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was examining decision-making behaviour, and given the opportunity to ask any
questions. They were informed that once the experiment commenced they would have
to wait until the end of the experiment to ask any additional question. This was done
so that the participants would not ask for input from the researcher when given the
opportunity to make focal decisions. Participants were also shown three kinds of prizes
(bottle-openers, pens, and USB drives). They were asked to select two of these kinds of
prizes for use in the experiment, which, they were informed, would later be able to keep.
The experiment consisted of two presentations which each had an identical form.
The first presentation manipulated only action-type the participant saw. The second
presentation presented the same action-type (as in the first presentation), but
manipulated the goal-type information.
In each presentation the model stood behind a table, and provided a verbal cue
that the presentation was about to begin: “This is the first presentation, please pay
attention”. He then laid out a set of three identical objects (this set consisted of
identical instances of one of the two objects participants had earlier selected) on a small
raised podium on the table. The objects were laid out evenly spaced perpendicular, and
in full sight, of the participant (their location will later be referred to as ’left, centre,
and right’). The experimenter then selected one of the objects (determined randomly
prior to experiment beginning), picked it up, and performed a condition-appropriate
action. The object was then returned to it’s original position and orientation. After this
the researcher said: “Please come up and select one of the objects”. He then averted eye
contact (and did not look at any of the objects), placed his hands behind his back and
took a small step away. Once the participant made their selection their choice was
recorded, and the remaining two objects were cleared away. The protocol was repeated
using the second set of identical objects, and here the verbal cue described the action as
either a blessing or a curse. Neither the instance of action (cloth, hum, gesture), nor the
position of the acted-upon object (left, centre, right), was the same in presentation two
as presentation one. Participants were then ushered into a second room in which they
completed a battery of computer-based surveys (detailed below).
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Action-Types. Cloth Action. In the Ritual condition a small black cloth was
waved up-and-down vigorously at the object; at no point did the cloth make contact
with the object. The control action had the demonstrator vigorously clean the object
with the same cloth using a matched up-and-down motion.
Gesture Action. In the Ritual condition the demonstrator closed his hand and
pointed with his thumbs at the object while moving his hand along the object’s length;
at no point did the gesture make contact with the object. The matched control action
had the demonstrator – using the same hand position – ‘scratch’ the object with his
thumb as if removing grit.
Hum action. In the Ritual condition the demonstrator held the object at
head-height and began to hum in a long, unwavering and sustained fashion for three
seconds. In the control condition the demonstrator held the object similarly for three
seconds, and made a shorter, more variable noise (as if inspecting or observing a curious
aspect of the object).
Coding. The first dependent variable was which object the participant selected
to keep (hereafter: ‘preference’). If a participant selected the acted-upon object they
were given a score of 1, and if they selected either of the two non-acted-upon objects
they were given a score of 0. The second measure was how many action-units
participants perceived/remembered when prompted after both presentations.
Participants were asked to write, ‘in as much detail as possible’, what they remembered
in both presentations. This was coded in two ways. The first value was coded by
counting the number of verbs the participant used which were attributed to the actor
(e.g., he took, he waved, he cleaned, he placed, he asked). This value was a simple
measure of the number of action-units recalled. The second value was only other
elements which one might expect to vary in recollection or importance between
individuals - typically adjectives or adverbs, but also references to quantity (e.g., he
cleaned for 3 seconds, he waved the cloth 3 or 4 times), specificity (e.g., he picked up
the object with his right hand), motion (e.g., he moved his hand in a clock-wise
direction), and relative special position (e.g., he rubbed the object from the middle to
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the top, he moved his hand near to the side of the object, he raised the object to eye
level, he picked up the object on the right). These values will be referred to as
‘specifics’. These two values together represent the number of actions recalled, as well as
the richness with which they are recalled. These values were coded in full by an
independent blind research assistant, and agreement between the lead author and the
assistant was very high (Presentation 1, Verbs: alpha = .915; Specifics: alpha = .846;
Presentation 2, Verbs: alpha = .926; Specifics: alpha = .803).
Self-report Battery. Several surveys were completed by participants in order
to understand what cognitive or experiential factors influence ritual cognition. These
scales measured Religiosity (Rohrbaugh & Jessor, 1975), Paranormal Beliefs (Tobacyk,
2004), Rational and Intuitive thinking styles (Pacini & Epstein, 1999), History of
Religious and Ritual Exposure (Kapitány & Nielsen, 2015), and a revised and expanded
scale measuring Ontological Confusion (see Appendix A; Lindeman,
Svedholm-Hakkinen, and Lipsanen (2015).
Pre-registered Analyses
Unless otherwise stated, all analyses are consistent with the pre-registered
hypotheses.
Sameness: We asked participants if the three objects in presentation one were the
same (this presentation only manipulated action-type). We ran a logistic regression
with action-type as a categorical IV. Our model was not significant,
χ2(1) = .014, p = .906. For presentation two we ran a logistic regression and included
both action-type and goal-information (Bless/Curse) as predictors, and we found that
our model was significant, χ2(2) = .9.923, p = .007, explaining approximately 19.8% of
the variance (Nagelkerke pseudo-R2). The effect of action-type was significant, such
that transparent actions made participants 11.439 times as likely to report the objects
as being the same compared to ritual actions, Wald Value(1) =
5.037, p = .025, β = 2.437, 95%CI = 1.362− 96.090. There was no effect of goal-type on
scores of sameness, Wald Value(1) = 2.337, p = .126, 95%CI = .074− 1.381. Because
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Odds Ratios are unstandardized measures of effect size, table 3 shows the raw values in
order to provide context.
Table 3
Raw values of agreement on the measure of ‘sameness’ in each presentation by condition.
Presentation 1 Were all the objects the same? Yes No missing data
Ritual Condition 48 (92.3%) 4 (7.7%) 0 (0.0%)
Ordinary Condition 44 (89.8%) 4 (8.2%) 1 (2.0%)
Presentation 2 Were all the objects the same? Yes No missing data
Ritual Condition 43 (82.7%) 9 (17.3%) 0 (0.0%)
Ordinary Condition 47 (96%) 1 (2.0%) 1 (2.0%)
Bless Condition 38 (90.5%) 4 (9.5%) 0 (0.0%)
Curse Condition 36 (83.7%) 7 (16.3%) 0 (0.0%)
Specialness: We asked participants if any of the three objects in Presentation 1
were special. We ran a logistic regression with action-type as a categorical IV. Our
model was not significant, χ2(1) = .140, p = .708. For Presentation 2, we ran a logistic
regression and included both action-type and goal as predictors, again, our model was
not significant, χ2(2) = .692, p = .707. Table 4 shows proportional responses.
Preference in P1 : We used a logistic regression to determine whether the
action-type a participant observed in P1 influenced the object they selected. Our model
was not significant, χ2(1) = 2.571, p = .109. In the Ordinary condition, 39 (79.6%)
participants chose the alternative, while 10 (20.4%) chose the acted-upon object. In the
Ritual condition, 34 (65.4%) chose the alternative, while 18 (34.6%) picked the
acted-upon item.
Preference in P2 : Using the same coding method as above, we conducted a
logistic regression to see if the action-type a participant observed, the stated purpose of
the action, and an interaction term, influenced participant’s preference. This model was
significant, χ2(3) = 14.397, p = .002. The model explained approximately 17.8% of
variance (Nagelkerke pseudo-R2). Analyses revealed that the effect of action-type did
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Table 4
Raw values of agreement on the measure of ‘specialness’ in each presentation by
condition.
Presentation 1 Were any of the objects special? Yes No
Ritual Condition 18 (43.9%) 22 (53.7%)
Ordinary Condition 16 (36.4%) 28 (63.6%)
Presentation 2 Were any of the objects special? Yes No
Ritual Condition 24 (58.5%) 17 (41.5%)
Ordinary Condition 23 (52.3%) 21 (47.7%)
Bless Condition 22 (52.4%) 20 (47.6%)
Curse Condition 25 (58.1%) 18 (41.9%)
not significantly predict preference,
WaldV alue(1) = .045, p = .833, 95%CI = .279− 2.798.
However, we found calling an action a blessing (compared to a curse) made
participants 3.75 times more likely to select the acted upon object, Wald Value(1) =
4.978, p = .026, β = 1.323, 95%CI = 1.174− 11.995. The interaction term was not
significant, WaldV alue(1) = .315, p = .575, 95%CI = .295− 9.032. In the Ordinary
condition, 29 (59.2%) chose the alternative, and 20 (40.8%) chose the target. In the
Ritual condition, 28 (53.8%) chose the alternative, and 24 (46.2%) chose the target.
Table 5 shows proportional responses.
The differential influence of an actor’s purpose across action-type: As per
Kapitany and Nielsen (2016) we split the data by action-type, then ran a logistic
regression on each dataset to determine whether goal-information had a differential
impact. For participants in the Ordinary condition, we found our model was significant,
χ2(1) = 8.821, p = .003. The model explained approximately 22.2% of the variance
(Nagelkerke pseudo-R2). Participants who were told ordinary actions were a blessing
were 6.13 times more likely to select the acted-upon object than participants who were
told ordinary actions were a curse,
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Table 5
Raw values of agreement on the measure of preference in each presentation by condition.
Presentation 1 Did the participant select the focal object Yes No
Ritual Condition 18 (34.6%) 34 (65.4%)
Ordinary Condition 10 (20.4%) 39 (79.6%)
Bless Condition* 11 (26.2%) 31 (73.8%)
Curse Condition* 10 (23.3%) 33 (76.7%)
Presentation 2 Did the participant select the focal object Yes No
Ritual Condition 24 (46.2%) 28 (53.8%)
Ordinary Condition 20 (40.8%) 29 (59.2%)
Bless Condition 24 (57.1%) 18 (42.9%)
Curse Condition 11 (25.9%) 32 (74.4%)
* This condition information was not apparent to participants in the first presentation.
It has been shown here for context.
WaldV alue(1) = 7.998, p = .005, β = 1.812, 95%CI = 1.744− 21.509. For participants
in the Ritual condition, we found our model was significant, χ2(1) = 5.284, p = .022,
and explained approximately 12.9% of variance (Nagelkerke pseudo-R2). Participants
who were told ritualized actions were a blessing were 3.75 times more likely to select the
acted-upon object than participants who were told ritual actions were a curse,
WaldV alue(1) = 4.978, p = .026, β = 1.323, 95%CI = 1.174− 11.995. Table 6 shows the
proportional responses for context.
Keeping in mind that goal information was not relevant in presentation one, it is
clearly the case that participants behaviour did not change as a consequence of the
actions in presentation two being called a curse. Rather, the effect appears to be driven
by calling the second presentation a blessing (see Table 6). Given the similarities
between numbers over both presentations, a correlation was conducted between
likelihood of selecting the acted-upon object in presentation one and presentation two.
No correlation was found amongst the 42 participants in the bless condition (r = .188, p
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Table 6
Proportion of individuals who selected the focal object in each presentation as a function
of Goal-condition.
Presentation 1 Ritual Action Ordinary Action
Bless Condition 7 (33.3%) 4 (19.0%)
Curse Condition 5 (25.0%) 5 (21.7%)
Presentation 2 Ritual Action Ordinary Action
Bless Condition 11 (52.4%) 13 (61.9%)
Curse Condition 6 (30.0)%) 5 (21.7%)
= .234), nor was there a correlation amongst the 42 participants in the curse condition
(r = .056, p = .723).
Action sub-units: In Presentation 1 an independent samples t-test revealed a
significant difference in the number of action sub-units (Verbs) recalled,
t(99) = 2.057, p = .042, 95%CI = −1.454−−.026, such that participants in the Ritual
condition described more action units (M = 4.577, SD = 2.042) than did the Ordinary
condition (M = 3.837, SD = 1.519). Similarly, on the measure of specificity (i.e.,
adjectives and adverbs), there was a significant difference,
t(93.650) = 3.132, p = .002, 95%CI = −1.720−−.3855, such that the Ritual condition
was recalled in more detail (M = 2.81, SD = 1.93) than the Ordinary condition (M =
1.76, SD = 1.42). In Presentation 2, we did not observe a significant difference in the
number of recalled sub-units (Verbs) between the Ritual condition (M = 4.529, SD =
2.352) and the Ordinary condition (M = 3.980, SD = 1.534),
t(98) = 1.378, p = .171, 95%CI = −1.341− .242. Similarly, on the measure of specificity,
we did not find a significant difference between the Ritual condition (M = 2.25, SD =
2.09) and the Ordinary condition (M = 1.59, SD = 1.21),
t(80.67) = 1.96, p = .054, 95%CI = −1.338− .012.
5Levene’s Test for Equality of Variance returned a significant results (p = .008) and so the t-values
presented assume variances were not equal.
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Exploratory Analyses. The following analyses are exploratory, and were not
pre-specified in the original registration.
Participants were asked to what extent they thought the object they selected in
Presentation 1 had positive or negative properties on a 100 point scale, where 50 was
‘the object is totally ordinary’ and the end points were ‘the object has
negative(0)/positive(100) qualities’. As evident in Tables 7 and 8, we observed no
differences between conditions. Importantly, by comparing means, it is apparent
participants did not think that the objects they selected varied in valence between
blessings and curses, but also that they thought the actor had no more capacity to
imbue the objects with these qualities than they did in Presentation 1.
As can be seen in Table 9, we found that paranormal beliefs were positively
associated with increasingly positive evaluations of the objects selected, and that these
beliefs were associated with a belief that the actor had some capacity to imbue objects
with these qualities. We find a relationship that increased exposure to rituals predicted
a belief that the actor could imbue objects with qualities. Scale items correlated in
systematic ways, but did not appear to bear upon attributions of objects or the actor’s
ability to imbue objects (see Table 7).
Table 7
Statistics Regarding object and actor attributions by action-type
Condition N Mean SD t-test
Presentation 1 Pos / Neg properties Ordinary 46 52.46 12.66 t(96) = .682,
of selected object Ritual 52 42.06 7.20 p = .497
Actor’s Ordinary 46 19.17 29.72 t(95) = .993,
Influence Ritual 51 13.65 25.10 p = .323
Presentation 2 Pos / Neg properties Ordinary 47 39.87 26.70 t(93) = 1.583,
of selected object Ritual 48 47.94 22.85 p = .117
Actor’s Ordinary 45 18.27 30.58 t(93) = .004,
Influence Ritual 50 18.24 28.44 p = .996
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Table 8
Statistics Regarding object and actor attributions by goal information
Condition N Mean SD t-test
Presentation 2 Pos / Neg properties Curse 48 42.69 23.92 t(93) = .494,
of selected object Bless 47 45.23 26.30 p = .623
Actor’s Curse 48 18.23 29.72 t(93) = .008,
Influence Bless 47 18.28 29.21 p = .994
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Discussion
Because ritualized actions cannot reasonably alter an object physically we
predicted that neither action-type will influence participant’s rating of ‘sameness’. This
was true in the first presentation, but not the second; in presentation two, when the
action couldn’t cause change more people reported it did. In this case it is worth noting
the raw values, and we compare these results to Kapitány and Nielsen (2015), who found
a similarly fleeting result. In the present experiment we believe it is likely Type-1 error.
We make this argument given that, while there may have been a perceived difference
between objects, it did not appear to alter participant preferences or other attributions.
With regard to intangible properties, we predicted that participants will regard
objects subjected to ritualized actions as more special than objects subjected to ordinary
actions. Unlike Kapitány and Nielsen (2015, 2016) we did not find any evidence that
participants attributed specialness to acted-upon objects, either as a result of ritualized
action or an actor’s motivation.
And yet, when the researcher ‘blessed’ or ‘cursed’ an object we observed a
significant and meaningful change in behaviour. A logistic regression indicated there
was a difference but since we were comparing the bless condition and the curse
condition directly, it was not immediately possible to determine whether the effect was
driving by one, or both, kinds of goal information. By comparing the behaviour of those
in each goal condition in presentation one (where goal information was not present) to
their behaviour in presentation two (where it was) we strongly suggest that the effect
was exclusively driven by the blessing rather than the curse, and this effect didn’t
appear to be limited by action-type. Since we predicted that when goal information is
present, the effect of describing an action as a blessing will only result in a higher
likelihood of preference in the Ordinary condition and when cursed, across both
action-type conditions, participants will be more likely to avoid acted-upon objects we
are forced to conclude that neither of these predictions were supported (despite prior
evidence to the contrary).
To begin examining how ritualistic actions are perceived we examined what
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participants could recall, and in how much details they could recall it. We predicted
that participants will report/describe more action units in the ritual condition than the
ordinary condition. In presentation one participants in the ritual condition recalled
more action units, and did so with greater specificity than those in the ordinary
condition. This supports our prediction that ritualized actions are represented as
gestures, not behaviours, as participants were not able to usefully chunk information
into more efficient units (e.g., ‘he waved the cloth up and down on the side of the
object’, vs, ‘he cleaned the object‘). However, this difference was eliminated when
goal-information was introduced (even though the difference was of a similar magnitude
and direction) - we suggest here this effect is attributable to presentation of the goal
information. In effect, participants were able to reconcile the gestures into behaviours.
Interestingly, even though goal information influenced participants preference,
participants did not explicitly report that they believed the object had been imbued
with positive or negative properties (given this result, it is unsurprising that
participants did not report a difference between conditions regarding the actor’s ability
to imbue objects with such qualities; note also that such values were very close to floor).
The disconnect between preference and the valance of an act directed toward the object
is interesting, particularly given that it was only when an(y) action was called a blessing
that preference was influenced (a finding contrary to prior findings). It is possible
participants were either not aware they held a belief consistent with goal information
(that it was blessed), or were not willing to admit it but acted consistent with the
information provided nonetheless. An effect for which there is precedent, see: Nemeroff
and Rozin (1994); Rozin et al. (1986); Savani et al. (2011); Subbotsky and Quinteros
(2002). It may also be the case that participants genuinely do not hold a belief that a
quality of the object has been changed, but interpret the information in a wholly
ordinary way, where a blessing indicates some kind of positive pro-social sentiment
between the actor and the observer. An even leaner interpretation is that participants
interpret this information as a set of social instructions (which might also be considered
a kind of demand effect) - it is as if the actor is saying “Blessing are good, and I want
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you to take this one”. In any event, the fact that goal information influence behaviour is
interesting, and is broadly consistent with observations of real world behaviour (as well
as conceptually replicating findings from the field of sympathetic magic; see: (Nemeroff
& Rozin, 1994; Rozin et al., 1986; Savani et al., 2011; Subbotsky & Quinteros, 2002)
even if it does not replicate the nuances of previous object-directed ritual action
findings.
General Discussion
Rituals are a pervasive part of living in groups, and we begin to participate in
them well before we are able to play an active role. Depending on where you happened
to be born, you may have participated in a ritual within days of your birth, which may
have included not being allowed to touch the ground (as with Balinese Hinduism
(World Heritage Encyclopedia, 2017), being baptised, or having your genitals mutilated
without your consent). Newborns are generally regarded as ‘Homo potato’, and so it
stands to reason they are unlikely to be able to actively share the rich exegetical,
orthopraxic, symbolism of the rituals in which they are the star. Rituals have been
frequently studied as they relate to group relations - identifying and causing
belongingness, trust, and shared belief. Yet even here, there is evidence that children do
not understand exactly what’s transpiring. For example, children up to the age of 5
believe that a birthday party causes them to age rather than simply marking the
passage of time; (Klavir & Leiser, 2002). The question we asked here was: Does
ritualized action change our perception of objects, and if so, how? In approaching this
question we built on the work of presented in the previous two chapters in several ways:
First, we attempted to examine at what point in development (throughout childhood)
did an (anticipated) adult-like set of responses appear. This was done in two distinct
cultural contexts. Second, among adults, we examined behaviour (rather than
self-report) and asked a range of additional questions that improved resolution on the
underlying cognitions associated with ritual.
The ritual stance suggests that the observation of causally opaque and goal
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demoted actions activates a normative response. It has been shown that both Adults
and Children who participate in rituals identify more strong with the group (Herrmann
et al., 2013; Legare, Wen, et al., 2015; Legare, Whitehouse, et al., 2015; Watson-Jones
et al., 2014), a pattern of responses consistent with the ritual stance. Yet there is no a
priori reason why the ritual stance - which predicts a normative interpretation of
ritualistic actions - should be limited to group-related rituals, or even the participation
in rituals (as opposed to the observation of rituals). Many rituals are directed towards
objects, and we appear to treat such objects differently. With good cause, we were
interested in determining whether a normative interpretation applied in these contexts.
Across three experiments, Kapitány and Nielsen (2015, 2016) demonstrated that objects
subjected to rituals were perceived as more special and more desirable, despite being
physically unchanged. In effect, we did not observe any sensitivity to object-direct
ritualized action. Ritualized action, as revealed by the behaviour of children and adults,
did not appear to make the focal objects more special, or to influence preference.
We also failed to compellingly replicate our findings regarding people’s sensitivity
to specific information regarding goal information. People appeared to respond by
prefering an object that was blessed, independent of the type of action the blessing was
associated with. While this was anticipated with ordinary actions, prior evidence led us
to anticipate it’s absence when associated with ritual acts. Similarly, we anticipated
that cursing an object (independent of action-type) would lead to aversion. We find no
clear evidence of this at all.
There are several possible explanations for our observed results, and the apparent
contradiction to previous work. First, with respect to both the adult and child data -
the ritual stance may have limits: it simply doesn’t apply to objects in the same way it
applies to groups and people (and results of the first two chapters are error or artefacts).
Second, our manipulation differed from successful manipulations previously employed in
important ways (prior results were correct, and the present results are not comparable).
Third, with respect specifically to the cross-cultural developmental data: Ritual-like
adult cognition (as suggested by prior publications) doesn’t emerge until the teen years.
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Finally (within the same context), aspects of the present manipulation produced
artefacts in the data in the cross-cultural context (i.e., I’m a WEIRD white guy).
I will address these concerns in reverse order. How do Ni-van children understand
the presence and intent of a group of strangers (white, foreign academics) arriving in
their community with gifts, then asking the children to participate in artificial
scenarios? And specifically, what impact does this have on ritual-cognition? These
communities represent well studied populations, who are comfortable with the presence
of researchers. It is unlikely that our presence was, all things being equal, considered
particularly disruptive. Several groups of researchers have worked among these
populations, and we were generally treated as guests (which, if anything, presents the
opposite problem for experimental hygiene - participants might have be over-eager
rather than wary). At a general level, we do not believe this is a problem. However, we
have not ruled out the potential problems associated with ritual-cognition. What does
it mean for a stranger, un-associated with the group, to perform ritual actions? It is
possible - and consistent with the ritual stance - that such a model exhibited either a) a
mixed and confusing array of cues, or b) was not recognized as having any capacity to
have ‘ritual influence’. Ritualized actions are already confusing and confounding, and by
introducing an additional set of cues associated with the model (being foreign, unable
to speak the language, a different race, and not belonging to the group) any effect
associated with ritualized action was suppressed. Likewise, such cues - rather than
being confusing - might simply have produced in observers a lack of confidence that the
actions being performed had any self-relevance. On each count we suspect this is not
the case (though cannot - with perfect certainty - rule it out). We found the same
pattern of null-results among children in Brisbane, and among those children, these
criticisms do not apply. While it is entirely possible that the same observed behaviour
between populations was the product of different cognitive mechanisms, it is not
parsimonious to claim so. Particularly in light of the fact that these (and other) Ni-van
children have demonstrated they are already sensitive to other ritual- and normative-
experiments (Clegg, Wen, & Legare, 2016; Rybanska et al., 2017). For these reasons we
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find it reasonable to conclude cues associated with the experimenter were unlikely to
produce this pattern of results, that is, these results cannot easily be attributed to the
fact that the experiment was an out-group member, lacked ritual-authority, or was
simply unusual.
Is it possible that adult-like ritual cognition doesn’t emerge until the teen years
(outside the range tested here)? Across both populations the mean age of participants
was just over 6 years (with a standard deviation of 2 years), in which the maximum age
was 13. Data reported by Kapitány and Nielsen (2015, 2016) show an effect associated
with ritualized actions among a considerably older population (the reported mean age
of the youngest sample was 19 years, the oldest sample had a mean of 35). Is it possible
that adult-like behaviour associated with ritual cognition occurs somewhere during the
teen years, and is not observable in childhood? It is the case that many important
rites-of-passage, that mark a distinction between childhood and adulthood, occur in the
early teens. Even among the Ni-van, males are not permitted to join the Kava
ceremony (a male-only ritual) until they are able to grow a sufficient beard, while
women are not sequestered and scarified (on Tanna Island) until their first
menstruation. But while these are convenient and affirming examples of this hypothesis,
there are frequently observed deviations. For example, the very same boys on Tanna
island are circumcised when they are about 7 or 8 years old, and girls are scarified (to a
lesser extent) when their older sisters have their first menstruation. Empirically,
children in Vanuatu have demonstrated a sensitivity to ritual manipulations (Clegg et
al., 2016; Rybanska et al., 2017). And of course, there is a strong legacy of western
children responding to ritual manipulation. But perhaps this entire point is moot. We
did not find the expected behavioural responses among adults (despite expectations
based on prior research that we would). If we can have confidence in the adult data
presented herein, then we have to assume that - given present methodologies - asking
questions about the emergence of adult-like ritual cognition is unanswerable: adults do
not show anticipated adult-like ritual cognition.
But stated so plainly we are forced to confront uncomfortable scientific and
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methodological questions. Despite the fact it seems obvious that we treat ritualized
objects as different from ordinary objects, we must ask: Were our manipulation and
measures valid? This question is the most difficult to answer. As stated previously,
three experiments - which were conducted online - produced behaviour consistent with
the ritual stance (see empirical chapters one and two). Notably, the stimuli in these
experiments (videos of ritualized actions performed over objects) were accompanied
with a statement of social context (‘the actions you’re seeing here belong to the
x-ceremony of y-location’). Here, when ritualized actions were presented sans context
we did not find the predicted behavioural responses. This leads to three possible
interpretations. One, despite the fact that we observed the behaviour online, the effect
is not manifest in situ for reasons unknown. Two, the effect is not manifest in situ,
because we omitted contextual information (suggesting that an explicit description of
the actions as ritualistic is more important than ritualistic motor-features). And three,
the ritual stance does not predict object directed behaviour, even though this behaviour
was identified in the somewhat artificial context of an online testing environment.
Greater time will be given to these points in the general discussion of this thesis, but
presently we will argue that position three is the most reasonable interpretation.
So why is it reasonable to suggest that the ritual stance - that goal demoted and
causally opaque acts are interpreted normatively - may not apply to object-directed
rituals? The ritual stance predicts behaviour in various contexts when certain features
are shared, such as active participation (Clegg & Legare, 2016a; Herrmann et al., 2013;
Watson-Jones et al., 2014; Wen et al., 2015), and certain social considerations are
present (Horner & Whiten, 2005; Kenward et al., 2011; McGuigan et al., 2011; Nielsen
& Blank, 2011; Whiten et al., 2016).
To explore the first criticism, there is precedent for the study of ritual action when
one is passive, and when (descriptions of) motor features are manipulated. Legare and
Souza (2012) showed that the number of steps within an actions sequence, and
repetition within an action sequences, leads to greater evaluation of ritual efficacy (i.e.,
greater likelihood the magical effect of the ritual sequence can be produced by the ritual
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sequence). Which, it should be noted, were not necessarily group-related outcomes -
they were outcomes much like those that I have previously manipulated (that is, to
bless or curse an object). Further, in chapter two, we observed that ritual actions that
were not associated with a goal, were the most likely to produce appeals to actions and
intentions consistent with a ritualistic interpretation (compared to ritualistic actions
with bless/curse information), and ordinary actions that were not associated with goal
information were the least likely to produce such responses (compared to ordinary
actions with bless/curse information; see table 5 of chapter two). Likewise in chapter
two, ritualistic actions (particularly those without goal information) were recalled in
qualitatively different ways from ordinary actions (consistent with theories that describe
causal opacity and goal demotion, but not necessarily ritual). And so there is
considerable evidence that 1) ritualized actions are perceived differently in situ and in
vivo (as presented here) from non-ritualized actions, 2) ritualized actions produce a
different pattern of responses (e.g., higher imitation) when participants actively engage
in the ritual actions (Clegg & Legare, 2016a; Herrmann et al., 2013; Watson-Jones et
al., 2014; Wen et al., 2015), and 3) ritualized actions produce different cognitions and
behaviours when there are social considerations (i.e., such as who is present, and who
demonstrated the given action; (Nielsen & Blank, 2011; Nielsen, Mushin, et al., 2014;
Wilks et al., 2016). And yet, given all the converging evidence, we find that when such
actions are directed towards objects, we lack evidence of their influence.
It may be that, through the lens of the ritual stance, activation of normative
interpretations as a consequence of causal opacity and goal demotion is too great an
explanatory leap for objects. Objects themselves are not social. Objects may become
associated with social groups by various means, but it is - at a minimum - a mediated
relationship between an object and it’s group. A group is constituted by people, it is
nonsensical to say that a group is constituted by objects. At face value objects
associated or involved in rituals are undeniably treated differently from objects that are
not. Consider the difference between a wedding ring and an ordinary ring, a birthday
cake and a typical dessert, and an Olympic medal and an exact replica. And yet here
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we find that a series of causally opaque and goal demoted actions are not enough to
arouse a response consistent with the ritual stance. Perhaps such actions are a
necessary-but-not-sufficient element of ritual sequences, but this same claim does not
hold when it comes to imitative behaviour or affiliation with a group (as previously
discussed). Given the design of the present experiments we can tentatively conclude
that within a behavioural context, ritualized actions do not arouse behaviours
consistent with a normative response, and that those response (null though they are)
appear, at least superficially, similar cross-culturally.
Finally, if we are take to assume a higher level of analysis - a step removed from
the question ‘does the ritual stance apply to objects’ - and address our original question:
Does ritualized action change our perception of, and behaviour toward, objects, and if
so, how?. While I have spent many words discussing the behavioural aspect of this
question, we have less extensively dealt with the cognitive question. It appears that
ritualized actions do influence the way we perceive objects. Among adults we do find
that causally opaque and goal demoted actions prompt a recall of the action sequence
that has a greater number of action-units than ordinary actions and the description
include more specific information. One way of conceiving this is that, were a naive
individual to read the recollections of participants from this experiment, they would be
more able to reproduce the actions exactly as they were observed despite not having
witnessed the actions first-hand. In chapter two we saw that when actions were causally
opaque, not only were they special, but people spontaneously made reference to the
actor’s intention and focus at about twice the rate as they did in the control condition -
as other’s have argued, we tend to build meaning on the fly (Wilder, 1978a, 1978b),
that we are motivated to reconcile gestures into behaviours and to prioritize intentions
and goals over other characteristics (Bekkering et al., 2000; Gleissner et al., 2000;
Heider, 1958; Malle et al., 2001; Zacks et al., 2007; Zacks & Tversky, 2001; Zacks et al.,
2001). In the present experiment we show what this looks like from the point of view of
our memory of events - specifically - it manifests as reporting more action-units with
greater specificity than the control action. It seems as though the answer to the
RITUAL COGNITION 157
cognitive question is ‘yes, ritualized actions are perceived (or at least cognitively-parsed
and expressed) in a manner that is different from ordinary actions)’. It’s just that this
may not bear upon ‘the ritual stance’ as an explanation for behaviour.
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General Discussion and Conclusions
I began this dissertation by asking what comes to mind when considering ritual?
And so, over its course I have considered this question from as many points of view as
time afforded. I have broken ritual down into its constituent elements, first separating
out religious or supernatural beliefs, and simple appeals to tradition. What then
remained was a series of actions and objects, devoid of context or claims of efficacy. Yet
the idea that a ritual is merely a series of actions does not benefit our understanding,
and indeed, seriously misrepresents the challenges (and interest) of the question. The
idea that rituals are, in part, constituted by ritualized actions is not sufficiently
explanative, for the features we consider important by common definition are not
particularly unique to ritual (even though they are necessary). I argued that we need to
consider the cognitive affordances of those actions. Action sequences we perform every
day, like cleaning a coffee cup, are not particularly notable to an observer, and yet some
of those very same actions, when altered only subtly, may leave an observer confused
and reaching for an explanation (consciously or otherwise). It is not that the actions
themselves are special, it’s that - by way of the actions’ relationship with causality, and,
importantly, the kinds of inferences they allow us to make about the actor performing
them - ritualized actions force upon us a cognitive challenge: it’s no longer easy to
determine how an action brings about an outcome, or even why someone would perform
them. These features are respectively referred to as causal opacity and goal demotion,
and I argue, they are what makes a ritual a ritual; they are what make it possible for us
to understand that a baptism is not about cleaning a baby, that birthday candles are
not related to food or eating, and that wedding rings are not simple aesthetic
adornments. And so the question takes on a more literally tone ’what comes to mind
when considering ritual?’
Commonly, ritualized actions (a constituent element of ritual) are said to be
recognizable for repetition, redundancy and stereotypy. The performance of which is
often rigidly determined and highly specified, and formally presented. All of which
facilitates a drive to prioritize accurate performance of the action rather than accurate
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reproduction of outcomes. Such actions, when performed by a group, may also feature
synchronicity (Bulbulia & Sosis, 2011; Cohen et al., 2013; Fischer et al., 2013; Kapitány
& Nielsen, 2015, 2016; Legare & Souza, 2012; Rappaport, 1999; Reddish et al., 2014;
Tunçgenç & Cohen, 2016; Wiltermuth & Heath, 2009). Rituals also tend to exhibit
causal opacity and goal demotion, but some have gone further to argue that these
motor features cause them (Boyer & Liénard, 2006; Schjødt & Sørensen, 2013). Over
the course of this dissertation, I have arrived at the following definition which,
eventually, I was able to fully articulate in my final empirical chapter: ritualized
behaviour is typically causally opaque and goal demoted as a consequence of the
repetition, redundancy, formality, and stereotypy of the motor features, and as a result
we prioritize accurate performance of process over outcome.
Causal opacity describes the degree to which an action affords an observer the
ability to determine how the action brings about an outcome. The understanding need
not be particularly in depth, or clear-minded, and can operate at the level of folk
physics. To observe someone cleaning a dirty cup with a cloth allows for the inference
that through the application of mechanistic forces above a particular threshold,
otherwise-difficult-to-remove stains can be dislodged. Though no-one would describe it
like that in the real world - most would say ‘the cloth rubs away the dirt’; it is a
causally transparent action. Likewise, to observe a helicopter lifting-off is causally
transparent: it is clear that the relationship between the speed of the rotating blades
governs whether the helicopter remains on the landing pad or hovers above it. Some
have described the difference between causal opacity and causal transparency as the
difference between the start-state and the end-state of the objects subjected to actions,
where the states are the same the mechanism of action is opaque, and where they are
different, they then are transparent. Even if it not possible to clearly and accurately
describe how an action causes an outcome it is still considered transparent if it is
potentially knowable (Legare, Whitehouse, et al., 2015; Watson-Jones et al., 2014).
But this cannot be completely accurate. If the universe is the same after a set of
actions as it was before, then no mechanism needs to be determined. It is neither
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possible, nor reasonable, to describe the mechanism of causation if your dirty coffee mug
is still dirty two minutes later, even if you were waving a cloth at it at a distance
removed. A better description of causal opacity is when the causal dependency
structure of the actions is disrupted (independent of whether the action sequence causes
an outcome or not (Schjødt & Sørensen, 2013). Under this definition waving a cloth in
a cleaning motion at a remove from the mug is a disruption of the typical causal
relationships observed when the cloth is brought into contact with the mug. But the
real utility of this definition is apparent when considering examples in which the end
state varies from the start state. Consider a helicopter with rotating blades attached,
not on top of the vehicle, but on one side. To observe the the blades increase in speed,
and to witness the helicopter lift vertically as a result is to see the structure of
cause-and-effect disrupted, but an effect bought about nonetheless. This is an extreme
example, and does not involve [ritualized] action, but it highlights how effective the
latter definition can be. Under the start-end-state-equivalency model, this would not be
an opaque causal process, but a transparent one (an absurd proposition).
However, accounting for a difference between start- and end-states is important,
as many sequences of actions (including ritual sequences) include both relevant and
irrelevant causal actions ostensibly to bring about a single outcome. Consider a
circumcision ritual (in the Jewish tradition): a sharp blade is causally required to alter
the body of the child, but it is not [causally] required that the cut is made by someone
of the Jewish faith, that an intermediary carry the child between the mother and the
father (a kvater or kvaterin), that the event take places during daytime eight days after
birth inside a particular building, or that blood is orally sucked from the wound rather
than wiped away by a cloth (Metzitzah B’Peh)6. Causal opacity, then, describes the
degree to which an action affords an observer the ability to determine how the action
brings about an outcome, where the actions disrupt typical causal structures by either
failing to cause an outcome, or where they are not causally related to the outcome.
6Admittedly this description involves a range of extant ritualistic elements which occur in conjunction
in only some communities.
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Goal demotion (and it’s counter-part, goal apparentness) is the degree to which an
action affords an observer insight into the goal, intention, or motive of the actor
performing it. This is an important and informative distinction to draw, for in instances
where the start- and end-states are equivalent (where it’s not possible to dwell upon
causal processes) it is reasonable to wonder why those actions were performed by the
actor. And so, if we consider the cleaning-action performed at a remove from a cup, we
do not ask how that is happening, but why. Thus, it is more useful to describe the
action as goal demoted (because the action does not afford an insight into the actor’s
mind), even if it may also be technically appropriate to consider the actions causally
opaque, too. If we apply this logic to the circumcision ritual, even if it’s impossible to
ask how a Jewish person performs a superior cut, it is very easy to understand, from
the point of view of goals and intentions, why a Jewish person is required to make it.
I hope to have illustrated this claim - that causal opacity and goal demotion are
dissociable in theory and in practice - and importantly that they are generated by
specific features and contexts in which motor sequences are performed (Boyer &
Liénard, 2006; Schjødt & Sørensen, 2013). I have done this in theory through the use of
the ’Hotel Attendant problem’. The Hotel Attendant problem describes a series of
ordinary actions that conform to the common definition of ritual but are, in fact, wholly
ordinary. But when these actions are placed into a context in which they force upon the
observer no clear causal mechanism, and no clear insight into the motive for their
performance, they suddenly afford a ritualistic interpretation. And I have done this in
practice across my empirical chapters. Doing so empirically represents a considerable
step forward in the literature, as many consider each element theoretically important
(Boyer & Liénard, 2006; Legare & Souza, 2012; Liénard & Boyer, 2006; Rossano, 2012;
Schjødt & Sørensen, 2013; Sørensen & Nielbo, 2013), but few have attempted to
examine the elements distinctly (particularly with regard to goal demotion, but see:
(Fux et al., 2013; Mitkidis et al., 2014; Nielbo & Sørensen, 2011). Herein, I have taken
considerable steps forward by methodologically separating and demarcating the role of
these features in stimuli and analysis.
RITUAL COGNITION 162
But why is it important that the role of causal opacity and goal demotion are
elevated in the study of ritual cognition? Beyond the points made that wholly ordinary
motor features (repetition, redundancy, formality, etc.) occur in wholly ordinary
sequences, their inclusion (particularly in light of greater theoretical clarity, presented
here) allows us to address underspecifications in existing ritual theory, and to do so
using ordinary features of human cognition (an important element of a CSR approach
to investigating religion and ritual). The ritual stance is one theory which describes how
the observation of, and the participation in, rituals (where those rituals tend to revolved
around the manipulation of objects) is governed by normative motives (Herrmann et al.,
2013; Legare & Herrmann, 2013; Legare & Wen, 2014; Legare, Wen, et al., 2015; Legare,
Whitehouse, et al., 2015; Watson-Jones et al., 2014). Often these manipulations,
however, rely on semantic cueing, in which statements of the form“this is how the
yellow group do it, everyone in the yellow group does it like this” make it extremely
difficult to demarcate whether ritual actions cue normative responses, or such cuing
produces normative responses. Further, the theory - which has considerably
explanatory power to date - assumes normative responses only when groups are
involves: it does not specify whether such responses will occur when the subject of the
ritual is an object. Over the course of this thesis I have investigated this possibility, and
found a mixed pattern of results which may support the predictions of the ritual stance,
however, I have found the question more complicated that it first appears, with
short-comings in behavioural and developmental contexts.
Another theory, which benefits from the increased theoretical clarity, is the hazard
precaution and action parsing system (Boyer, 2001; Liénard & Boyer, 2006). This theory
provides some interesting hypothesizing on the ultimate origins of ritual, as well as the
proximal factors that maintain it. Specifically, if ritualistic actions activate anticipatory
threat-responses, then those response ought to produce some kind of systematic pattern
of behaviour toward the focus on those actions. Simultaneously, the features that allow
us to recognize and parse ritualistic action as a kind of action different from ordinary
action should be measurable in ritualistic contexts. For this latter claim, I have
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produced answers of increasing resolution which support predictions made regarding
how we observe and perceive (and recall) ritualistic action. However, with regard to
responses such perceptions produce, I am forced to draw more conservative conclusions.
And I have also attempted to introduced generalizability as well as methodological
clarity. The ritual stance is implicitly universal, and the hazard precaution system is
explicitly so. In the introduction I wrote the following:
“While the tendency for those within the field of cognitive sciences of religion is to
study far more diverse populations than other fields, which - in theory - allow for more
generalizable conclusions, it is still the case that any psychological theory that aspires to
universality must take into account cultural considerations, and any theories that claim
to be evolutionary, must consider the trait’s development (Mesoudi, 2011; Nielsen &
Haun, 2016)”
To this end, after establishing a protocol and observing a series of encouraging
results (in two separate populations: Australia and America), I attempted to examine
if, and when, children in two diverse cultures responded (Australia and Vanuatu). The
results I produced here, that were behavioural in nature (both among children and
adults) posed the greatest challenge to clarity of the questions under consideration - for
the results were generated in a fair test under valid ecological conditions, and yet did
not support the hypothesis.
Across all three empirical chapters (comprised of five experiments across three
cultures including two distinct age groups) I employed highly matched stimuli, common
methodologies, and consistent predictions and analyses. I examined, in all of these
contexts, the responses of individuals after they observed a model focusing ritualistic
actions on objects.
In empirical chapter one we found that people who observed ritualized actions
(specifically, causally opaque and goal demoted actions) that were focused toward one
object in an array of identical objects did not generally perceive those actions as
producing a difference among the objects (which was the same pattern observed when
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the actions were wholly ordinary). However, ritualized actions did produce a perception
that one object within the set was special compared to alternatives (an effect not
produced by ordinary actions). Further, ritualized actions produced in participants an
increased preference for the acted-upon object. When these actions were presented with
contextual information, that the actions the participants observed belonged to a specific
social group (that participants were not familiar with) the effect of specialness and
desirability was amplified. In a second experiment, when we manipulated the valence of
the contextual information (from benign and unknown, to negative/sinister) we found
(unexpectedly) that the influence of context disappeared (even though we predicted a
reversal).
I concluded that ritualistic actions do bear upon people’s responses towards
objects, both in terms of their evaluation of the object (as more special) and in regard
to their self-reported intentions (the objects were more desirable). These findings
appeared consistent with predictions made by the ritual stance. That benign social
considerations improved these attributions, and that sinister social considerations did
not influence the results, something I interpreted as also being consistent with the ritual
stance. Rituals are, after all, social actions. A cue that a set of actions belongs to a
group should serve to enhance responses consistent with a normative drive. We
replicated, in two studies, the role causal opacity and goal demotion play (examined in
conjunction) with respect to perceptions and reported intentions.
In empirical chapter 2 we employed the same ritualized actions (with benign social
context) which, taken alone, were causally opaque and goal demoted, but through
written cuing manipulated whether participants had access to the goals and intentions
of the actor. We replicated the effect of ritualized action alone (without goal
information) - again, such actions did not produce a perception of physical difference
among the objects, but did produce perceptions of specialness, and self-reported
intentions of preference. Ordinary actions, again, appeared to make no difference. In
manipulating the goal information, we told participants that the actions they were
observing were either blessings or curses (performed to bring about good/bad luck, and
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good/bad health). These manipulations did not change perceptions about physical
difference, or about specialness, but did influence preference for objects in the predicted
directions. Notably, the effect of curses and blessings was observed when the actions
were wholly ordinary, but we observed only an effect of curses when actions were
ritualistic (suggesting ritualized actions and positive by default). Again, we find
support that causally opaque and goal demoted ritualized actions influence participants
in a manner consistent with the ritual stance. We further demarcate the role goal
demotion played, and showed that introducing positive goal information to ritualized
action doesn’t influence participants’ responses, but introducing negative goal
information does while the role of goal information on ordinary actions appears to play
out in intuitive and predictable ways.
Additionally, we took initial steps to show that these well matched stimuli, which
vary by the degree to which causal relationships are determinable and goal information
is provided, influence how participants process what they observe. Consistent with
predictions made by the hazard precaution and action parsing theories, we show that
when observing ritualistic actions participants report paying attention to different
features of the action. When asked what ‘special’ meant to the participants, we found
that rituals without explicit goal information reliably produced appeals to goal
information at rates greater than when rituals have explicit goal information provided
(and the opposite pattern of results was observed when the actions were ordinary). This
observation conceptually replicates prior findings that ritualistic actions are perceived
and processed as different from ordinary actions. Thus providing a plausible mechanism
for identification and response.
In experiment one of empirical chapter 3 we examined, among children in two
distinct cultures, whether or not they produce an adult-like pattern of responses to
ritual action. Here, we simplified the design, presented fewer options in our array of
choices, and minimized language cues. When children (in both cultures) observed a
model performing a ritualistic action (across two presentations) on one of two bowls
(which each contained a reward), it appeared not to influence their subsequent
RITUAL COGNITION 166
preference and decision at rates different from ordinary action or chance. It was not
possible to measure what occurred at a cognitive level among these children, but as far
as their behaviour is concerned, they did not respond in a manner consistent with prior
data (despite the fact that children in both of these locations had been shown to be
sensitive or responsive to ritual-type manipulations conducted by other researchers).
Nor did we observe an age-related effect - we could not conclude that as children get
older they become more adult-like with regard to the ritual response.
In experiment two of empirical chapter 3 we subjected participants to the same
stimuli and manipulations as in chapter two, but did so using live, rather than video,
presentations. In the first of two presentations, participants saw a model perform
ritualistic (or control) actions on an array of three identical objects. In this presentation
the actions were both causally opaque and goal demoted. In the second presentation
the same kind of action was performed on a similar array, and we indicated that the
actions being performed were either a blessing or a curse. Here we failed to find the
predicted effects associated with ritualistic action. Ritualistic actions alone did not
produce specialness, and did not produce preference (as measured by actual behaviour).
Not only is this contra to predication made by the ritual stance (at least inasmuch as
preference is concerned), but contrasts starkly with evidence from three experiments in
the first two chapters. However, some degree of ritual cognition was evident; when
participants were asked to recall in as much detail what they observed in the first
presentation, their responses were more detailed and specific than those in the control
condition. Though we predicted that we would observe this same pattern of results in
the second presentation (when the goal of the actor was apparent) we did not. However,
in hindsight, we believe this is consistent, as goal information ought to allow
participants to reconcile the otherwise-difficult-to-explain actions with reference to the
information provided. We cautiously propose support for hypotheses associated with
action-parsing, and modify our prior beliefs regarding the ritual stance.
In the same experiment we observed that the pattern of preference, while not
influenced by the kinds of actions performed, was influenced by the goal information
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(presentation two). Blessed objects were preferred many time more than cursed object.
This finding contrasts the findings presented in empirical chapter two, in which we
reported that blessings had no impact on ritualistic actions, but did on ordinary
actions. The possibility remains open that that ritualistic actions may play some
interactive role when intentions are present, but we are far from being confident or
conclusive on this matter.
And so what can we conclude from this series of experiments? It seems safe to say
that we perceive ritualistic actions as different from ordinary actions. When
participants are asked to explain what they saw (compared to ordinary actions), they
appeal to distinct, theoretically-consistent constructs (such as an individual’s intention),
and do so with greater clarity (as a consequence of top-down error detection, they
identify more components of action, and associated specifics). This cannot be
understated. It is one thing to predict a behavioural response to observing ritual, but
the devil is in the detail, and there’s an evidential burden of those in the field to define
how we can ‘see’ a ritual at all, before hypothesizing how and why we respond so. I have
shown that even when behaviour does not suggest ritual cognition, participants still see
ritualistic actions differently - suggesting interesting hypotheses: The question no longer
is ‘Why do we act in a normative manner when we see rituals?’ (for example), but
‘What is it about about actions which do not afford causal understanding or intentional
predictions (cognitively represented by schemas), that activate a normative drive?’.
To contextualize this claim: we can now examine the hotel attendant problem and
explain why a forest rather than a hotel room affords a ritualistic interpretation. To
perform cleaning actions on a mirror or a cup, which may or may not be dirty, activates
the schema of cleaning. For things that can be dirty or clean, this schema is
appropriate. However, for things that cannot be typically ‘dirty’ or ‘clean’, like a tree or
a leaf, it becomes inappropriate to use the cleaning-schema. Thus, recognition that a
series of typical actions (which feature repetition, formality, stereotypy, redundancy) is
now being applied to a situation in which the goal of cleaning is not appropriate,
represents a meaningful corruption of the typical causal-dependency structures of the
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cleaning action. And because it makes no sense to clean a tree, one cannot attribute the
goal of ‘making clean’ to the agent performing the action. Thus, we see a series of
ordinary actions - normal in a hotel - become ritualistic when they force upon the
observer causal opacity of action and outcome, and a goal demoted quality regarding
the agent who performs them.
But thereafter it becomes more difficult to draw clear conclusions. Using the
framework of the ritual stance we predicted that the normative responses that rituals
encourage in individuals when interacting with groups would apply to individuals
interacting with objects. This question is not merely a curio, as there are so many
instances in one’s life when ritualized objects are treated differently from ordinary
objects (not to mention that interactions with objects are frequently governed by a
norms). Birthday cakes are different and special in a way that other cakes are not, and
to interact with a birthday cake in the way one would with an ordinary cake would be
inappropriate, as would the reciprocal: A late night slice of cake is fine, but if at
11:37pm you decide the slice needs to have a lit candle implanted upon it and
immediately extinguished, then you might very well want to question what you’re
doing. We showed that people tend to attribute a specialness to ritualized objects.
However, this was only found in online samples (albeit, three online samples with a
combined N exceeding 1300 people). The effect was not replicated when people
observed the same actions in a live context. Beyond the reality of the situation one
potential difference between the online and the virtual environment was that in the
online sample we provide a social context: we informed participants that what they
were observing belonged to a particular social group. Yet, in one condition of both
experiments one and two, this was not present, and we still observed that people were
more likely to make attributions of specialness when actions were ritualized (compared
to ordinary). Why is it, then, that the effect disappeared under more ecologically valid
circumstances when it had been robustly observed elsewhere?
It may be the case that participants were more self-concious about engaging in
magical thinking when clearly under lab conditions. The actions are obviously absurd,
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and to reveal that you think they caused some intangible effect in the world may reflect
upon you poorly. Contrariwise, participants online may have been susceptible to the
expectation effects. The actions are obviously absurd, but it may have followed that
this absurdity implied that the experimenter wants me (the participant) to say ‘this one
is special’ (though, if this is the case, such expectation effects were not observed in the
control condition). It might also the case that in our online samples we had about 100
participants per cell, and in our lab sample we had only 50. The Odds Ratio (an
unstandardized measure of effect size) indicated that the effect of ritualized action was
frequently greater than 2.0 (meaning participants were more than twice as likely to say
that specialness was present than absent). Statistically, even if an effect is real, the
chances of making a Type II error (incorrect rejection) are not only possible, but
expected (Lakens & Etz, 2017). And so it is tempting to suggest that, mediated by the
cognitive processes that allow us to recognize rituals, we may also make attributions to
a ritualized object’s status using the label ‘special’, even if we only observed it in three
out of four experiments. As comforting as this conclusion is, that the following results
are also null casts a little more doubt.
In the very same behavioural experiment we found no effect of ritualized action on
an individual’s preference for objects. This was the central dependent variable - do
people exhibit normative responses when they observe ritualized actions performed
towards objects? We found this effect online when people were asked ‘Which drink
would you select to drink?’, and so it was unexpected that these self-reported intentions
did not match actual behaviour. The potential explanations of the null effect with
regard to specialness may also apply here, it might be a case of self-presentation bias in
a live context, or expectation effects in the virtual context. The same follows with the
argument about expected null findings, but it is striking that it wasn’t either
specialness or preference that was found to be null (allowing for the generous
interpretation of Type-II error), but both. This should lead any cautious scientists to
lower their subjective confidence in the claim that the ritual stance applies to objects as
well as groups.
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It should be noted, however, that the role of goal demotion did influence
participants behaviour (though, matching prior results, it did not influence ratings of
specialness). When an object was cursed it was avoided, and when an object was
blessed it was desired (more so in the control condition than the ritual condition). As
with earlier experiments, this supports the claim that goal demotion is unique from
causal opacity accounting different responses (causal opacity, and ‘how’ question relate
to attributions of specialness, while goal demotion, and ‘why’ questions related to
preference), and (weakly, albeit with precedence) suggests that goal demotion and
causal opacity interact in interesting ways.
An additional theoretical concern is integrating the finding that children don’t
exhibit preference toward ritualized objects. If it is the case, as suggested in the final
empirical chapter, that there was something about the methodology in both the
developmental context and the adult context which nullified the anticipated effects then
we can simply dismiss the findings as the consequence of sloppy methods. But there is
no clear justification for this conclusion, and I maintain that the methods employed
were a priori theoretically appropriate. It seems less likely that children are susceptible
to self-presentation bias (explaining a lack of preference), and if anything, may be more
sensitive to expectation effects than adults (who are likely more able to hold an
expectation and a personal intention in mind in a dissociable manner). It is possible
that, despite the null effects observed amongst the live behaviour of adults, an effect
does exist - yet the children we measured were below the threshold for exhibiting
adult-like cognition (a point explored previously). To integrate these findings then, we
must be conservative, and again, lower our subjective confidence in our assertions.
Does the ritual stance predict normative responses towards objects? We know
that ritualized actions toward objects are perceived as not-ordinary, and that there is -
on the weight of things - more evidence that people perceive specialness and form
preference than evidence failing to show this. But, the evidence that fails to show it is
more ecologically valid, employing real world stimuli and rewards. Published work on
the ritual stance (Herrmann et al., 2013; Legare & Herrmann, 2013; Legare & Wen,
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2014; Legare, Wen, et al., 2015; Legare, Whitehouse, et al., 2015; Watson-Jones et al.,
2014) rarely demonstrates null effects. It is unclear whether work conducted by those
who examine the ritual stance is prey to file-drawer effect, or any other practice
(intentional or otherwise) which might produce such consistent published results. As
clichéd as the following claim might be, more research is required.
That said, I am in a position afforded those who write a thesis to offer my opinion
on the evidence presented. In light of the fact that we clearly treat ritualized objects
differently in the real world, that rituals and ritualized objects are ubiquitous the world
over, that rituals clearly influence the identity of individuals and groups, that all stimuli
herein presented was constructed according to a robust a priori definition, that we
clearly perceive rituals as not ordinary, and that the weight of evidence suggests people
do attribute specialness and generate preference, then I would argue the hypothesise is
moderately supported. Not only do rituals tend to influence the way we see ritualized
objects, but we subsequently interpret them as having a special status, and generally (in
the absence of specific goal-related information) find such objects desirable. That
positive goal related information tends to have far less an influence on ritualized actions
than does negative, and that both positive and negative have a far greater influence on
ordinary/control actions also supports this position - for while ‘pure’ ritualized actions
are causally opaque and goal demoted, rituals more broadly naturally manipulate both
elements. Thus, I submit that it is the case that the ritual stances applies to objects,
though this needs to examined and replicated further. It may be the case that, work
herein presented, demonstrates an absence of evidence. It is less clear whether the
hypothesis has been convincingly falsified - there is not evidence of absence.
A more salient contribution, I would argue, is the increased theoretical clarity
regarding the distinguishable roles both causal opacity and goal demotion play in ritual
cognition. The finally formulated definition proposes not just co-occurance of these
features in conjunction with repetition, redundancy, formality, stereotypy, and
synchrony, but that these qualities produce causal opacity and goal demotion, via a
clearly articulated cognitive pathway - anticipated by Boyer and Liénard (2006);
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Liénard and Boyer (2006) - and further demonstrated here. This empirical work allows
for greater specifity in the questions we can ask about rituals. For it is no longer the
case that we simply ‘know it [a ritual] when we see it’, but that we have greater insight
into the cognitive processes ‘... when we see it’.
Having addressed earlier the question What comes to mind when considering
ritual? several other questions were proposed. The first two relate to a proximal
explanation of ritual, and were ‘How do we recognize this act as something that is not
ordinary?’ and ’why do we continue to perform rituals?’, while the third was addressed
the ultimate question of ‘why does anything like a ritual exist at all?’. I think it is the
case that of the three questions, the first has been addressed. The work presented
herein show not only that we do see rituals as different from ordinary actions, but how
and why. But the broader question of ‘why do we continue to perform rituals’ may not
have been addressed, and I raise it here to introduce a number of future questions.
Given that rituals are perceived and recalled in more detail than ordinary actions,
might it be the case rituals persist (over other sequences of action) because they convey
some kind of memory advantage? Others have written on the way ritual interacts with
memory. Atkinson and Whitehouse (2011); Whitehouse (1992) argues that doctrinal
rituals (which most closely match the manipulations herein presented) allow for the
creation of semantic memory associated with group-defining beliefs and practices, while
Schjødt and Sørensen (2013) argue that such ritual deplete cognitive resources, making
memory for specific events more difficult. This could be addressed with a series of
studies examining the fidelity of ritual performance in transmission chains. Based on
the research presented here, I would predict that sequences that contain ritualistic
elements would propogate more effectively and with less error through populations, due
to the fact that such actions appear to be recalled at a higher resolution and in more
detail than ordinary counterparts. If this is shown to the be the case, it might also lend
support to other theories of ritual cognition (for example, positive evidence may
support Whitehouse’s Modes Theory of Ritual, while negative evidence may support
the Cognitive Depletion Model). An additional prediction might also follow that, in
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societies that do not rely on written information (i.e., some traditional extant societies,
and any society from the pre-literate epoch) that cultural technological sequences (such
as producing medicines, tools and artefacts, or conveying important social information
about what is safe to eat, and where is safe to visit) might be more likely to be
ritualized or contain ritualistic elements. But since we rarely see sequences of action
that are exclusively ritualistic (particularly as the length of the sequence increases), it
follows that there is likely to be some frequency-dependent optima for ritualistic action
in enhancing their transmission advantage. This kind of research could be modelled on
the work of of those who have shown transmission advantages for particular kinds of
ideas within cultural construct (Banerjee et al., 2013; Norenzayan et al., 2006; Tehrani,
2013; ?).
I propose that one of the reasons we may still continue to perform rituals is
because they are more salient and arresting than the alternatives (in much the same
way particular folk tales and supernatural beliefs persevere compared to mundane
alternatives). This line of argument may also suggest a novel ultimate prediction:
rituals were never deliberately formed, but were perhaps ‘hopeful monsters’ or
accidental ‘good tricks’ arrived upon by chance (or at least, without explicitly deliberate
top-down planning), that, when performed arrested the attention of those around them
in way that non-ritual could not; or that such beneficial errors in motor sequences could
do the work that would otherwise be required by lengthy semantic explanations).
Though the appeal to normativity might not be the most parsimonious mechanism
here, it is not an incompatible aspect of these predictions. Others have made claims
that flirt with these predictions. Legare and Nielsen (2015); Nielbo and Sørensen (2015)
have suggested the phenomena of over-imitation, and other similar ritual-related ideas,
allow for children and ‘cultural novices’ to acquire important social skills that enable
them to enter into a community and maintain their standing. It is, on the face of the
claim, fair: If I were to meet a woman from a different culture, and I wished to marry
her and become a part of her culture, I could not remain ignorant of how a marriage is
executed and what it symbolises. That children (and novices) learn to do normative
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and ritualistic actions cheaply (as far as the beneficial memory advantages afforded by
the ritualism go), and by making small incremental gains in performing normative
actions, they could very reasonably provide a series of important cultural stepping
stones to becomes a functioning, accepted member of their own community (in much
the same way I would have to if I married in such an environment).
And yet, on the assumption all my findings are in error, the fact that we do have
ritualized objects in our everyday lives, and that those objects are treated in a manner
different from ordinary objects, still requires explanation. Is it merely a pattern of
associations? That rituals themselves do nothing other than focus our attention on one
of many objects, and by focusing our attention (and frequently co-featuring a host of
explicit or dogmatic beliefs) preference is formed, something similar to a ‘familiarity
effect’ (Coupey, Irwin, Payne, Irwin, & Payne, 2014). It is the case that I cannot tell a
wedding ring from a gold band unless I have been exposed to the objects’ history (either
as a witness, or been provided this information prior) - there is nothing essentially
different about the two objects available to the naive observer. Alternatively, can
cognitive dissonance (Brehm & Cohen, 1962) explain the effect? One train of thought
might follow that a wedding band must be special, because I’ve clearly invested time
and effort into placing it on my betrothed’s fingers. Attempts to falsify predictions that
rituals cause attributions of specialness and preference might investigate whether there
are simpler explanations than normativity at play.
Finally, if it is the case that a verdical explanation of ritual is rich enough to
require abstract thought, it becomes increasingly important to examine the questions
from a developmental and evolutionary point of view. The question of ‘when do children
demonstrate adult-like ritual cognition’ is straight-forward enough (though, apparently,
not so straightforward that I was able to deliver a simple answer). Such a question
should, as a first step, require additional testing. Should it prove as difficult as I have so
far observed, demarcating (and investigating) the steps between over-imitation (as
robustly established by many other scholars) and ‘ritual’ (as proposed in empircal
chapter two) will be a necessary (and methodological step-wise) procedure.
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A much more complicated and interesting question might be when it arose in our
evolution. The fact objects and artefacts persevere throughout deep-time in a way that
behaviour doesn’t allows for interesting speculation on when ritualistic actions
appeared. By about 74kya early Homo were burying their dead with funeral goods
(d’Errico & Backwell, 2016), implying abstract thought, but does this also imply a
commitment to ritual in the way it has been operationlized here? Recent findings, such
as the Neanderthal ring-shaped structures (dated to about 176kya) come to my mind,
which appear to conform to a specific shape (though size varies), and were found 336
meters from the entrance of the cave, and which show evidence of fires placed on the
rings, rather than on the floor (Jaubert et al., 2016). This behaviour is suggestive of a
fit with the definition of ritual presented (at least insofar as the consequences, but not
the practice thereof, can be observed). The rings are repetitive, apparently redundant,
structured in such a way as to suggest formality, and made to a kind of specification
which may have emphasized process over outcome (not to mention the fact that the
task of making such circles would have been much easier in the light!). Moving further
(cladistically) afield, more recent evidence has suggested ‘ritual drumming’ in
chimpanzees (Kühl et al., 2016). Whether or not this is the case (it is my opinion that
such a claim is a stretch) examining whether other Great Apes (or even other highly
social, or artefact using non-humans) respond to causally opaque or goal demoted
actions in a systematic way might provide interesting insight into the ultimate questions
surrounding our ubiquitous use of rituals.
That so many interesting questions remain in the psychological investigation of
ritual is encouraging, but their investigation requires scholars to move afield from
questions that repeatedly examine the relationship between rituals, groups, and
identity, to better uncover the hidden workings of the phenomenon. The empirical work
presented here has improved our resolution of understanding inside an under-researched
aspect of ritual cognition - namely, the relationship between rituals, cognition, and
objects. This work has also motivated me to address some of the consequent hypotheses
that relate to memory, cultural evolution, and comparative research. Further, the CSR
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approach to understanding the area of ritual cognition, an area so rich in narrative,
history, subjective musings, and historical speculation, has proven highly fruitful and
enduring, for both myself and the scholars I admire and respect. While there are those
who conduct research on the role religion (as a complex) plays from an evolutionary
point of view, fewer examine the proximate and ultimate role ritual has played. And so
here, I hope to have addressed the question ‘What comes to mind when considering
ritual?’ in such a way as to answer a specific subset of questions in a robust and
informative manner, but also to have generated a line of enquiry that may lead other
scholars to examine a range of ritual-related phenomenon that we know too-little about.
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Appendix
Appendix A
The novel ‘history of religion and ritual exposure’ survey (7-point Likert Scale).
How frequently do you:
1. Knock on wood
2. Cross your fingers
3. Avoid walking under ladders
4. Avoid opening an umbrella inside
5. Throw salt over your shoulder if you spill it
6. Attend formal worship services (like those held in a Church, Synagogue, or
Mosque)
7. Perform informal religious rituals in a group (like before a sporting match or a
family dinner)
8. Perform private religious rituals individually (like prayer, cleansing, absolutions,
or salat)
Would you:
9. Expect to see candles on your birthday cake
10. Expect to see candles on other’s birthday cakes
11. Stand for the national anthem 12. Expect others to stand for your national
anthem
12. Give flowers to express an emotion like sorrow or grief
13. Expect flowers in times of personal sorrow or grief 15. Wear particular colours or
items of clothing to bring about good luck
14. Perform certain actions before or during stressful events (like before a speech, or
during an exam) in order to manage your emotions
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